University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 3

Article 2

2015

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Unconstitutional Power Grab in
Arkansas Department of Human Services V. Shelby and the
Judiciary’s Authority in Child-Welfare Cases
Jerald A. Sharum

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jerald A. Sharum, The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Unconstitutional Power Grab in Arkansas Department
of Human Services V. Shelby and the Judiciary’s Authority in Child-Welfare Cases, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 391 (2015).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL
POWER GRAB IN ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES V.
SHELBY AND THE JUDICIARY’S AUTHORITY IN CHILD-WELFARE
CASES
Jerald A. Sharum*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Shelby, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a circuit court acting as a juvenile court had sufficient authority over the internal staffing operations of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“the Department”) to “fix” a problem identified
by a court that has the effect of coercing the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations1
in child-welfare proceedings (“Shelby-style order”).2 A bare majority of the
Court3 based this authority on the majority’s assertion of a broad jurisdiction
vested in circuit courts over juvenile matters that includes the specific powers granted to circuit courts by the Arkansas Juvenile Code as well as a circuit court’s common law jurisdiction over minors in equity and a circuit
* Adjunct Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law, and Attorney for the
Arkansas Department of Human Services.
1. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615,
at *3–5 (affirming a circuit court’s order to “rectify” a caseworker’s caseload based on the
circuit court’s “jurisdiction to protect minor[,] . . . assure that the necessary services are being
delivered[, and] . . . control and protect the integrity of the proceedings and the rights of the
litigants”).
2. Child-welfare proceedings are specialized cases prescribed under the Arkansas Juvenile Code that address the abuse, neglect, and dependency of juveniles that arise from the
acts or omissions of a given juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker, as well as
issues related to the state’s protective custody of minors in such circumstances. E.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-303(18)(A) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27306(a)(1)(B)–(C) (Supp. 2013). This article focuses on these proceedings, specifically those
where a juvenile has been removed from the custody of a parent and placed in an out-ofhome placement due to the acts or omissions of that parent. Practitioners in Arkansas and
elsewhere also commonly refer to child-welfare proceedings as dependency-neglect cases, in
part to differentiate such cases from delinquency and family-in-need-of-services cases, which
are other kinds of child-welfare proceedings that deal with the different elements of a child’s
welfare. Although this article does not address these other cases per se, the principles and
conclusions set out in this article likely apply similarly to those kinds of cases.
3. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Jim Hannah and joined by Justices Karen Baker, Jim Gunter, and Courtney Hudson Goodson. The dissent was written by
Justice Paul E. Danielson and joined by Justices Donald L. Corbin and Robert L. Brown. See
Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 1, 5, 2012 WL 401615, at *1, *5.
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court’s “inherent authority” to protect the integrity of its proceedings and
safeguard litigants appearing before it (“the Inherent Protection Power”).4
This article terms these broad assertions of authority—along with their underlying jurisdictional bases—the Shelby Doctrine.5
The Shelby Doctrine, however, is wrong. Arkansas courts do not have
the authority to enter Shelby-style orders or otherwise direct the internal
operations of any state executive agency, including the Department in childwelfare cases like Shelby, nor do any of Arkansas’s courts have the broad
jurisdiction and authority related to juveniles and all types of litigants that
the Shelby Doctrine suggests. More specifically, the Shelby Doctrine is
wrong because the authority asserted in Shelby exceeds the jurisdiction allowed to the judiciary by the Arkansas Constitution. First, the Shelby Doctrine violates Amendment 67 because it asserts that circuit courts have jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the General Assembly has not provided
by law and assumes authority outside the limited jurisdiction provided under
the juvenile code to courts in child-welfare proceedings.6 Second, the Shelby
Doctrine authorizes circuit courts to compel the Department to act in violation of the state’s sovereign immunity, which deprives Arkansas courts of
the jurisdiction to coerce a state agency like the Department to act.7
Moreover, the Shelby decision itself is a dangerous precedent that silently overturns dozens of prior Arkansas Supreme Court cases8 and gives
circuit courts across the state a license to direct any state agency to comply
with a given circuit court’s determination of what a given agency’s staffing,
internal operations, or services should be.9 In this way, the Shelby Doctrine
allows circuit courts to assume in a very practical way the nonjudicial role
of super-social worker in child-welfare proceedings without the training or
expertise of an actual social worker and without the training or expertise that
specialized agencies like the Department have in implementing public poli4. Id. at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5.
5. Although Shelby was not the first case in which a member of the Arkansas Supreme
Court voiced approval for the judiciary’s authority to manage the juvenile system to assure
the Department’s performance in a given case or in future cases, it is the first case where that
authority was specifically set out and sanctioned by a majority of the Arkansas Supreme
Court. See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 506–08, 237
S.W.3d 7, 14–15 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 411, 802 S.W.2d 461, 465 (1991) (Glaze, J., concurring). Although neither of these progenitors addressed the constitutional issues raised in this
article, the Shelby Doctrine must be interpreted through the lens of these prior cases—
particularly Chief Justice Hannah’s dissenting opinion in Briley—because they inform the
Shelby Doctrine’s analytical context.
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. See Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
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cies related to child welfare. Indeed, at least one circuit court has already
attempted to employ the broad authority announced in Shelby to manage the
Department’s human resources in counties directly.10 And if the authority
announced in Shelby is left unchecked, there is arguably no limit to the expansion of the judiciary’s authority into other areas.
Part II of this article begins the analysis to reach these conclusions by
setting out Shelby and the essential elements of the Shelby Doctrine. Part III
then compares the limits imposed on the judiciary’s authority by the Arkansas Constitution with the authority asserted in the Shelby Doctrine and argues that Shelby-style orders exceed those limits based on the impact of
Amendment 67 on the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings,
the Shelby Doctrine’s violation of the Department’s sovereign immunity,
and the judiciary’s lack of a constitutionally sufficient role in child-welfare
proceedings sufficient to allow a circuit court to enter a Shelby-style order.
Part IV then concludes that the judiciary will continue to assume unconstitutional roles unless the Arkansas Supreme Court repudiates the Shelby Doctrine.
II. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES V. SHELBY
The harbinger of the Shelby Doctrine, Arkansas Department of Human
Services v. Shelby, reached the Arkansas Supreme Court after the Department filed a petition for certiorari11 from a child-welfare proceeding in Jefferson County in which the circuit judge, the Honorable Earnest E. Brown,
had ordered the Department to “rectify” the high caseload of the Department’s caseworker assigned to the case.12 The Department alleged that the
10. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sliger, JV-2010-40 (Scott Co. Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012)
(ordering the Department to hire or assign a caseworker into the Department’s Division of
Children and Family Services in Scott County). Interestingly, the circuit judge in Sliger reconsidered his order upon considering some of the arguments raised in this article and modified the order to more closely track the order sanctioned in Shelby, to wit, “the Department
shall fix the staffing issues that gave rise to this Court’s finding of no reasonable efforts.”
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sliger, JV-2010-40 (Scott Co. Cir. Ct. May 22, 2012).
11. The Department originally filed its appeal with the Arkansas Court of Appeals under
several theories of appeal, including an appeal from an order designated as a final and appealable order under Rule 54(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal from a
mandatory injunction under Rule 2(a)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure – (en
dash)Civil, and as a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 6-1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the State of Arkansas. The Arkansas Supreme Court
asserted jurisdiction on November 15, 2011, because the appeal involved an extraordinary
writ. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 1 n.1, 2012 WL 401615, at *1. The case was formally submitted to the Arkansas Supreme Court on January 26, 2012, as a petition for a writ of certiorari,
and the court issued its opinion in Shelby on February 9, 2012. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *1.
12. Id. at 1–3, 2012 WL 401615, at *1–3 (quoting Transcript of Record, Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Shelby, JV-2010-1130 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2011)).
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circuit court did not have the jurisdiction to order the Department to change
the caseloads of its caseworkers and that such an order violated the Arkansas Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine.13
The basis for Judge Brown’s order was that even though the Department was statutorily required to prepare a case plan long before the permanency planning hearing in the case,14 the Department’s caseworker had testified that she was not able to prepare a case plan by the time of the permanency planning hearing because the caseworker had forty-one cases on her
caseload and was responsible for fifty juveniles in foster care.15 As Judge
Brown explained:
Forty-one cases are too much, so I’m going to do this. . . . Y’all either fix
it or the Court will call somebody to fix it. This lady’s got too many cases. She’s got too many tough cases to do that. Now, somebody’s going to
have to split out some of these cases and do it and I don’t get into that
micromanaging there, but based on what I was told by Cecile Bluch [sic]
in Little Rock what the average load is supposed to be in Pine Bluff. Forty-one cases, especially the types of cases she has, is [sic] too many and I
want that rectified within five business days of today’s court order. She’s
got too many cases, and I don’t want nobody [sic] else to get 41 either as
a result of it, but there’s some deficiency in the system if that particular
thing happens there.16
13. See id., at 1, 2012 WL 401615, at *1.
14. The juvenile code requires that the Department prepare a complete case plan within
thirty days from the date of the dependency-neglect adjudication hearing. ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-27-402(a)(4) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-28-111(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 2013). Adjudication hearings
and permanency planning hearings are each one of six main types of hearings that occur in
child-welfare proceedings in which a juvenile is placed in foster care or another out-of-home
placement due to the acts or omissions of a parent. See id. §§ 9-27-315 (Supp. 2013) (probable cause hearings), -327 (Supp. 2013) (adjudication hearings), -329 (Supp. 2013) (disposition hearings), -337 (Supp. 2013) (review hearings), -338 (Supp. 2013) (permanency planning hearing), -359 (Supp. 2013) (fifteen-month review hearings).
15. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–3, 2012 WL 401615, at *2–3. Judge Brown’s dissatisfaction is understandable given the importance of case plans as the roadmaps for many childwelfare proceedings and the stage of the Shelby case at the time of Judge Brown’s order.
Case plans are developed by the Department in consultation with all parties and attorneys in
the dependency-neglect cases and provide the benchmark for evaluating the progress of the
parents, guardians, and custodians at each stage of a dependency-neglect case. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-303(9), -338(c), -341(a), -359(b), -360(b), -361(a) (Repl. 2009 & Supp.
2013). The lack of a case plan in Shelby at the time of the permanency planning hearing was
also even more significant because permanency planning hearings are generally held a year
after a juvenile enters an out-of-home placement in order to finalize a permanency plan for
the juvenile, which may in turn call for the termination of a parent’s rights to the juvenile. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(a) (Supp. 2013).
16. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4 (quoting Transcript of Record, Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, JV-2010-1130 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct. July 13,
2011)).
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Judge Brown reflected this sentiment in his written order and directly
ordered the Department to rectify the specific issue of the caseworker’s
caseload: “That, the case worker testified that she has 41 cases on her caseload and fifty juveniles in foster care. That within five days, [the Department] shall rectify this issue.”17
A divided Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Judge Brown’s jurisdiction to order the Department to fix the caseworker’s caseload as necessary
and appropriate to address the Department’s failure to comply with the juvenile code.18 First, the majority held that a circuit court had the jurisdiction
over juveniles in equity that authorized such a court to “make all orders that
will properly safeguard the[] rights” of juveniles appearing before it, including orders to protect such juveniles and “assure that . . . necessary services
are being delivered.”19 Second, the majority concluded that a circuit court’s
“inherent authority” to protect the integrity of its proceedings and safeguard
litigants appearing before it allowed the circuit court to compel the Department to fulfill the Department’s obligations under the juvenile code and
“correct problems that were preventing work and services [from being performed by the Department].”20
The majority also held that the Juvenile code did not limit a circuit
court’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings because the juvenile code
was not a circuit court’s only source of jurisdiction over juveniles.21 Rather,
the majority reasoned, the jurisdiction over juveniles historically held by
courts of equity in Arkansas provided modern circuit courts with the necessary additional jurisdiction to act outside the juvenile code in issuing orders
to the Department.22
The majority further found that Judge Brown’s order did not violate
Arkansas’s separation-of-powers doctrine because Judge Brown did not
specify how the Department was to correct the “problem.” 23 Acknowledging
17. Id. at 3, 2012 WL 401615, at *3.
18. Id. at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. The framing of the majority and dissenting
opinions through a jurisdictional lens is not surprising because the legal issue presented for
appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court was that Judge Brown’s order (1) exceeded the circuit
court’s jurisdiction, and (2) violated the Arkansas Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine. Id. at 1, 2012 WL 401615, at *1. Moreover, the Department presented the appeal to the
Arkansas Supreme Court through a petition for a writ of certiorari, which is a writ for extraordinary relief largely focused on jurisdiction. E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Denmon, 2009 Ark. 485, at 7, 346 S.W.3d 283, 288 (providing that a writ of certiorari is
available only if “there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of
the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record”).
19. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
20. Id. at 4–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *4–5.
21. Id. at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
22. See id., 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
23. Id. at 5, 2012 WL 401615, at *5.
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that a circuit court “is generally without jurisdiction to judicially review the
discretionary functions of the executive branch of government,” the majority
concluded that Judge Brown did not impermissibly attempt to control any
discretionary functions of the Department because he had merely ordered
the Department to “fix” the staffing problems that kept the Department
“from fulfilling its obligations and duties” and did not give a specific description of how the Department was to correct the problems.24
In a rare three-justice dissent, Justice Danielson, joined by Justices
Corbin and Brown, argued that Judge Brown’s order violated the separationof-powers doctrine and set a “horrible precedent” that would allow any circuit court “to direct any state agency to comply with [the circuit court’s]
desire for how [the state agency] should operate.”25 Not only did the dissenting justices believe the majority’s claim that the “circuit court was not ordering [the Department] how it was to correct the problem” to be disingenuous given the facts in the case and the specificity of Judge Brown’s orders,
they also rejected the notion that a circuit court had any management authority over the Department at all.26 The dissent also observed that instead of
ordering the Department to correct its staffing problem, the circuit court
could have constitutionally used its contempt power to ensure that the Department had prepared the case plan; the dissent cautioned, however, that
even when a court enters an order through a recognized power such as a
circuit court’s contempt power, that court must be careful not to exceed its
jurisdictional limitations.27
But what the majority and dissenting opinions in Shelby did not say is
just as important as what the opinions did say—especially the majority opinion. First, neither opinion evaluated the impact of Amendment 67 to the
Arkansas Constitution on the jurisdiction of circuit courts in juvenile matters. Second, neither opinion articulated a fully formed analysis that evaluated the authority of the General Assembly to prescribe jurisdiction under
Amendment 67 or the authority of a circuit court to act outside of the juvenile code. Third, neither opinion evaluated whether the doctrine of sovereign
immunity prohibited the direct coercion of the Department that the circuit
court in Shelby employed by ordering the Department to rectify its staffing
problems, much less how the Department’s sovereign immunity could be
overcome by a circuit court’s purported jurisdiction in equity over juveniles
or a circuit court’s “inherent authority” to protect the integrity of the circuit
court’s proceedings and safeguard “litigants” appearing before the circuit
court.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *5.
Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 5–6, 2012 WL 401615, at *5–6.
Id. at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6.
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Part III of this article addresses these and other issues by evaluating the
Shelby Doctrine in light of Amendment 67 to the Arkansas Constitution and
the Department’s sovereign immunity against coercion by the judiciary. And
as described below, this article concludes that the Shelby Doctrine is unconstitutional under both principles.
III. THE SHELBY DOCTRINE VS. THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION
The Shelby Doctrine is wrong because it sanctions a vastly expanded
role of circuit courts in child-welfare proceedings based entirely on jurisdictional foundations that violate the Arkansas Constitution. First, the Shelby
Doctrine violates Amendment 67 because it asserts that circuit courts have
jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the General Assembly has not provided by law. Second, the Shelby Doctrine violates the sovereign immunity
of the State of Arkansas by authorizing circuit courts to compel the Department to act without the application of an appropriate exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity.
Part III.A of this article introduces Amendment 67 and explains the
impact that Amendment 67 has had on the role and authority of the General
Assembly to define the child-welfare system and prescribe the jurisdictional
role that the judiciary plays in that system under Amendment 67. Part III.B
then applies the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the Shelby Doctrine and
evaluates whether Shelby-style orders fall within any recognized exceptions
to the Department’s sovereign immunity. Part III.B also specifically evaluates whether the Inherent Protection Power asserted by the Shelby Doctrine
should constitute a new sovereign immunity exception and whether the judiciary’s role in child-welfare proceedings provides sufficient support for interpreting the Inherent Protection Power as a new sovereign immunity exception.
A.

Amendment 67 and the Apotheosis of the General Assembly in ChildWelfare Proceedings

Amendment 67 was enacted during one of the most tumultuous times
in the history of Arkansas’s child-welfare system and was part of the General Assembly’s plan to change the constitutional and statutory framework
that governed child-welfare proceedings. It represented the second of three
major steps taken by the General Assembly to address serious issues in the
child-welfare system in place at the time and was the vehicle through which
the modern juvenile code was adopted.
This article argues that Amendment 67 should be further interpreted as
controlling the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings because
Amendment 67 impacts the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceed-
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ings and limits the judiciary’s jurisdiction to only the jurisdiction allowed
under Amendment 67—a limitation that in practical terms circumscribes the
judiciary’s jurisdiction to only that jurisdiction provided through the juvenile code. In these ways, Amendment 67 allows the General Assembly to
define the child-welfare system as the General Assembly sees fit—even if
that definition conflicts with how the judiciary would want the system to
operate and even if the judiciary does not have the authority it would want
to have over the Department’s implementation and performance in the childwelfare system.
Arkansas courts and legal commentators, however, have provided only
limited treatment of Amendment 67’s import to the judiciary’s jurisdiction
in child-welfare proceedings and have never expressly concluded that
Amendment 67 operates to limit affirmatively the jurisdiction of the judiciary. This article therefore now turns to first set out Amendment 67, the circumstances in which Amendment 67 was adopted, and the proper interpretation that should be given to Amendment 67’s text.
1.

Arkansas’s Child-Welfare Menagerie and the Adoption of
Amendment 67 and the Juvenile Code of 1989

Amendment 67 was adopted in 1988, became effective in 1989, and
was part of the most significant shift in Arkansas’s child-welfare system
since the system was first created in 1907.28 In relevant part, Amendment 67
provides the following:
The General Assembly shall define jurisdiction of matters relating to juveniles . . . and may confer such jurisdiction upon chancery, circuit or
probate courts, or upon separate divisions of such courts, or may establish separate juvenile courts upon which such jurisdiction may be conferred, and shall transfer to such courts the jurisdiction over juvenile
28. The child-welfare system began with the adoption of Act 237 in 1907, an act that
broadly empowered county courts to take custody of at-risk juveniles between the ages of
three and fifteen and make placements to institutions and private foster care. Act of Apr. 30,
1907, No. 237, 1907 Ark. Acts 555. The General Assembly almost immediately began to
expand and modify the child-welfare system into an increasingly more complex and robust
system, beginning with the adoption of the first formal juvenile code, the Juvenile Code of
1911, and the establishment of the first “juvenile court.” Act of Apr. 15, 1911, No. 215, 1911
Ark. Acts 166 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Repl. 2009 &
Supp. 2013)). The 1911 Juvenile Code was amended at least thirteen times from 1911 to
1975, ultimately leading up to the adoption of the 1975 Juvenile Code, which substantially
revised the child-welfare system to formally provide, among other things, state custody of
dependent-neglected juveniles and emergency custody. Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975, No.
451, §§ 33, 38, 1975 Ark. Acts 1179, 1193, 1196 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 45-401 to 454 (Repl. 1977 & Supp. 1985)). The 1975 Juvenile Code was the juvenile code in effect at
the time of the adoption of Amendment 67. 1975 Ark. Acts 1200, at § 51.
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matters now vested in county courts by Section 28 of Article 7 of this
Constitution.29

Amendment 67 therefore expressly contemplates three main components. First, Amendment 67 grants the General Assembly the power to define the jurisdiction of juvenile matters. Second, Amendment 67 allows the
General Assembly to confer the jurisdiction that it defines upon one or more
courts, specifically, the chancery, circuit, or probate courts, or upon a court
that the General Assembly establishes to act as a juvenile court. Third,
Amendment 67 provides that if the General Assembly grants jurisdiction to
a court, the General Assembly is required to transfer the jurisdiction over
juveniles held by county courts on January 1, 1989, the time Amendment 67
became effective.30
Amendment 67 was adopted two years after the Arkansas Supreme
Court had held in its landmark Walker v. Arkansas Department of Human
Services decision that the General Assembly had only limited authority to
define the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare and that the child-welfare
system that the General Assembly had created was unconstitutional.31 Specifically, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the county courts designated
by the General Assembly to hear child-welfare proceedings as “juvenile
courts” in the then-existing juvenile code were unconstitutional because the
General Assembly lacked the constitutional authority to vest county courts
with the jurisdiction to hear child-welfare proceedings due to the Arkansas
Constitution’s express allocation of jurisdiction among Arkansas’s trial
courts.32
Prior to Amendment 67, the General Assembly lacked the authority to
define the child-welfare system and prescribe the judiciary’s involvement in
that system. And although the Arkansas Supreme Court observed that the
General Assembly could address the issue of jurisdiction over child-welfare
proceedings—and indeed expressly left the issue unresolved for the General
29. ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (emphasis added).
30. H.R.J. Res. 1001 § 2, 76th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1987) (providing that
Amendment 67 would become effective on January 1, 1989). Voters approved Amendment
67 in the 1988 general election. See Ark. Sec. of State, Historical Initiatives & Referenda
Election Results, http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/elections/Documents/Revised%20Initiatives%
20and%20Amendments%201938-2014.pdf (last visited May 30, 2015).
31. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 47–52, 722 S.W.2d 558, 560–
62 (1987). The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Walker was consequential not only
because it held that the child-welfare system in place at the time was unconstitutional, but
also because it expressly abrogated the Arkansas Supreme Court’s nearly seventy-year old
initial determination in Ex Parte King that the General Assembly had constitutionally vested
county courts with jurisdiction over child-welfare proceedings. See id. at 47–48, 722 S.W.2d
at 560, abrogating Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919); DIANE D. BLAIR &
JAY BARTH, ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 225, 227 (2d ed. 2005).
32. Walker, 291 Ark. at 47–52, 722 S.W.2d at 560–62.
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Assembly to address33—the undeniable message from the Walker decision
was that the General Assembly was not free to define jurisdiction over
child-welfare proceedings because of the limitations that the state constitution of the day imposed on the General Assembly’s authority.34
Even prior to Walker, the allocation of jurisdiction in matters related to
juveniles among Arkansas’s trial courts created numerous problems for the
child-welfare system and its effectiveness was the frequent object of criticism by judges and commentators for years prior to the adoption of
Amendment 67. Indeed, the concurrent and conflicting jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts related to juveniles prior to the adoption of Amendment 67 35
33. Id. at 51, 722 S.W.2d at 562 (citing Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 279 Ark. 340, 651
S.W.2d 90 (1983)). The Walker court’s deference to the legislature in developing a constitutional child-welfare system for the Arkansas Supreme Court to then review is not surprising
given the court’s citation of Dupree v. Alma School District, which was the first in a line of
Arkansas Supreme Court decisions that held that the state’s public education system was
unconstitutional under the Arkansas Constitution. Jerald A. Sharum, Arkansas’s Tradition of
Popular Constitutional Activism and the Ascendancy of the Arkansas Supreme Court, 32 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33, 86–94 (2009). Dupree was unique in that line of cases—which
increasingly recognized the role of the judiciary in state systems and policies—because it
announced and employed a narrow judicial role in reviewing state systems and policies much
in the same way that the Walker court followed a narrow role in evaluating the constitutionality of the child-welfare system and then leaving it to the legislature to create a constitutionally sufficient system. See id.; Dupree, 279 Ark. at 49–50, 651 S.W.2d at 95.
34. Walker, 291 Ark. at 51, 722 S.W.2d at 562.
35. During this time, county court held jurisdiction as “juvenile courts” over statutory
proceedings involving juveniles who had been abused, neglected, or otherwise left without a
legal caregiver. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 15, 1911, No. 215, § 1, 1911 Ark. Acts 166, 167–69;
Ark. Juvenile Code of 1975, No. 451, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 1179, 1181 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-401 to -454 (Repl. 1977 & Supp. 1985)). Arkansas’s other trial courts, however,
had sufficient overlapping jurisdictions to allow those courts to substantially impact childwelfare proceedings even when those proceedings were ongoing and even as to the same
issues that child-welfare proceedings involved. Chancery courts, for example, held equitable
jurisdiction over juveniles that allowed chancery courts to “make all orders that will properly
safeguard [the rights of juveniles].” See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 105–06, 680
S.W.2d 118, 120 (1984) (citing Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 617 S.W.2d 857
(1981); Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 2 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583,
12 S.W.2d 879 (1928); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919); State v. Grisby,
38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481 (1882)) (rejecting the exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile courts
over juveniles and reaffirming the long-standing jurisdiction of chancery courts over juveniles as separately sufficient from the special subject-matter jurisdiction afforded juvenile
courts to justify the actions of the chancery court in changing custody of the juvenile in the
case). Likewise, probate courts held jurisdiction related to juveniles that included jurisdiction
over adoptions and guardianships of the persons and estates of juveniles. See, e.g., Robins,
273 Ark. at 244–45, 617 S.W.2d at 858–59 (citing Lee v. Grubbs, 269 Ark. 205, 599 S.W.2d
715 (1980); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Scott v. Brown, 160 Ark.
489, 254 S.W. 1074 (1923); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 465). Finally, circuit courts held jurisdiction over juveniles in civil and criminal proceedings. See, e.g., id. at
245, 617 S.W.2d at 858–59.
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created a well-recognized and “horrendous problem” whereby any juvenile
in Arkansas could be “placed in the custody of a divorced parent by the
chancery court, placed in the custody of a social services agency by the
[county] juvenile court, and subjected to the guardianship of his person by
the probate court—all at the same time!”36
Likewise, Arkansas’s child-welfare system prior to Amendment 67 was
cited multiple times for failing to meet the legal requirements imposed by
increasingly complex federal and state statutory schemes to implement expanding policies and mandates to protect children—in part because of how
many different courts needed to know about and apply the requirements in
order for the legal requirements to be properly implemented. Throughout the
1980s, for example, numerous Arkansas courts failed to review properly or
meaningfully certain types of child-welfare proceedings involving foster
care.37 This failure was primarily because the various courts that dealt with
such cases, including juvenile and probate courts, were not dedicated to such
child-welfare cases and simply did not know about the federal law that prescribed the review required.38 In addition, the child-welfare agency in existence at the time, the Social Services Division, failed to communicate the
requirements to the various courts that did need to know.39
Following Walker, however, the General Assembly and other entities
began to take action to fill the void that Walker left. The General Assembly
first enacted Act 14 of 1987 in order to create a temporary statutory fix given the jurisdictional options available after Walker.40 Specifically, Act 14
36. Dyer v. Ross-Lawhon, 288 Ark. 327, 331, 704 S.W.2d 629, 631–32 (1986) (Newbern, J., concurring); Jarmon v. Brown, 286 Ark. 455, 457–58, 692 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1985)
(Newbern, J., concurring) (noting the “horrendous problem of concurrent and conflicting
jurisdiction with respect to cases pertaining to juveniles existing in our juvenile, county, and
chancery courts”). Although Walker represented the first decision that invalidated the jurisdictional authority of county courts to hear juvenile matters, various members of the majority
in Walker had previously announced their dissatisfaction with the juvenile system in other
cases. Justice Steele Hays joined Newbern’s concurrence in Jarmon, and both Justice Hays
and Chief Justice Jack Holt joined Justice David Newbern in his concurrence in Dyer. Chief
Justice Holt would later write the majority opinion in Walker and be joined by Justices Newbern and Hays in that opinion.
37. See generally Tom Glaze, Foster Care Reform: A Model for the Nation, 20 ARK.
LAW. 1, 27–34 (1986), available at www.issuu.com/arkansas_bar_association/docs/January1986 (observing problems in the child-welfare system related to the failure to apply the law
governing the review of foster care cases by the various courts in Arkansas that interacted
with such cases).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Act of Feb. 6, 1987, No. 14, §§ 1, 15, 1987 Ark. Acts 24, 24–25, 36; Walker v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 47–52, 722 S.W.2d 558, 560–62 (1987); KAY C.
GOSS, THE ARKANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION 239 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Oxford University Press
2011) (1993). The General Assembly signed Act 14 into law seventeen days after Walker was
decided; not surprisingly, the General Assembly declared that the Walker decision created an
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vested jurisdiction over child-welfare proceedings formerly held by county
courts into a juvenile division of the circuit courts with respect to juvenile
delinquency and into a juvenile division of the probate courts with respect to
“juveniles in need of supervision” and dependent-neglected juveniles.41
Following the adoption of Amendment 67 in January of 1989, the General Assembly enacted a revised juvenile code to govern child-welfare proceedings, the Juvenile Code of 1989.42 The 1989 Juvenile Code implemented many of the features of the 1975 Juvenile Code and Act 14 of 1987, but
vested jurisdiction over the child-welfare proceedings governed by the 1989
Juvenile Code with the Juvenile Division of Chancery Court,43 which the
General Assembly created by Act 294 of 1989.44 Under the 1989 Juvenile
Code, the Juvenile Division of Chancery Court held “exclusive original jurisdiction of and [was] the sole court for . . . proceedings governed by [the
1989 Juvenile Code],” including proceedings involving dependency-neglect;
families-in-need-of-services; paternity, custody, visitation, and support involving illegitimate juveniles; termination of parent rights; as well as adoptions and guardianships arising during such proceedings.45 Act 294 further
announced that the General Assembly specifically intended
to transfer and vest all powers, functions, and duties now vested by law
in the juvenile divisions of the circuit and probate courts [pursuant to Act
14] to juvenile divisions of the chancery courts of this state, with each
division to be assigned the jurisdiction over juvenile matters as provided
in [Act 294].46

This jurisdiction included dependency-neglect, families in need of services,
delinquency, bastardy, termination of parental rights, and such other juvenile matters as may be provided by law.47
The 1989 Juvenile Code has remained in effect since its adoption,
though it has undergone revisions as to the court designated to hear childwelfare proceedings, the jurisdiction of such courts, and the authority of
emergency requiring immediate action to ensure the “orderly and efficient administration of
the juvenile justice system.” 1987 Ark. Acts 24–25, 36.
41. 1987 Ark. Acts 25 at §§ 2–3. Interestingly, Act 14’s allocation of jurisdiction between circuit courts and probate courts left chancery courts as the only trial court without
jurisdiction over the child-welfare proceedings governed by the juvenile code. See id.
42. Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, No. 273, 1989 Ark. Acts 486 (codified as amended
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013)).
43. 1989 Ark. Acts 492 at secs. 3(8), 5(a) (providing that all proceedings prescribed
under the juvenile code were to be heard before the Juvenile Division of Chancery Court).
44. Act of Mar. 2, 1989, No. 294, 1989 Ark. Acts 611 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§
16-13-601 to -608 (Repl. 1999)).
45. 1989 Ark. Acts 499 at § 5(a)–(b).
46. 1989 Ark. Acts 612 at §§ 1(4), 2(b).
47. Id., No. 294, §§ 1(4), 2(b).
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such courts to order the Department to take certain actions. Currently, the
juvenile code provides that circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
child-welfare proceedings governed by the juvenile code,48 which specifically authorizes, among other things, a circuit court to order the Department to
provide “family services,” take custody of juveniles in certain circumstances, and perform other functions in child-welfare proceedings.49 The import
of the juvenile code’s jurisdictional framework is described throughout the
remainder of this article.
2.

Amendment 67 and the Authority of the General Assembly over
Child-Welfare Proceedings

Amendment 67 provides that the General Assembly defines the judiciary’s jurisdiction over juveniles.50 What is not clear is how Amendment 67
and the General Assembly’s authority to define jurisdiction of child-welfare
matters impacts the Shelby Doctrine and the jurisdiction in equity asserted
by the Shelby Doctrine over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings that
courts of equity in Arkansas have traditionally held over juveniles.51 This
article argues that Amendment 67’s allocation of power to the General Assembly to define jurisdiction over juveniles should be interpreted to have
broad application to the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings
and the viability of the Shelby Doctrine. More specifically, this article argues that Amendment 67’s grant of exclusive authority to the General Assembly to define juvenile jurisdiction, along with the General Assembly’s
use of that authority through the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, effective48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a) (Supp. 2013).
49. Id. §§ 9-27-303(25), 9-27-329 to -335 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (providing the
dispositions that circuit courts are authorized to order in delinquency, family-in-need-ofservices, and dependency-neglect proceedings).
50. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67; Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 766, 894 S.W.2d 888,
889 (1995) (“The juvenile court’s jurisdiction derives from Amendment 67 to the Constitution of Arkansas.”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 407, 802 S.W.2d
461, 463 (1991) (“Following the passage of Amendment 67 to the Arkansas Constitution, the
77th General Assembly in Act 294 of 1989 defined jurisdiction of matters relating to juveniles and conferred such jurisdiction upon a newly created juvenile division of chancery
court.”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 352, 33 S.W.3d 514, 517
(2000) (“Following the passage of Amendment 67, the legislature defined jurisdiction of
matters relating to juveniles and bestowed such jurisdiction upon newly created divisions of
chancery court.”); see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.
51. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615,
at *3–4 (rejecting the position that the juvenile code provides a circuit court its only source of
jurisdiction over juveniles). Although the majority in Shelby did not expressly state that equitable jurisdiction was the only jurisdiction that a circuit court held over juveniles that was not
provided by the juvenile code, the majority did not indicate that there were any other jurisdictional bases upon which a circuit court could rely. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
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ly rebooted the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings to include only such jurisdiction and authority as the General Assembly provided
by law in the juvenile code. Amendment 67, however, has never been expressly interpreted as having such a broad effect by any court in Arkansas52
or by any previous commentator.53 Nevertheless, Amendment 67 should be
affirmatively interpreted as rebooting juvenile jurisdiction and extinguishing
all judicial jurisdiction over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings because
this effect is required by the unambiguous plain text of Amendment 67.
Such an interpretation also flows naturally from a reasonable interpretation
of Amendment 67 based on standard principles of constitutional interpretation.
a.

The plain text of Amendment 67 reboots the jurisdiction of
Arkansas courts in juvenile matters

Amendment 67’s plain text supports the interpretation that Amendment
67 rebooted juvenile jurisdiction and extinguished all prior judicial jurisdiction over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings because Amendment 67
expressly gives the General Assembly the exclusive power to change the
judiciary’s jurisdiction in all juvenile matters. First, Amendment 67 provides
the General Assembly with sole constitutional authority to define jurisdiction over juvenile matters. Second, Amendment 67 does not place any
meaningful limitation on the General Assembly’s power to circumscribe
juvenile jurisdiction as to only legal versus equitable jurisdiction. Third,
Amendment 67 does not place any limitation at all on the scope of the juvenile jurisdiction subject to the General Assembly’s power.
The General Assembly has the sole constitutional authority to define
jurisdiction over juvenile matters because that is exactly what Amendment
67 says: “[t]he General Assembly shall define jurisdiction of matters relating to juveniles.”54 This grant of power is significant because it designates
only the General Assembly as the branch of government with the power to
set jurisdiction related to juvenile matters and allows for the conclusion that
all juvenile jurisdiction shall be defined by the General Assembly. Simply
put, if the General Assembly does not provide jurisdiction, the judiciary
52. At the time of this writing, there have only been five appellate decisions that have
even mentioned Amendment 67. See Rosario, 319 Ark. 764, 894 S.W.2d 888; Clark, 304
Ark. 403, 802 S.W.2d 461; White v. Winston, 302 Ark. 345, 789 S.W.2d 459 (1990); Hutton
v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W.2d 394 (1989); Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 22 S.W.3d 514.
That said, even the limited treatment that these cases provided on the import of Amendment
67 supports this article’s interpretation. See infra notes 54, 92–95 and accompanying text.
53. At the time of this writing, none of Arkansas’s scholarly journals have published an
article focused on Amendment 67 or its implications.
54. ARK. CONST. amend. 67.
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does not have it as a matter of constitutional law. In this way, the judiciary
does not have any jurisdiction over juvenile matters—including in childwelfare proceedings and equitable jurisdiction that Arkansas courts previously held over juveniles—unless the General Assembly first provides the
jurisdiction by law.
Similarly, the judiciary lacks the authority to assert jurisdiction over
juveniles beyond what the General Assembly provides because such an assertion would mean that the judiciary would be defining juvenile jurisdiction
in contravention to the express allocation of that authority to the General
Assembly by Amendment 67.55 To construe Amendment 67 to allow the
judiciary to make such an assertion would improperly add language to
Amendment 67 and expand the amendment’s clear assignment of that authority beyond the General Assembly in violation of Arkansas’s strong separation-of-powers doctrine.56
Further, Amendment 67 does not place any meaningful limitation on
the General Assembly’s power to circumscribe juvenile jurisdiction because
the express terms of the amendment do not limit the General Assembly’s
power to add or to remove from the judiciary’s jurisdiction so long as the
court to which the General Assembly grants juvenile jurisdiction retains the
juvenile jurisdiction held by county courts at the time Amendment 67 was
adopted.57 Moreover, even this requirement lacks real significance because
county courts did not even possess jurisdiction over child-welfare matters at
the time Amendment 67 was adopted and have never possessed jurisdiction
in equity.58 In addition, the General Assembly does not even appear to be
55. Cf. ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2 (prohibiting any branch of government from exercising any power belonging to another branch of government unless expressly allowed to do
so by the Arkansas Constitution).
56. See id.; T.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 655–56, 210 S.W.3d 79, 82–
83 (2005) (providing that a court lacks the authority to compel an executive or legislative
body to act if the duty to act is discretionary); Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 550, 898
S.W.2d 43, 45–46 (1995) (same); State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 426, 426, 3 S.W. 352, 360
(1887); Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570, 589–96, 1839 WL 103, at *8–13 (1839); see generally L. Scott Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Distinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279 (1984).
57. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67. The state of county jurisdiction at the time Amendment
67 was adopted is controlling because Amendment 67 only requires that the General Assembly transfer jurisdiction “now vested in county courts.” Id. (emphasis added). Consequently,
subsequent changes to county court jurisdiction are of no moment to the operation of
Amendment 67, as are any changes to county court jurisdiction that may have occurred prior
to Walker because Walker was the last event that addressed the issue of county court jurisdiction prior to the adoption of Amendment 67.
58. See Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 51, 722 S.W.2d 558, 562
(1987) (holding that county courts do not have jurisdiction over juvenile matters), overruling
Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919) (holding that county courts did have
jurisdiction over juvenile matters). County court jurisdiction dates back to the Constitution of
1874, which vested jurisdiction over bastardy, the “apprenticeship of minors,” and other
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required to transfer such jurisdiction to a court under Amendment 67 and
could instead confer all jurisdiction over juvenile matters to a purely administrative system.59 This possibility arises from the plain text of Amendment
matters related to the internal improvement and local concerns of the county in which the
given county court sat, as well as jurisdiction related to certain probate matters. ARK. CONST.
art. 7, §§ 1, 28–31, 33–34, 36–37; id. sched. § 23; King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 467–69
(interpreting section 28 of article 7 to the Arkansas Constitution as providing a list of jurisdictional issues related to the local concerns of a specific county in which the given county
court sits), overruled on other grounds, Walker, 291 Ark. at 47, 722 S.W.2d at 560; GOSS,
supra note 40, at 71, 80–83. The 1874 Constitution, however, did not vest any equitable
jurisdiction in county courts because that jurisdiction was placed with circuit courts and then
with chancery courts. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 15 (granting to circuit courts equitable jurisdiction until such time that the General Assembly establishes courts of chancery). Nor was the
jurisdiction of county courts ever expanded beyond its original designation. In fact, county
court jurisdiction became more limited following the 1938 adoption of Amendment 24,
which removed all probate jurisdiction from county courts and consolidated that jurisdiction
with chancery court jurisdiction over equity. ARK. CONST. amend. 24; GOSS, supra note 40, at
172–73. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Walker, which held that county courts
hold no jurisdiction over juvenile matters, also limited the jurisdiction of county courts.
Walker, 291 Ark. at 45–51, 722 S.W.2d at 559–62 (finding that county courts do not have
jurisdiction over child-welfare matters because juvenile matters are not matters of local concern, but still implicitly upholding the interpretation of section 28 of article 7 in King that
county courts have jurisdiction over local concerns). Although the Arkansas Supreme Court
in Walker broadly stated that county courts held no jurisdiction over “juvenile matters” or
“jurisdiction over minors,” it seems clear that what the court really meant was that county
courts did not hold jurisdiction over juveniles other than the specific designations of jurisdiction over bastardy and juvenile apprenticeship afforded to county courts under the Arkansas
Constitution, which were not modified until at least Amendment 67. See ARK. CONST. art. 7,
§ 28. This view is consistent with the specific issue presented on appeal to the court in Walker as to whether county courts have jurisdiction over juvenile matters governed by the 1975
Juvenile Code, as well as the court’s holding that courts do not have the jurisdiction because
the jurisdiction does not fall within county court’s jurisdiction over matters of local county
concern. See Walker, 291 Ark. at 49–50, 722 S.W.2d at 561–62. Thus, the only jurisdiction
that county courts appear to have retained following Walker was jurisdiction related to juvenile bastardy and the “apprenticeship of minors,” each as originally provided under the 1874
Constitution. This view is also consistent with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s cases holding
that county courts have jurisdiction over matters related to bastardy, none of which were
overruled or otherwise abrogated by the court in Walker. See, e.g., Pucket v. Pucket, 289 Ark.
67, 67–68, 709 S.W.2d 82, 82–83 (1986) (holding that a chancery court erred in asserting
jurisdiction over a paternity issue by reaffirming that county courts have original jurisdiction
in all matters relating to bastardy, not just bastardy proceedings themselves); Stain v. Stain,
286 Ark. 140, 142–43, 689 S.W.2d 566, 567 (1985) (same). In any event, at the time
Amendment 67 was adopted, it seems clear that county court jurisdiction was limited to the
jurisdiction over bastardy, paternity, and juvenile apprenticeship that it was originally provided under the 1874 Constitution. See BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 31, at 233.
59. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (providing that the General Assembly “may” transfer
juvenile jurisdiction to a court). Whether such a grant of authority to address child-welfare
issues would be constitutionally permissible, however, is unclear because such an analysis
would depend on the administrative system being used and whether, among other things, the
administrative system impermissibly intrudes upon the judiciary’s power of deciding cases.
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67, which gives the General Assembly the power to define jurisdiction, but
does not require the General Assembly to grant that jurisdiction to a court.60
The transfer requirement itself could also be illusory because the judiciary
may not compel the General Assembly to make that transfer given the Arkansas Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the separation of powers and discretionary actions of the executive and legislative branches.61
Amendment 67 also does not place any limitation at all on the scope of
juvenile jurisdiction subject to the General Assembly’s power because
Amendment 67 uses the term “jurisdiction” without limitation or qualification.62 Indeed, the text of the amendment suggests that the scope of jurisdicSee ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (prohibiting any branch of state government from exercising any
power belonging to either of the other branches unless expressly directed or permitted by the
terms of the Arkansas Constitution). The Arkansas Supreme Court has also suggested that a
child-welfare system based even on part-executive, part-judicial courts would be insufficient
to properly address constitutional issues or provide sufficient “judicial safeguards.” Walker,
291 Ark. at 51, 722 S.W.2d at 562. A full analysis of an agency-based child-welfare system,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
60. ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (providing that the General Assembly “shall” define jurisdiction over juvenile matters but merely “may” confer such jurisdiction on a chancery, circuit, probate, or juvenile court (emphasis added)). Under this interpretation, the transfer of
county court jurisdiction required by the Amendment is only triggered if the General Assembly confers some jurisdiction to a court. Id. (conditioning the General Assembly’s required
transfer of jurisdiction upon the discretionary conferral of jurisdiction on “such” courts as the
General Assembly designates). Admittedly, such an interpretation is not the only possible
interpretation. An equally valid interpretation could be that the permissive “may” simply
means that the General Assembly shall confer juvenile jurisdiction on either existing chancery, circuit, or probate courts, or on such juvenile courts as the General Assembly may establish. This interpretation is supported by the amendment’s language indicating that the
juvenile jurisdiction defined by the General Assembly should be transferred in its entirety to
courts designated by the General Assembly and the mandatory “shall” used by the amendment to require that the General Assembly transfer existing county court jurisdiction over
juvenile matters to the courts designated by the General Assembly to receive juvenile jurisdiction.
61. See, e.g., T.J., 362 Ark. at 655–56, 210 S.W.3d at 82–83; Saunders, 320 Ark. at 550,
898 S.W.2d at 45–46; Churchill, 48 Ark. at 426, 3 S.W. at 360; Hawkins, 1 Ark. 570, 1839
WL 103, *8–13. This possibility arises because the transfer of jurisdiction authorized under
Amendment 67 was not automatically operative but rather tied to the General Assembly’s
own action of transferring the jurisdiction as part of the General Assembly’s definition of
jurisdiction. As the General Assembly’s act of legislating is inherently discretionary, it is
unclear whether the judiciary could force the General Assembly to effect the transfer or even
whether the judiciary would simply find that such jurisdiction was transferred by operation of
law and not requiring the General Assembly to actually transfer the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (requiring the General Assembly to transfer jurisdiction but implicitly providing that the transfer be by way of legislation); Saunders, 320 Ark. at 550, 898
S.W.2d at 45–46 (observing that a court only has the authority to compel the exercise an
executive officer his or her discretion to decide affirmatively to act or not to act when dealing
with an issue where the officer has the discretion to act or not act).
62. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67.
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tion subject to the General Assembly’s power is limited only by the requirement that the General Assembly transfer any jurisdiction held by county courts at the time Amendment 67 was adopted. Amendment 67’s designation of “jurisdiction” should therefore be given its plain-text meaning and
include all jurisdiction over juvenile matters at law and in equity—including
the jurisdiction over juveniles in equity asserted by the Shelby Doctrine.
The plain-text interpretation of Amendment 67 just described is controlling and requires that a court interpret Amendment 67 just as it reads
because the text is not ambiguous and a plain-text interpretation would not
produce absurd results.63 First, Amendment 67’s text is not ambiguous because the sole grant of power to define juvenile jurisdiction to the General
Assembly, the lack of limitations on that power, and the lack of limitations
on the jurisdiction subject to the General Assembly’s power are not open to
multiple reasonable interpretations.64 To the contrary, the General Assembly
is the only entity given the authority to set jurisdiction “relat[ed] to juveniles” with no bounds of law or equity related to the General Assembly’s
use of that power or the scope of the jurisdiction subject to that power.65
There is no mention of the judiciary’s role in establishing juvenile jurisdiction and no mention of any reservations of jurisdiction to the judiciary other
than the jurisdiction that the General Assembly establishes pursuant to
Amendment 67. Moreover, confusion and ambiguity only arise if one tries
to interpret Amendment 67 in order to reach the strained conclusion that the
General Assembly cannot in fact limit the involvement and authority of the
judiciary in juvenile matters even though the General Assembly is the only
branch authorized by Amendment 67 to define the judiciary’s jurisdiction.
Second, a literal interpretation of Amendment 67 does not produce absurd results because such an interpretation presents a reasonable approach to
developing a comprehensive, consistent, and effective child-welfare system.
For example, a literal interpretation places the responsibility and authority
for achieving the state’s policy objectives for juvenile matters in the General
Assembly, which the Arkansas Supreme Court itself recognized is “the body

63. See, e.g., Curry v. Pope Co. Equalization Bd., 2011 Ark. 408, at 6, 10, 385 S.W.3d
130, 134, 136 (“Language of a constitutional provision that is plain and unambiguous must
be given its obvious and common meaning.”); Ludwig v. Bella Casa, LLC, 2010 Ark. 435, at
5, 372 S.W.3d 792, 796 (observing that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of
a law is to construe the law “just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language”); Brewer v. Fergus, 348 Ark. 577, 583, 79 S.W.3d
831, 834 (2002) (“Where the meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous, we do not
resort to the rules of statutory, or in this case, constitutional interpretation.”).
64. See, e.g., Wickham v. State, 2009 Ark. 357, at 5–6, 324 S.W.3d 344, 347 (providing
that a law may be interpreted when it is “open to two or more constructions” or when its
meaning is such that “reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning”).
65. ARK. CONST. amend. 67.
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equipped and designed to perform that function.”66 Such an interpretation
also gives the General Assembly the power to prescribe the appropriate involvement of the judiciary in all juvenile matters by way of setting the judiciary’s jurisdiction and addresses the problems that Amendment 67 was
arguably designed to address, including those related to competing jurisdictions between multiple state courts and competing branches of government
that characterized and undermined the juvenile system prior to the adoption
of Amendment 67. A literal interpretation is also consistent with the General
Assembly’s existing power to control state agencies tasked with child welfare and set the responsibilities of those agencies in the child-welfare system. Moreover, the decision of Amendment 67’s framers to give the General
Assembly the only authority to define juvenile jurisdiction need not be the
best (or even a good) way to design the juvenile system’s jurisdictional
framework or the way the judiciary would have provided for juvenile jurisdiction or the judiciary’s role in the child-welfare system; it is sufficient that
the decision is unambiguous and does not produce absurd results.67
b.

A reasonable interpretation of Amendment 67 reboots the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts in juvenile matters

Even if a plain-text interpretation of Amendment 67 would be so unclear as to require that the amendment be interpreted beyond the plain meaning of the text,68 a reasonable interpretation of Amendment 67 yields the
same results based on established principles of constitutional interpretation,
the circumstances in which Amendment 67 was adopted, the problems that
the amendment was designed to fix, and the development of constitutional
and statutory law since Amendment 67 was adopted. First, the choice of
Amendment 67’s framers to grant the power only to the General Assembly—with no mention or inclusion of the judiciary—indicates Amendment
66. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 51, 722 S.W.2d 558, 562
(1987) (citing Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983)) (“We leave
the matter of achieving a constitutional system to the legislature, the body equipped and
designed to perform that function.”).
67. As the Arkansas Supreme Court observed six years before the adoption of Amendment 67, “where the meaning of a[] . . . constitutional amendment is clear and unambiguous,
this Court is primarily concerned with what the document says, rather than what its drafters
may have intended . . . and we have no authority to construe the amendment to mean anything other than what it says.” Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 280 Ark. 106, 109–10, 655
S.W.2d 426, 428–29 (1983).
68. Although most of the cases cited in this sub-section refer to the interpretation of
statutes, their analysis is equally applicable to interpreting constitutional amendments like
Amendment 67 because the “rules of statutory construction apply to [the] interpretation of
constitutional amendments.” Brewer, 348 Ark. at 583, 79 S.W.3d at 834. Therefore, no further attempt will be made to differentiate statutory interpretation from constitutional interpretation other than to accurately reflect what a given case says.
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67 should be interpreted to prohibit the judiciary from defining jurisdiction
in juvenile matters by asserting jurisdiction not provided by the General
Assembly. Under the maxim of statutory interpretation known as expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the express designation of the General Assembly
may be properly construed to exclude the judiciary from having the power
to define juvenile jurisdiction.69 In addition, allowing a court to inherit or
otherwise retain previously held jurisdiction would improperly create a new,
unexpressed exception to Amendment 67’s grant to the General Assembly
of sole authority to define juvenile jurisdiction.70 Had the framers intended
for such an additional exception to exist, the framers could have easily
drafted such an exception just as the framers specified that juvenile courts
under Amendment 67 would retain the juvenile jurisdiction then vested in
county courts by Article 7, section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution.
Second, Amendment 67’s use of the term “jurisdiction” should be interpreted to include all possible jurisdiction related to juvenile matters, including all jurisdiction cognizable at law or in equity. As suggested above, if
the framers had intended for courts to wield jurisdiction beyond that which
the General Assembly specified, the framers could have expressly provided
for the specific kinds of jurisdiction that the General Assembly had the discretion to define or expressly stated what jurisdiction the courts retained.

69. See, e.g., Larry Hobbs Farm Equip. v. CNH America, LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 385, 291
S.W.3d 190, 195 (2009); Calnan v. State, 310 Ark. 744, 748, 841 S.W.2d 593, 595 (1992)
(applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to resolve an issue of constitutional interpretation). Such an exclusive designation of power to the General Assembly is
also consistent with Arkansas’s strong separation-of-powers doctrine that prohibits one
branch of government from exercising the authority of another branch of government. See
supra notes 56–57, 59 and accompanying text.
70. See Calnan, 310 Ark. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 595. In Calnan, the Arkansas Supreme
Court addressed a similar issue of interpretation related to a constitutional amendment. Id. at
746–47, 841 S.W.2d at 596. In that case, the court evaluated whether the requirement that a
party must object in order to preserve an issue for appeal provides an exception to the right to
a jury trial under the Arkansas Constitution where the defendant in the case failed to object to
the trial court’s failure to honor the defendant’s right to a jury trial. Id. at 747–48, 841
S.W.2d at 596–97. On that issue, the court found that the defendant did not lose his right to a
jury trial by not objecting because the only exception to the right to a jury trial expressed in
the Arkansas Constitution was “waiver.” Id. at 749, 841 S.W.2d at 596. The court held that
the expression of “waiver” as the only exception to the general rule that the right to a jury
trial was to remain inviolate meant that there were no other exceptions to the right to a jury
trial. Id. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 596. Calnan is particularly relevant to this article’s analysis of
Amendment 67 because, in both situations, the analysis pits the judiciary’s long history of
employing the given requirement or power against the correct interpretation of a specific
constitutional provision, specifically the long-standing requirement that objections must be
preserved at trial against the right to a jury trial in Calnan and the judiciary’s long-standing
jurisdiction over juveniles against the jurisdictional changes contemplated by Amendment 67.
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Either method, if not phrased as a truly open-ended series,71 could have imposed limits on the scope of juvenile jurisdiction. But that is not what
Amendment 67 provides. The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
once again suggests that the judiciary did not inherit or otherwise retain previously held jurisdiction over juveniles—including the Shelby Doctrine’s
jurisdiction in equity over juveniles—because the framers included only one
mechanism for a court to inherit or otherwise retain jurisdiction over juveniles, namely, the requirement that the General Assembly transfer juvenile
jurisdiction held by county courts at the time Amendment 67 was adopted.72
This demonstrates that the framers intended Amendment 67 to give the
General Assembly power over all jurisdiction related to juvenile matters
other than the one exception to the General Assembly’s power related to
county court jurisdiction.
Third, the problems that Amendment 67 was designed to fix and the
circumstances in which Amendment 67 was adopted further indicate that the
framers intended the General Assembly to have the exclusive authority to
prescribe all jurisdiction available to Arkansas courts in child-welfare proceedings.73 Amendment 67 was expressly part of the General Assembly’s
solution to the jurisdictional crisis that arose when the Arkansas Supreme
Court invalidated Arkansas’s child-welfare system in Walker.74 Moreover,
Amendment 67 was adopted in response75 to the broader and well-known
dysfunction in the child-welfare system that resulted from overlapping jurisdictions between nearly all of Arkansas’s trial courts—including between
the courts with statutory jurisdiction over child-welfare cases76 and chancery
71. See Edwards v. Campbell, 2010 Ark. 398, at 4–5, 370 S.W.3d 250, 253 (describing
ejusdem generis, the doctrine of interpretation that provides that when general words follow
enumerations of particular things, the general words must be interpreted to include only those
things of the same kind as those specifically enumerated things); State v. Oldner, 361 Ark.
316, 327, 206 S.W.3d 818, 822 (2005) (same); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W.
465, 468–69 (1919) (same).
72. ARK. CONST. amend. 67.
73. See Brewer, 348 Ark. at 581, 79 S.W.3d at 833–34 (observing that when interpreting
a constitutional amendment, “it is helpful to determine what changes the amendment was
intended to make in the existing law”).
74. See, e.g., Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 47–52, 722 S.W.2d
558, 560–62 (1987); BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 31, at 225, 227; GOSS, supra note 40, at
239; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
75. GOSS, supra note 40, at 239; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
76. Prior to Walker, county courts held jurisdiction over child-welfare matters governed
by the juvenile code. Walker, 291 Ark. at 47–52, 722 S.W.2d at 560–62; see also supra notes
31–39 and accompanying text. After Walker, the General Assembly transferred the jurisdiction formerly held by county courts into a juvenile division of circuit court with respect to
juvenile delinquency and into a juvenile division of probate court with respect to “juveniles
in need of supervision” and dependent-neglected juveniles. Act of Feb. 6, 1987, Reg. Sess.,
No. 14, §§ 2, 3, 1987 Ark. Acts 24, 25–27; see also supra notes 31–39 and accompanying
text.
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courts, which held the jurisdiction in equity over juveniles asserted by the
Shelby Doctrine.77 The overlapping jurisdictions directly impacted the effectiveness of the increasingly complex statutory scheme designed by the General Assembly to implement expanding public policies to protect juveniles
because, as Walker and other cases demonstrated, the General Assembly had
limited means to improve the operation of the child-welfare system prior to
the adoption of Amendment 67.
These limitations arose from the fact that the Arkansas Constitution’s
then-existing jurisdictional framework (1) limited what court the General
Assembly could designate to be a juvenile court;78 (2) created confusion as
to the contours of the jurisdictional framework involving juveniles,79 includ77. See GOSS, supra note 40, at 239; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
78. These limitations were based partially on the General Assembly’s inability to create
a court other than chancery courts, courts of common pleas, and the Court of Appeals of
Arkansas. ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 1, 32, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22; ARK.
CONST. amend. 24 (permitting the General Assembly to provide for the consolidation of
chancery and probate courts); ARK. CONST. amend. 58, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80,
§ 22, subsec. D; Walker, 291 Ark. at 47, 722 S.W.2d at 560; Ward Sch. Bus Mfg., Inc. v.
Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 120, 547 S.W.2d 394, 405 (1977) (“The powers of the General Assembly to alter the structure of the judicial system [are] very limited.”). The Arkansas Constitution also imposed limitations on what jurisdiction could be exercised by the various courts.
ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 27, 33, 51–52 (jurisdiction of circuit courts); id. §§ 11, 14–15, 35,
45, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22 (same); id. § 15, repealed by ARK. CONST.
amend. 80, § 22 (jurisdiction of chancery courts); id. § 34, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend.
80, § 22 (jurisdiction of probate courts); id. § 28 (jurisdiction of county courts); id. § 34,
repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22 (same); id. § 24, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend.
80, § 22 (jurisdiction of probate and chancery courts). Admittedly, Amendment 24 and the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Hutton indicate that the General Assembly did have
some ability to designate a juvenile court—but only some authority. Moreover, it is worth
noting that the conclusion in Hutton that the General Assembly had the authority to expand
the jurisdiction of probate court is arguably dicta. First, the issue of the probate court’s jurisdiction over dependency-neglect cases was unnecessary to the result reached by the Hutton
court, particularly given that the court found that the probate court did have jurisdiction over
such matters. See, e.g., Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 267–68, 769 S.W.2d 394, 400
(1989); In re Giurbino, 258 Ark. 277, 281, 524 S.W.2d 236, 238 (1975) (“[T]his court will
not decide constitutional questions unless such a decision is necessary to a determination of
the pending case.”). Second, the court could have solely relied on the much narrower basis
that the actions of the juvenile master in the case exceeded the authority permitted by Arkansas law, which the court found before reaching the issue of probate court jurisdiction; instead,
the court went out of its way to address the issue of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hutton, 298 Ark. at
267–68, 769 S.W.2d at 399–400 (holding that the actions of the juvenile court were contrary
to the Arkansas Constitution, existing case law, and the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure);
Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, at 14–15, 388 S.W.3d 429, 437 (declining to reach additional
constitutional issues after finding a statute unconstitutional on more direct state constitutional
grounds); Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 9, 11, 308 S.W.3d 135,
141–42 (same).
79. One need only look at the legions of cases challenging the jurisdiction of circuit,
chancery, probate, and county courts over juvenile matters between 1907 and 1989 to see that
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ing as to the extent of probate80 and chancery81 court jurisdiction over juvenile matters; and (3) ensured that the child-welfare system and the juvenile
the proper distribution of juvenile jurisdiction in Arkansas has long been an open question.
See, e.g., Walker, 291 Ark. at 47–48, 722 S.W.2d at 560 (striking down the 1975 Juvenile
Code’s investiture with county courts of jurisdiction over juvenile matters governed by the
juvenile code); Dyer v. Ross-Lawhon, 288 Ark. 327, 330, 704 S.W.2d 629, 631 (1986) (holding that a probate court has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian even with a pending juvenile
court matter); Jarmon v. Brown, 286 Ark. 455, 456–57, 692 S.W.2d 618, 619–20 (1985)
(invalidating the custody order of a chancery court because county courts had exclusive jurisdiction over bastardy cases); Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 243–45, 617 S.W.2d
857, 858–59 (1981) (employing the jurisdictional scheme of juvenile, probate, chancery, and
circuit courts as provided in the juvenile code and the Arkansas Constitution); Lee v. Grubbs,
269 Ark. 205, 206–07, 599 S.W.2d 715, 716 (1980) (finding that juvenile courts do not have
the jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for illegitimate juveniles because such jurisdiction was
held only by probate courts); Sargent v. Cole, 269 Ark. 121, 125–26, 598 S.W.2d 749, 752
(1980) (holding that a juvenile over age fifteen could be tried in juvenile, circuit, and municipal courts as provided by the juvenile code); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 935–36, 377
S.W.2d 816, 820–21 (1964) (finding that the juvenile court could not appoint a guardian
because the appointment of a guardian was within the sole jurisdiction of probate courts);
Edwards v. Martin, 231 Ark. 528, 529–30, 331 S.W.2d 97, 97–98 (1960) (providing that the
probate court has no jurisdiction over the custody of juveniles because chancery courts are
vested with that jurisdiction); Underwood v. Farrell, 175 Ark. 217, 217, 299 S.W. 5, 6 (1927)
(holding that a juvenile court did not have the jurisdiction to sentence a delinquent juvenile to
prison because that jurisdiction was held by circuit courts); Scott v. Brown, 160 Ark. 489,
489, 254 S.W. 1074, 1075–76 (1923) (holding that the juvenile court did not violate the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of probate courts over the persons and estates of juveniles); Ex parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W. 465, 466, 469 (1919) (upholding the 1911
Juvenile Code’s investiture with county courts of jurisdiction over juvenile matters governed
by the juvenile code). The determination of what jurisdiction belonged in which court was
also compounded by Arkansas’s retention of courts of equity as separate courts from courts
of law well past 1989 and the jurisdictional tension that such a system produces. See Morton
Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts: Historical
Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215, 244–45, 247 (1995);
Mark R. Killenbeck, And Then They Did . . . ? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44
ARK. L. REV. 235, 312–37 (1991).
80. At the time Amendment 67 was adopted, the jurisdiction of probate courts related to
child-welfare matters was something of open question because of two potentially conflicting
authorities in Arkansas: (1) the Arkansas Supreme Court 1919 holding in King that probate
courts did not have jurisdiction over child-welfare matters contemplated by the juvenile code,
King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 467–68, and (2) Amendment 24, which was adopted in
1938 and allowed the General Assembly to revise probate court jurisdiction. ARK. CONST.
amend. 24. Indeed, despite the adoption of Amendment 24, King’s prohibition appears to
have been good law at the time of the adoption of Amendment 67 because neither the court in
Walker nor any appellate court in Arkansas had abrogated this rule. Walker, 291 Ark. at 48–
51, 722 S.W.2d at 560–62 (citing cases that approved of King but only abrogating King to the
extent that the Walker court held that county courts did in fact lack jurisdiction to hear childwelfare matters because such were not matters only of “local concern”). It was not until
1989—a year after Amendment 67 was passed by voters—that the Arkansas Supreme Court
addressed the impact of Amendment 24 on the appropriate jurisdiction of probate courts
related to juvenile matters and found that Amendment 24 provided the General Assembly
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court were subject to the competing jurisdiction of other courts—most notably the jurisdiction in equity of chancery courts over juveniles that the Shelby Doctrine asserts.82 It therefore stands to reason that Amendment 67 was
adopted to not only put in place a constitutional child-welfare system that
complied with Walker, but also to eliminate the limitations on what court the
General Assembly could designate as the court in child-welfare cases, what
jurisdiction the General Assembly could grant to such a court, and the concurrent and competing jurisdiction over juveniles in child-welfare cases held
by courts that had undermined the effectiveness of the child-welfare system
for so long.
with the constitutional authority to add jurisdiction over juvenile matters to the jurisdiction of
probate courts. Hutton, 298 Ark. at 267–68, 769 S.W.2d at 400. Even Hutton, however, tacitly suggests that Amendment 67 informed the court’s conclusions regarding the impact of
Amendment 24 on the General Assembly’s authority because the Hutton court noted the
existence of Amendment 67 following its formal analysis involving Amendment 24. See id.,
769 S.W.2d at 400.
81. Although chancery courts prior to Amendment 67 surely held the jurisdiction over
juveniles asserted by the Shelby Doctrine, the extent of a chancery court’s jurisdiction was far
less settled because even though chancery courts were ostensibly limited to the jurisdiction
that chancery courts could have exercised in equity at the time of the adoption of the 1874
Constitution, it was not always clear just what fell within that equitable jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Mark R. Killenbeck, Nothing That We Can Do? Or, Much Ado About Nothing? Some
Thoughts on Bates v. Bates, Equity, and Domestic Abuse in Arkansas, 43 ARK. L. REV. 725,
734 (1990) (arguing that chancery courts were not limited to the jurisdiction in equity cognizable at the time the people adopted the 1874 Constitution). This was because all equitable
remedies—including the jurisdiction over juveniles held by a chancery court—were only
available if there is not an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227,
230–231, 996 S.W.2d 17, 18–19 (1999); American Investors Life Ins. Co. v. TCB Transp.,
Inc., 312 Ark. 343, 345, 849 S.W.2d 509, 511 (1993); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 91, 793
S.W.2d 788, 790 (1990) (citing Patterson v. McKay, 199 Ark. 140, 134 S.W.2d 543 (1939)).
Thus, with the expansion of the jurisdiction and remedies available to courts of law under the
various incarnations of Arkansas’s juvenile codes, the equitable jurisdiction over juveniles
asserted by the Shelby Doctrine would have become increasingly narrow over time because
of the expansion of legal remedies limiting the circumstances in which equitable jurisdiction
could have been asserted over juveniles. In other words, even though the General Assembly
could not expand or contract equitable jurisdiction, the equitable jurisdiction over juveniles
became subject to increasingly expansive remedies at law that limited the circumstances in
which equity could properly be invoked. Not surprisingly, the court in Shelby did not address
nor much less conclude that the juvenile code did not provide an adequate remedy at law.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
82. Perhaps the first recognition of the concurrence of these competing and separate
jurisdictions came from the Arkansas Supreme Court itself in King, where the court held that
the 1911 Juvenile Code did not interfere with the jurisdiction of probate courts over the
guardianship of the estates of minors, the jurisdiction of criminal courts over the criminal
prosecution of juveniles, the jurisdiction of circuit courts over all matters not otherwise prescribed by the Arkansas Constitution to another court, or the “general jurisdiction over the
persons and property of minors” held by chancery courts in equity. King, 141 Ark at 213, 217
S.W. at 467–70.
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Fourth, the General Assembly’s decision to respond to the Walker decision with a constitutional amendment further demonstrates that the framers
intended Amendment 67 to provide the General Assembly the exclusive,
constitutional authority to prescribe all jurisdiction available to Arkansas
courts in child-welfare proceedings. Specifically, the General Assembly
passed Amendment 67 and sent it to the voters for approval after the General Assembly had passed Act 14, its initial emergency response to Walker,
but before the General Assembly passed the Juvenile Code of 1989, the
General Assembly’s more comprehensive child-welfare reform effort that
vested jurisdiction over child-welfare matters in a single court, the juvenile
division of chancery court.83 The adoption of Amendment 67 prior to the
enactment of the revised juvenile code was plainly necessary in order to
allow the General Assembly to provide chancery courts with jurisdiction
over child-welfare matters governed by the juvenile code because the General Assembly was not authorized to modify the jurisdiction of chancery
courts as the General Assembly could with probate courts84 and chancery
courts did not have the catch-all jurisdiction that circuit courts had over matters not otherwise specifically designated to another court by the Arkansas
Constitution.85 However, the breadth of Amendment 67’s broad announcement of the General Assembly’s authority would have been unnecessary if
all the General Assembly intended to do was simply to allow the General
Assembly to modify chancery jurisdiction to include matters governed by
the juvenile code.86 The adoption of Amendment 67 itself further suggests
that the framers believed that the General Assembly’s existing powers were
not sufficient. Moreover, the General Assembly’s decision to vest jurisdiction over child-welfare matters with chancery courts in the 1989 Juvenile
Code does not necessarily mean that the General Assembly intended chancery courts to retain equity jurisdiction over juveniles following the adoption of Amendment 67. Again, such an intent is not evidenced anywhere in
Amendment 67’s text and is contraindicated by the fact that the only jurisdiction that Amendment 67 did carry over was jurisdiction related to county
courts, which did not have equity jurisdiction.
Fifth, the specific, exclusive, and limited jurisdiction that the General
Assembly provided in the Juvenile Code of 1989 to the juvenile courts of
83. Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, No. 273, 1989 Ark. Acts 486 (codified as amended
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013)).
84. Compare ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 15, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22,
with ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 34, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22, and ARK. CONST.
amend. 24; see Hutton, 298 Ark. at 267–68, 769 S.W. at 400.
85. Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 244–45, 617 S.W.2d 857, 858–59 (1981);
King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 466–68 (providing that circuit courts would have jurisdiction over child-welfare matters if such matters were not vested with any other court).
86. Compare ARK. CONST. amend. 24, with ARK. CONST. amend. 67.
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the time—then the juvenile division of chancery court—indicates that the
General Assembly intended Amendment 67 to reboot the jurisdiction over
juveniles held by Arkansas’s courts. Consider the following: chancery
courts prior to the adoption of Amendment 67 unquestionably had the authority to “make all orders that will properly safeguard the[] rights” of juveniles appearing before them under chancery courts’ jurisdiction in equity
over juveniles.87 Thus, if that jurisdiction had continued, chancery courts
and modern circuit courts acting as juvenile courts after them would have
the equitable jurisdiction to protect juveniles appearing before them and
ensure that “necessary services” were being provided to the juveniles in
whatever kind of case the juvenile was involved in, child-welfare or otherwise. And the scope of this jurisdiction would have been limited only by the
bounds of equity and not by any limitations made by the General Assembly
in law, a fact that the General Assembly was well aware of following Walker. Nevertheless, the Juvenile Code of 1989 included specific limitations on
the jurisdiction of juvenile courts and the authority of juvenile courts to order the Department to provide services—limitations that would have been
meaningless unless the General Assembly had intended the juvenile code to
prescribe the whole jurisdiction available to juvenile courts. These specific
limitations indicate that the General Assembly did intend to prescribe jurisdiction as described in the Juvenile Code of 1989. This apparent intention
supports the conclusion that the framers intended Amendment 67 to reboot
the jurisdiction over juveniles held by Arkansas’s courts.
Sixth, Amendment 67 itself would be rendered meaningless88 if all it
did was state that the General Assembly had the power to confer jurisdiction
over juvenile mattes without the ability to alter existing common law jurisdictions like equitable jurisdiction. Such a reading would effectively render
Amendment 67 constitutional surplusage because it would be a mere re87. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 105, 680 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1984) (citing
Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 32 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583, 12
S.W.2d 879 (1928); State v. Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481 (1882)).
88. Arkansas’s jurisprudence governing the interpretation of statutory and constitutional
provisions has long required that such provisions must be interpreted so as not to render the
provision meaningless. Hobbs v. Baird, 2011 Ark. 261, at 3, 2011 WL 2412740, at *2 (observing that laws must be interpreted “so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible”); Osborn v.
Bryant, 2009 Ark. 358, at 6, 324 S.W.3d 687, 690 (same); Larry Hobbs Farm Equip. v. CNH
Am., LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 383, 291 S.W.3d 190, 195 (2009) (finding that courts must construe statutes so that “no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant” and so that “meaning
and effect” are given to every word in the statute); McDonald v. Bowen, 250 Ark. 1049,
1060, 468 S.W.2d 765, 771 (1971) (Fogleman, J., concurring and dissenting) (“In statutory
and constitutional construction, if it is possible to do, we are bound to give meaning and
effect to every word, phrase and clause, so that no word is rendered void, superfluous or
insignificant or discarded as surplusage.”).
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statement of Amendment 80, which gives the General Assembly the power
to “establish jurisdiction of all courts” unless otherwise provided by the Arkansas Constitution and affords modern circuit courts with the jurisdiction
previously held by circuit, chancery, probate, and juvenile courts, including
such common law and equitable jurisdiction as may have existed in those
courts at the time Amendment 80 was adopted.89 Amendment 80 therefore
encompasses a broad jurisdictional power that would completely encompass
Amendment 67’s power because Amendment 80 is not limited to juvenile
matters and Amendment 80 did not repeal Amendment 67 as it had done
with Amendment 24, another jurisdictional amendment.90 Moreover,
Amendment 67 appears to fall within Amendment 80’s exception for other
constitutional provisions. Thus, even if the jurisdictional authority contemplated under Amendment 80 includes common law jurisdiction, Amendment
67 overrules that jurisdictional augmentation for child-welfare proceedings
because it does not specifically provide for the reservation of common law
jurisdiction like Amendment 80 did for all other types of cases.91 In these
ways, it seems that the framers of Amendment 80 intended Amendment 67
to mean something more than even the broad power over jurisdiction provided to the General Assembly under Amendment 80.92
89. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 10 (“The General Assembly shall have the power to
establish jurisdiction of all courts . . . unless otherwise provided in this Constitution.”); ARK.
CONST. amend. 80, §§ 10, 19, subsec. B, ¶ 1.
90. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22. More to the point, even though Amendment 80
was adopted later than Amendment 67, Amendment 80 does not supersede Amendment 67’s
specific authorization because Amendment 80 specifically did not supersede Amendment 67
like Amendment 80 did with other constitutional provisions related to jurisdiction, including
Amendment 24, and Amendment 80 is not irreconcilable with Amendment 67. See, e.g.,
ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22 (expressly superseding Amendment 24 along with a list of
specific constitutional provisions that did not include Amendment 67 and providing that
“[n]o other provision of the Constitution . . . shall be repealed by [Amendment 80] unless the
provision is in irreconcilable conflict with the provisions of [Amendment 80]”); Brock v.
Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, at 16–17, 309 S.W.2d 179, 189 (providing that a law may be
deemed repealed by implication where there is either an irreconcilable conflict between the
first law and the law adopted subsequent to the first law or the “legislature takes up the whole
subject anew and covers the entire ground of the subject matter of a former [law] and evidently intends it as a substitute”).
91. No other applicable provision reserved to any court common law jurisdiction at the
time Amendment 80 was enacted except for Amendment 80 itself, leaving Amendment 67 as
the only “otherwise provided” source that would impact jurisdiction. See supra notes 88–90
and accompanying text. Moreover, even if Amendment 80 were to be interpreted as subsuming and implicitly overruling Amendment 67, no equitable jurisdiction over juveniles existed
in child-welfare proceedings at the time that Amendment 80 was adopted.
92. Indeed, a natural reading of Amendments 80 and 67 together preserves the General
Assembly’s prerogative under Amendment 67 to prescribe the jurisdiction of modern circuit
courts in juvenile matters while allowing Amendment 80 to reserve probate and equity jurisdiction over matters not having to do with juveniles. In addition, such a harmonious reading
is in accord with the framers’ intentional omission of Amendment 67 in Amendment 80’s
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Arkansas case law supports the interpretation that Amendment 67 rebooted the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts in juvenile matters

Arkansas’s case law on the jurisdiction of juvenile courts before and
after Amendment 67 is largely in accord with the interpretation that
Amendment 67 rebooted the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts over juveniles
and limited the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts to only that jurisdiction
provided by the General Assembly.93 The Arkansas Supreme Court and the
Arkansas Court of Appeals have long held that Arkansas’s courts have limited authority and jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings and that the juvenile code imposes limitations on the authority of courts to order the Department to act in child-welfare proceedings.94 Reviewing courts have also
repealer even though the framers included other provisions related to modern circuit court
jurisdiction such as Amendment 24, which impacted jurisdiction over probate and chancery
courts and also included authority for the General Assembly to impact the jurisdiction of a
court. See, e.g., Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 267–68, 769 S.W.2d 394, 400 (1989). But
see Glover v. Henry, 231 Ark. 111, 115–16, 328 S.W.2d 382, 385 (1959) (declining to interpret a constitutional amendment as doing anything more than “reaffirm[ing] the existing
[constitutional] law as a basis for the operation of other provisions in the amendment”). Although the Arkansas Supreme Court in Glover did find that it was permissible for a constitutional amendment merely to restate existing law, the court based that finding on its conclusion that the restatement was merely the part of the amendment that formed the “basis for the
operation of the other provisions in the amendment.” Id., 328 S.W.2d at 385. By contrast,
Amendment 67 has no other provisions other than the amendment’s grant of power to the
General Assembly and the amendment’s description of that power. See ARK. CONST. amend.
67.
93. Although Arkansas courts do still refer to child-welfare proceedings as “equity matters” after the adoption of Amendment 67 and Amendment 80, the references are limited to
the de novo nature of appellate review that the cases were entitled to and never recognized
any additional jurisdiction arising under equity. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, at 4–5, 423 S.W.3d 86, 88–89; Mahone v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 819, at 3, 2010 WL 4983009, at *3, rev’d on other grounds, Mahone
v. Ark. Dept. Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 370, 383 S.W.3d 854; Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. v. C.M., 100 Ark. App. 414, 415–16, 269 S.W.3d 387, 388 (2007); Moiser v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 32, 34–35, 233 S.W.3d 172, 174 (2006); cf. Ingle v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. 53, at 9, 431 S.W.3d 303, 308 (applying an exception
to normal de novo review in equity cases where an appeals court can enter an order that the
circuit court “should have entered”).
94. See, e.g., Young v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. 334, at 1, 3–4, 2012 WL
4163177, at *1, *3–4 (holding that a circuit court could not reopen a dependency-neglect case
after the court had closed the case because the court’s jurisdiction ended pursuant to the juvenile code once the juvenile was no longer dependent-neglected and the case was closed, but
affirming the circuit court’s order based on the court’s separate jurisdiction to hear custody
matters); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Denmon, 2009 Ark. 485, at 7–9, 346 S.W.3d 283,
288 (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order the Department to use a
particular provider because the juvenile code prohibited trial courts from making such orders); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 516–523, 95 S.W.3d 722, 779–
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acknowledged that, following the adoption of Amendment 67, the General
Assembly’s passage of the juvenile code “defined jurisdiction of matters
relating to juveniles and conferred such jurisdiction upon [juvenile courts]”
and that both the juvenile courts and the Department are “creatures of statute.”95
782 (2003) (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction in a dependency-neglect
action over an unborn fetus because the juvenile code’s definition of “juvenile” did not include unborn fetuses); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 319 Ark. 749, 750–51, 894
S.W.2d 592, 593 (1995) (holding that the omission of any authority regarding the placement
of juveniles in a youth services center precluded the juvenile court from entering an order
making such a placement); Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 767–68, 894 S.W.2d 888, 889–90
(1995) (holding that a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over a delinquency proceeding that
did not fall within the juvenile code’s definition of what delinquency proceedings the juvenile
court could hear); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 485–89, 850 S.W.2d
847, 849–51 (1993) (holding that a juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to order the Department to pay restitution for a juvenile in the Department’s custody because, inter alia, the
juvenile code did not provide the court with that authority); A.M., 2012 Ark. App. at 7–8, 423
S.W.3d at 90–91 (holding that a circuit court did not have the authority to order the Department to provide a juvenile maternity clothes or school uniforms because such services did not
fall within the juvenile code’s definition of “family services”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 352, 33 S.W.3d 514, 517 (2000) (holding that a juvenile court
lacked the jurisdiction to address the placement of names on the Child Maltreatment Central
Registry because the jurisdiction was not provided to the juvenile court by statute); Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Southerland, 65 Ark. App. 97, 100, 985 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1999)
(holding that a juvenile court did not have the statutory authority to order the Department to
pay a foster-care board payment to a person who had not been licensed by the Department to
be a foster home and finding such a payment would conflict with Department policy and
federal law); cf. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cir. Ct. of Sebastian Cnty., 363 Ark. 389,
393–94, 214 S.W.3d 856, 859–60 (2005) (declining to issue a writ of certiorari to a circuit
court that had ordered physical and legal custody to be split where the juvenile code does not
expressly allow custody to be split because the circuit court below had “jurisdiction” under
the juvenile code to make custody determinations); Hudson v. Kyle, 352 Ark. 346, 349–52,
101 S.W.3d 202, 205–07 (2003) (holding that a court did not have the authority to terminate
parental rights under Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-9-220 despite jurisdiction over “all justiciable
matters”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cox, 349 Ark. 205, 210–14, 82 S.W.3d 806, 810–
12 (2002) (holding that a probate court had jurisdiction to enter a guardianship order over a
juvenile in the custody of the Department pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because the UCCJEA did not apply to the juvenile);
Nance v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 53–54, 873 S.W.2d 812, 813–14 (1994)
(clarifying a prior decision and holding that when the juvenile court took jurisdiction of a
child-welfare case, the juvenile code’s requirements regarding review hearings became mandatory and the juvenile court was “wrong” to dismiss the case in violation of those requirements); Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 310 Ark. 208, 211, 833 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1992) (holding
that even though the juvenile court had jurisdiction to declare the juvenile mother in need of
family services pursuant to the juvenile code, the court had no jurisdiction to prohibit the
juvenile from obtaining an abortion); Lewis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App.
154, at 14–15, 391 S.W.3d 695, 704 (holding that a circuit court lacked the authority to terminate a parent’s rights except as provided under the juvenile code).
95. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 407–08, 802 S.W.2d 461, 463–
64 (1991); see also Thomas, 71 Ark. App. at 352, 33 S.W.3d at 517.
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Reviewing courts often cite the juvenile code’s specific provisions as a
court’s source of authority even where the reviewing court finds that a lower
court did have the authority or jurisdiction to act or order the Department to
act.96 Perhaps the most frequently invoked of these limitations arises from
the definition of “family services,” which Arkansas’s reviewing courts have
consistently found to limit the scope and extent of the services that a modern
circuit court has the authority to order the Department to perform. 97 If the
juvenile code did not in fact limit the authority and jurisdiction of modern
circuit courts in this way—as the Shelby Doctrine implicitly requires—then
courts in numerous cases would not have been limited to “family services”
in those cases and would have instead been free to order the Department to
provide such necessary services as the court believed appropriate under the
jurisdiction in equity asserted by the Shelby Doctrine. Such a conclusion,
however, conflicts with long-standing precedent in Arkansas and would
appear to implicitly overrule Arkansas’s long-standing recognition of the
juvenile code as the source of judicial authority in child-welfare proceedings.
3.

Amendment 67’s Impact on the Shelby Doctrine and the Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts in Child-Welfare Proceedings

The interpretation that Amendment 67 rebooted all jurisdiction related
to juveniles and extinguished all judicial jurisdiction over juveniles in childwelfare proceedings is consequential in four related respects. First, the interpretation directly and necessarily invalidates the Shelby Doctrine’s reliance on jurisdiction that the General Assembly has not provided to modern
circuit courts, specifically including the jurisdiction that chancery courts
96. Cf., e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.B., 347 Ark. 593, 599–603, 67 S.W.3d
539, 543–46 (2002) (holding that the juvenile court could order the Department to pay for a
juvenile’s residential treatment because the juvenile code allows the court to order financial
assistance and treatment as “family services”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark.
516, 529–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 231–33 (1998) (holding that a juvenile court had jurisdiction
to order the Department to pay a family’s utility bills because the juvenile code specifically
authorized courts to order cash assistance in family-in-need-of-services cases like the one
before the court below); Clark, 304 Ark. at 407–08, 802 S.W.2d at 463–64 (upholding juvenile court’s order for the Department to provide financial and transportation assistance because such assistance was included in the juvenile code’s definition of “family services”);
C.M., 100 Ark. App. at 416–17, 269 S.W.3d at 389–90 (holding that a juvenile court could
order the Department to pay for a juvenile’s legal representation in an administrative hearing
because the payment would constitute “cash assistance” under the juvenile code’s definition
of “family services”).
97. See, e.g., A.M., 2012 Ark. App. at 7–8, 423 S.W.3d at 90–91; cf. T.B., 347 Ark. at
599–603, 67 S.W.3d at 543–46; R.P., 333 Ark. at 529–32, 970 S.W.2d at 231–33; Clark, 304
Ark. at 407–08, 802 S.W.2d at 463–64; C.M., 100 Ark. App. at 416–17, 269 S.W.3d at 389–
90.
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held in equity over juveniles prior to the adoption of Amendment 67. Second, the interpretation recognizes the juvenile code as the only source of
jurisdiction and authority available to modern circuit courts in child-welfare
proceedings, which in turn invalidates the Shelby Doctrine’s express assertion that circuit courts have jurisdiction in child-welfare matters beyond the
jurisdiction prescribed by the juvenile code. Third, the interpretation confirms and constitutionalizes Arkansas’s long-standing case law that provides
that the jurisdiction of modern circuit courts in child-welfare cases is limited
to the jurisdiction prescribed in the juvenile code. Fourth, the interpretation
does not change what is required to invoke jurisdiction in equity generally
or the limitations imposed on the scope of the jurisdiction over juveniles in
equity specifically.
The jurisdictional bases of the Shelby Doctrine, however, assert that
circuit courts hold jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that was held by
chancery courts prior to the adoption of Amendment 67 and that this jurisdiction authorizes circuit courts to dictate the Department’s internal operations in child-welfare cases.98 More specifically, the majority in Shelby explained that circuit courts held jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that authorized circuit courts to “make all orders that will properly safeguard the[]
rights” of juveniles appearing before it, including orders to protect such juveniles and “assure that . . . necessary services are being delivered.”99 The
majority relied on this specific source of jurisdiction to sanction the circuit
court’s order that the Department “rectify” the high caseload of the Department’s caseworker assigned to the case, which effectively dictated to the
Department how it should conduct internal staffing operations.100
The Shelby Doctrine’s assertion of such equitable jurisdiction is invalid
because Amendment 67 extinguished the jurisdiction over juveniles held in
equity by chancery courts when Amendment 67 was enacted in 1989.101
Modern circuit courts therefore cannot exercise this equitable jurisdiction
over juveniles unless the General Assembly granted such jurisdiction to circuit courts through the juvenile code or some other law.102 But as described
98. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615,
at *3–5; supra Part II.
99. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
100. See id.
101. See supra Part III.A.2.
102. See supra Part III.A.2. Likewise, even if the General Assembly had at one point
legislatively conferred the same jurisdiction over juveniles previously held by chancery
courts, the General Assembly would be free to revoke that jurisdiction; the key, in this regard, is whether the General Assembly provided that jurisdiction to a given court at the exact
time that the court attempts to use it. See, e.g., Sands v. Albert Pike Motor Hotel, 245 Ark.
755, 760, 434 S.W.2d 288, 290 (1968) (“There is no question that the legislature may limit or
withdraw judicial jurisdiction conferred by a legislative act, and there is no question that the
legislature may amend [statutes] in any manner it deems proper.”); James D. Robertson,
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above, the General Assembly has never granted or otherwise reserved to any
court jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the Shelby Doctrine asserts.
The General Assembly also did not do so in Amendment 67 itself, in the
1989 Juvenile Code, or in any of the numerous amendments to the 1989
juvenile code that the General Assembly has enacted in the last two decades.
Jurisdiction over juveniles in equity was also not altered by the adoption of Amendment 80 because such jurisdiction had already been extinguished more than a decade before and would therefore not have been available to be passed to modern circuit courts by Amendment 80.103 Thus,
Amendment 80 could not reserve to circuit courts the equitable jurisdiction
over juveniles asserted by the Shelby Doctrine because that jurisdiction
simply did not exist at the time Amendment 80 was adopted. Even the majority in Shelby did not rely on Amendment 80’s consolidation of jurisdiction in circuit courts as the source of the Shelby Doctrine’s authority and
jurisdiction; rather, the majority merely concluded that equitable jurisdiction
over juveniles was not altered by Amendment 80.104
The operation of Amendment 67 to extinguish the equitable jurisdiction asserted by the Shelby Doctrine and to afford the General Assembly the
unfettered discretion to prescribe the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts related to juvenile matters also means that the only jurisdiction that modern circuit courts have in child-welfare proceedings is that jurisdiction provided
under the juvenile code. Put another way, the juvenile code is the only
source of jurisdiction that modern circuit courts have to compel the Department to provide services, take custody (or not) of juveniles, or otherwise act
in child-welfare proceedings. Indeed, without the juvenile code, no court in
Arkansas could order the Department to provide services, take custody, or
otherwise act to provide for the welfare of juveniles. The full significance of
this consequence is described in more detail in Part III.B below through the
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but for now it is sufficient to observe that Amendment 67 effectively deprives modern circuit
courts of jurisdiction over juveniles and the Department sufficient to order
the Department to do anything unless authorized by the juvenile code.
Note, Spradlin v. Arkansas Ethics Commission: A Hard-Line Approach to Separation of
Powers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 755, 770 (1995).
103. See supra Part III.A.2. Amendment 80 also did not reserve statutory jurisdiction that
was in effect at the time Amendment 80 was adopted, which constituted the only jurisdiction
Arkansas’s courts held over juveniles at that time. This is because the General Assembly was
free to modify this statutory jurisdiction at any time that the General Assembly saw fit—even
after Amendment 80 was adopted. See supra note 101. More importantly, interpretation of
Amendment 80 that reserved the statutory jurisdiction over juveniles in place at the time
Amendment 80 was adopted is misplaced because such an interpretation would directly conflict with the General Assembly’s continuing authority under Amendment 67. See ARK.
CONST. amend. 80, § 22; id. amend. 67; supra Part III.A.2.b.
104. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
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Moreover, the interpretation that Amendment 67 rebooted all jurisdiction related to juveniles and extinguished all judicial jurisdiction over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings accords with—and provides a specific
constitutional mandate for—Arkansas’s long-standing case law that limits
the jurisdiction of modern circuit courts in child-welfare cases to the jurisdiction prescribed in the juvenile code.105 Indeed, Arkansas courts have long
held that the juvenile code’s specific prescriptions of authority limit what
modern circuit courts can order the Department to do in cases involving the
welfare of juveniles.106 More broadly, Arkansas’s appellate courts have held
that the authority prescribed in the juvenile code is the extent of modern
circuit court jurisdiction over juveniles, that Arkansas courts have limited
authority and jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings, and that the juvenile
code imposes limitations on the authority of courts to order the Department
to act in child-welfare proceedings.107 The Shelby Doctrine asserts just the
opposite, namely, that modern circuit courts hold jurisdiction over juveniles
in equity that allows modern circuit courts to act outside the juvenile code
and that the juvenile code is “not the extent of circuit court jurisdiction over
minors.”108
Not surprisingly, the majority in Shelby cited only cases that predate
Amendment 67 to support its position that modern circuit courts have the
jurisdiction to act outside the juvenile code and order “necessary services.”109 This reliance is significant because the majority’s exclusive reliance on this limited swath of case law indicates that the majority did not
consider the import of Amendment 67 on the traditional jurisdiction over
juveniles asserted by the Shelby Doctrine—nor did the majority attempt to
distinguish extensive modern case law that circumscribes the authority and
jurisdiction of circuit courts. The reason for the majority’s failure to recognize modern case law is, of course, unclear, and whether or not the majority
affirmatively decided to ignore modern case law that did not support the
105. See supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text.
108. See Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. The majority in Shelby
acknowledged that the juvenile code does provide the substantive law and procedures applicable to juvenile matters covered by the juvenile code. Id. at 3, 2012 WL 401615, at *3 (“Exclusive, original jurisdiction for specified proceedings occurring under the Juvenile Code is
conferred on the circuit court.”). This acknowledgement, combined with the Shelby Doctrine’s core assertion that the juvenile code is not the only source of a circuit court’s jurisdiction over juveniles, further suggests that the majority interprets the circuit court’s jurisdiction
over juvenile code-based proceedings separate from the circuit court’s jurisdiction in equity
over juveniles.
109. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *3 (citing Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 680 S.W.2d
118 (1984); Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 32 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark
583, 12 S.W.2d 879 (1928); State v. Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481 (1882)).
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majority’s position, the majority in Shelby was clearly dissatisfied with the
Department’s efforts in the case and unquestionably relied on dated cases to
support the majority’s position.
The Shelby Doctrine’s assertion of equitable jurisdiction over juveniles
is also invalid under Amendment 67 because of what Amendment 67 does
not do. Specifically, Amendment 67 does not change the requirement that
equitable jurisdiction is only available if there are no adequate legal remedies available110 and does not change the limitation on the exercise of equitable jurisdiction over juveniles to only the person and the estate of the individual juvenile or juveniles before the given court exercising that jurisdiction.111 These requirements have governed equity jurisdiction in general
since antiquity and over juveniles specifically since before the introduction
of the first juvenile codes in Arkansas.112 The majority in Shelby, however,
did not apply any of these principles in its analysis or otherwise explain how
the circuit court below could have exerted equitable jurisdiction over juveniles at all, much less how that jurisdiction could justify the entry of an order against the Department to change the Department’s staffing in cases
other than the one before the circuit court.113 Instead, the majority assumed
that such jurisdiction was applicable and simply announced that juveniles
are “wards of the [circuit court] and [that] it is the duty of those courts to
make all orders that will properly safeguard the[] rights [of juveniles],”114 all
without mentioning that juvenile jurisdiction in equity has always been lim110. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 611, 80 S.W.3d 332, 336 (2002) (“[E]quity
jurisdiction exists only when the remedy at law is inadequate.”); Watson v. Henderson, 98
Ark. 63, 63, 135 S.W. 461, 464 (1911) (noting that even the jurisdiction in equity over juveniles is limited and “sits silent in the courts as long as the law is able to meet the demands of
justice”); see also supra note 80.
111. See, e.g., Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W.465, 470 (1919) (“The jurisdiction of chancery courts, as the jurisdiction of probate courts in matters relating to guardians, deals solely with the person and the estate of the individual infant, and has reference to
the interests of the particular jurisdiction over individual minors.”) (emphasis added); Jones,
13 Ark. App. at 105, 680 S.W.2d at 120 (providing that constitutionally created courts such
as chancery courts held their “traditional jurisdiction over individual minors”) (emphasis
added).
112. See, e.g., King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 470; Watson, 98 Ark. at 63, 135 S.W. at
464 (citing Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481; Myrick v. Jacks, 33 Ark. 425, 1878 WL
1283 (1878)); Jones, 13 Ark. App. at 105, 680 S.W.2d at 120.
113. See Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. Neither the circuit
court below nor the majority in Shelby provided any analysis as to the availability of an equitable remedy or whether or not the juvenile code provided an adequate remedy at law. And
neither the circuit court below nor the majority in Shelby addressed the limitation on equitable jurisdiction over juveniles to only the person and estate of the specific juvenile before the
circuit court.
114. Id. at 3, 2012 WL 401615, at *3 (citing Jones, 13 Ark. App. at 105, 680 S.W.2d at
118; Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 32 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583,
12 S.W.2d 879 (1928); Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481).
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ited to the specific juveniles appearing before the court of equity or the requirement that the equitable jurisdiction is only available if the remedy at
law is insufficient.
Amendment 67’s impact on a circuit court’s jurisdiction over juveniles
in equity, however, is not the only deficiency with the Shelby Doctrine’s
jurisdictional bases. As described below in Part III.B, the Shelby Doctrine’s
framework also violates Arkansas’s sovereign immunity doctrine.
B.

Sovereign Immunity, the Judiciary’s Inherent Powers, and the Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts to Enter Shelby-Style Orders

The doctrine of sovereign immunity in Arkansas is as old as the state
itself and has long protected the state and state agencies115 from becoming a
defendant or otherwise being coerced in any state court except in certain
narrow circumstances where a recognized exception to the immunity applies.116 The majority in Shelby, however, failed to address the Department’s
sovereign immunity directly, much less provide any analysis as to why the
doctrine of sovereign immunity would not apply to the Department in the
case.
This failure is remarkable because, absent the juvenile code and related
statutes, there is no other legal authority for any court in Arkansas to order
the Department to provide services, take custody of juveniles, or otherwise
act to provide for the welfare of juveniles. Although the majority did touch
on overlapping principles common to both the separation of powers and
sovereign immunity regarding the general prohibition against courts directing the discretionary actions of executive agencies,117 the majority never
developed a fully-formed sovereign immunity analysis of the prohibition
against any compelled action that sovereign immunity adds to separation-ofpowers principles. As a result, the majority in Shelby effectively conflated
the two doctrines and subsumed sovereign immunity as nothing more than a
restatement of separation-of-powers principles that only prohibit one branch

115. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 731,
733; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Eddings, 2011 Ark. 47, at 4, 378 S.W.3d 694, 697 (citing
Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 301 Ark. 451, 784 S.W.2d 771 (1990));
Short v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 347 Ark. 497, 65 S.W.3d 440 (2002).
116. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 (“The State of Arkansas shall never be made
defendant in any of her courts.”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 487–
88, 850 S.W.2d 847, 850–51 (1993); Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Flake, 254 Ark. 624,
628, 495 S.W.2d 855, 858 (1973) (“Sovereign immunity was a common law doctrine that
originated centuries before the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
117. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 4–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *4–5.
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of government from exercising the powers of another branch of government.118
This article therefore now turns to address these issues and ultimately
concludes that the Shelby Doctrine violates the Department’s sovereign immunity because the Department’s sovereign immunity applies to invalidate
Shelby-style orders, and none of the exceptions to the sovereign immunity
doctrine apply. In addition, the broad Inherent Protection Power asserted in
Shelby should not constitute a new exception to sovereign immunity that
would otherwise authorize the entry of Shelby-style orders.
1.

Sovereign Immunity Applies to Invalidate the Shelby Doctrine

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides state agencies with jurisdictional immunity from suit and prohibits any legal action against a state
agency that has the purpose or effect, directly or indirectly, of coercing the
state agency to act or not act.119 Coercion to act includes compelling a state
agency to spend funds from the State’s treasury, subjecting the State to liability, or otherwise controlling the action of a state agency. 120 The Shelby
Doctrine therefore triggers the Department’s sovereign immunity because
the Department is an agency of the State and Shelby-style orders sanctioned
under the Shelby Doctrine coerce the Department to act to affirmatively
“fix” problems identified by a court even where the order has the effect of
compelling the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise
dictating the Department’s internal operations in child-welfare cases.
118. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *4–5 (citing Villines v. Lee, 321 Ark. 405, 902 S.W.2d 233
(1995)) (discussing the separation-of-powers doctrine but failing to note that the exceptions
to the general prohibition against reviewing discretionary executive functions described in
Villines are based on sovereign immunity principles).
119. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20; LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 372
Ark. 40, 42, 269 S.W.3d 793, 795 (2007) (observing that sovereign immunity requires the
dismissal of a legal action if it “operate[s] to control the action of the State or subject[s] it to
liability”); Travelers Cas. v. State Highway Comm’n, 353 Ark. 721, 726–28, 120 S.W.3d 50,
52–54 (2003) (same); State, 312 Ark. at 487–89, 850 S.W.2d at 850–51 (explaining that
sovereign immunity applies to “[a]ny suit, whether in law or equity, which has for its purpose
and effect, directly or indirectly, coercing the State”). See generally Jack Druff, State Court
Sovereign Immunity: Just When Is the Emperor Armor-Clad?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 255 (2002).
120. LandsnPulaski, 372 Ark. at 42, 269 S.W.3d at 795; Travelers, 353 Ark. at 727–28,
120 S.W.3d at 52–54; Short, 347 Ark. at 504–08, 65 S.W.3d at 445–48 (providing that forcing the State to pay funds from its treasury renders the State a defendant and violates its sovereign immunity); Dermott Spec. Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 90, 93, 32 S.W.3d 477, 479
(2000) (same); Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 527, 121 S.W. 742, 745–46 (1909) (providing
that suits that compel state officers to “do acts which would impose a contractual pecuniary
liability upon the state, or to issue any evidence of debt, in the name of the state, which would
have that result, is in fact and legal effect a suit against the state” and therefore prohibited).
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In Shelby, for example, Judge Brown affirmatively commanded the
Department to reduce the caseload of the caseworker involved in the case—
an order that clearly seeks to control the Department’s internal and discretionary staffing functions. And notwithstanding Judge Brown’s disclaimer
that he did not intend to “micromanage” the Department,121 Judge Brown
effectively required the Department to either hire new caseworkers or transfer existing caseworkers into the county to reduce the Department’s caseload per worker overall by prohibiting the Department from moving the high
caseload to another caseworker.122 Moreover, because there is no way for the
caseworker’s caseload to change without assigning the cases to new or existing caseworkers, the Department would also likely be required to spend
funds from the State’s treasury to pay for new salaries, mileage, and other
attendant expenses in order to comply with the order in Shelby and other
Shelby-style orders.
And even if the analysis assumes, as the majority in Shelby held, that
the circuit court was not attempting to control discretionary staffing issues,
but rather was merely seeking to obtain a case plan that the Department was
“obligated to provide,” the circuit court still ordered the Department to “fix
the problems that stopped [the Department] from fulfilling its obligations
and duties” and identified the “problem” as being the high caseload of the
caseworker.123 The difference between telling a state agency to “fix” some121. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *2–4. As Justice Danielson observed in his forceful dissent in Shelby, the transcript of the permanency planning hearing and
Judge Brown’s written order expressly designate the caseworker’s caseload as the specific
issue that the Department was to rectify within five business days. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at
*2–4 (majority opinion) (“Forty-one cases, especially the type of cases she has, is too many
and I want that rectified within five business days of today’s court order.”); id. at 6, 2012 WL
401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2, 2012 WL 401615, at *2 (majority opinion) (“Now, somebody’s going to
have to split out some of these cases and . . . I don’t want nobody else to get 41 either as a
result of it.”); id. at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Judge
Brown’s disclaimer that he had no intention to micromanage the Department “makes it more
evident that the circuit court wrongly believed it had some sort of management authority” at
all). And while there might be some argument that there might be systemic or policy changes
that could be implemented to address the caseworker’s high caseload—such as through programs like the Department’s new differential response model aimed at reducing custody cases
in favor of alternate, non-custody-based approaches—it is nearly impossible that such broad
changes could occur within Judge Brown’s five-day window in which the Department was to
“fix” the problem and in any case would still constitute coercion of the Department. See
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES,
POLICY & PROCEDURES MANUAL 18–27 (2015), available at http://humanservices.
arkansas.gov/dcfs/dcfsDocs/Master%20DCFS%20Policy.pdf. The five-day window, in turn,
left redirecting new caseworkers or transferring new existing caseworkers into the county as
the only viable option to comply with Judge Brown’s order—with an order compelling the
Department to do either clearly constituting an order coercing the Department to act.
123. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *2–4.
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thing to ensure a specific result and telling a state agency exactly how to fix
something to ensure a specific result is simply a distinction without a difference, as both coerce the Department to take some action. And as described
below, there is no authority for a state court to use the Department’s failure
to comply with the requirements of the juvenile code to trigger additional
jurisdiction over the Department.
2.

The Shelby Doctrine Is Not Saved by Any Recognized Exceptions
to Sovereign Immunity

The Shelby Doctrine and all Shelby-style orders that coerce the Department to act under the jurisdiction and authority asserted by the Shelby
Doctrine are invalid under the sovereign immunity doctrine unless an exception to sovereign immunity applies. The only exceptions that the Arkansas
Supreme Court has recognized to this immunity are those circumstances in
which (1) the General Assembly has created a specific waiver of an agency’s sovereign immunity (“the Waiver Exception”), (2) the state agency
waives sovereign immunity as the moving party seeking specific relief (“the
Moving Party Exception”), (3) the state agency or an officer of a state agency is refusing to do a purely ministerial action required by statute or is acting illegally (“the Ministerial Exception”), or (4) the coercion of a state
agency arises from the court’s contempt powers (“the Contempt Exception”).124 As described below, however, the Shelby Doctrine is not saved
from invalidation by the Department’s sovereign immunity because none of
these exceptions apply to authorize a circuit court to act beyond the authority conferred by the juvenile code.
a.

The General Assembly did not sufficiently waive the Department’s sovereign immunity in child-welfare cases to allow Shelby-style orders

The General Assembly did not create a sufficient waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity under the Waiver Exception to allow Shelby-style orders. This is because the Waiver Exception applies to a state
agency like the Department only if the General Assembly creates a specific
waiver by either a statute’s express terms or by the necessary implication of
a statute’s express terms.125 The General Assembly, however, has not creat-

124. See, e.g., Landsnpulaski, 371 Ark. at 43, 269 S.W.3d at 795–96; Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232 (1998); State, 312 Ark. at 488,
850 S.W.2d at 850–51.
125. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, at 4–6, 425 S.W.3d
731, 734–35 (providing that the State’s sovereign immunity can be waived where the General
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ed a sufficient waiver that permits Shelby-style orders through either of these modes of operation. First, no statute by its express terms authorizes a
circuit court to order the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or
otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations. Second, the juvenile
code should not be interpreted to waive impliedly the Department’s sovereign immunity except as specifically waived in the context of the Department’s express obligations under the juvenile code, obligations that do not
cover the Department’s internal operations much less the entry of Shelbystyle orders.
The question of implied waiver, however, is a tedious one given the juvenile code’s numerous and often lengthy sections126 and the judiciary’s
recognition that the roles and responsibilities as between the circuit court
and the Department in child-welfare proceedings are not well defined under
the juvenile code.127 The juvenile code’s mandate to protect juveniles also
does not clearly specify what roles the judiciary and the Department have
with respect to achieving those worthy goals.128 Even the specific obligations imposed do not always make clear the allocation of authority and responsibility between the Department and the judiciary. This article therefore
now turns to evaluating the propriety of implied waiver by considering existing case law and the juvenile code’s statutory scheme.
i.

Arkansas law suggests that the juvenile code does not
impliedly waive the Department’s sovereign immunity

The question of whether or not the juvenile code creates any implied
waivers of the Department’s sovereign immunity has never been specifically
addressed by Arkansas’s appellate courts. Arkansas law, however, supports
the conclusion that the juvenile code does not create any implied waivers of
the Department’s sovereign immunity because Arkansas’s courts have recAssembly creates “a specific waiver of sovereign immunity,” and further providing that a “[a]
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity may be express or implied”).
126. For the purposes of this subsection, references to the juvenile code include ARK.
CODE. ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Supp. 2013) as well as other sections of the Arkansas Code
that impose further obligations on the Department that are part and parcel to most childwelfare proceedings. Most notably, such additional sections include ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 928-101 to -120 (Supp. 2013).
127. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 407, 802 S.W.2d 461,
463 (1991) (“The jurisdictions of the juvenile court and DHS overlap in numerous and varied
areas.”); Bruce Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare
Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 377,
383–84 (1995). Nor is Arkansas different in this regard from other states. See generally id.
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Supp. 2013). Other sections also provide that “the
state has a responsibility to protect children from abuse and neglect by providing services and
supports that promote the safety, permanency, and well-being of the children and families of
Arkansas.” Id. § 9-28-101 (Supp. 2013).
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ognized that even though the juvenile code does provide for specific exceptions to sovereign immunity in child-welfare proceedings, the exceptions are
limited to the juvenile code’s express provisions that allow circuit courts to
order “family services.”129 Notably, this is the main provision in the juvenile
code that allows a circuit court to order the Department to take any kind of
specific, affirmative action.
As the Arkansas Supreme Court in Arkansas Department of Human
Services v. R.P. observed, the juvenile code created only a specific waiver to
sovereign immunity by allowing circuit courts to order the Department to
provide “family services” in child-welfare cases,130 but expressly limited the
waiver to the “family services” that circuit courts were allowed to order under—and as defined by—the juvenile code.131 The juvenile code in turn expressly prescribes the services that a circuit court can order the Department
to perform to only those services that are (1) relevant, (2) provided to the
given juvenile or the juvenile’s family, and (3) provided in order to prevent
a juvenile from being removed, reunite a juvenile with the person from
whom the juvenile was removed, implement a permanent plan of adoption
or guardianship in a dependency-neglect case, or rehabilitate a juvenile in
delinquency or family-in-need-of-services cases.132
Furthermore, a plain-text reading of the definition of “family services”
indicates that “family services” does not encompass Shelby-style orders because Shelby-style orders that direct the Department to “fix” a problem identified by a court and have the effect of coercing the Department to reduce a
caseworker’s caseload or otherwise direct the Department’s internal operations are simply not a service provided to the juvenile or the juvenile’s family as the definition of “family services” requires.133 Rather, such orders are
129. See R.P., 333 Ark. at 531–32, 970 S.W.2d at 232–33.
130. Although R.P. dealt with a family-in-need-of-services case governed by the juvenile
code, the same limited waiver applies in dependency-neglect cases such as Shelby because
dependency-neglect cases share disposition limitations that are, in relevant part, identical to
family-in-need-of-services cases. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-334 (Repl. 2013)
(providing that a circuit court is limited in dependency-neglect cases to ordering the Department to perform “family services”), with id. § 9-27-332.
131. R.P., 333 Ark. at 331–32, 970 S.W.2d at 232–33.
132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(B) (Supp. 2013); R.P., 333 Ark. at 331–32, 970
S.W.2d at 232–33 (providing that the definition of “family services” sets the contours of the
General Assembly’s limited waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity). The definition
of “family services” was amended in 2013 to clarify when a circuit court could order the
Department to provide services to rehabilitate a juvenile, but the definition provided here
matches in relevant part the definition in place at the time the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Shelby in 2012. See Act of Apr. 10, 2013, No. 1055, § 5, 2013 Ark. Acts 3963, 3965.
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25). An argument could be made that any order related
to the Department’s caseworker operations would constitute a service to the juvenile or the
family through the casework and case management services that the Department provides to
families. Under this argument, the order in Shelby to modify a caseworker’s caseload and the
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expressly and exclusively directed to the Department. In addition, interpreting such orders as “family services” would violate the maxim of statutory
interpretation known as eiusdem generis because the Department’s internal
operations do not fit within the category of services specifically listed in the
“family services” definition134—which all relate to actual services provided
to the juvenile or the family and do not include any example services related
to the Department’s operations.135 By contrast, directly ordering the Department to prepare a case plan, which was not prepared in Shelby,136 would

Department’s staffing overall would be a service because the order impacts the Department’s
operations, which impacts the Department’s casework, which impacts the casework services
that the Department provides to the juvenile and the family. Such an interpretation, however,
would improperly expand the category of services authorized under “family services” to
include any act as long as the act merely relates to the actual services provided to the family.
First, the interpretation would read out of the definition the requirement that the act ordered
by the court be a service affirmatively provided to the juvenile or the juvenile’s family. Id. §
9-27-303(25)(A); Hobbs v. Baird, 2011 Ark. 261, at 3, 2011 WL 2412740, at *3 (observing
that laws must be interpreted “so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and
we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible”); Larry Hobbs Farm
Equip. v. CNH Am., LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 383, 291 S.W.3d 190, 194 (2009) (same); Ark.
Comp. Health Ins. Pool v. Denton, 374 Ark. 162, 165, 286 S.W.3d 698, 701 (2008) (same).
Second, the interpretation would defeat the express terms of the statutory definition by allowing the limited definition of “family services” to be swallowed by an effectively unlimited
definition of “family services” that includes any service that merely relates to the actual services provided to the family. See, e.g., Griffen v. Ark. Jud. Discipline Comm’n, 355 Ark. 38,
52–53, 130 S.W.3d 524, 533 (2003) (declining to interpret a judicial canon to allow a judge
to speak with a legislator about any matter of interest to the judge because that interpretation
would swallow the rule that prohibits judges from consulting with bodies or officers of the
other branches); Willett v. State, 334 Ark. 40, 42–43, 970 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1998) (declining
to interpret the rules of attorney practice allowing “nonresident lawyers” to practice in Arkansas pro hac vice to allow non-practicing lawyers who are licensed in another state but
reside in Arkansas to practice in Arkansas because such an interpretation would swallow the
non-resident lawyer rule). Third, the interpretation would be contrary to Arkansas appellate
courts’ long-standing interpretation that “family services” was a limited definition that imposes limitation on juvenile courts’ authority to order the Department to act. See supra notes
51, 92–96 and accompanying text.
134. See Edwards v. Campbell, 2010 Ark. 398, at 4–5, 370 S.W.3d 250, 253 (describing
eiusdem generis, the doctrine of interpretation that provides that when general words follow
enumerations of particular things, the general words must be interpreted to include only those
things of the same kind as those specifically enumerated things); State v. Oldner, 361 Ark.
316, 327, 206 S.W.3d 818, 822 (2005) (same); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W.
465, 468–69 (1919) (same).
135. The definition of “family services” includes an unbounded list of example services,
including child care, homemaker services, crisis counseling, cash assistance, transportation,
family therapy, physical, psychiatric, and psychological evaluation, counseling, and treatment. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(A) (Supp. 2013).
136. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2, 4, 2012 WL 401615, at
*2, 4.
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constitute a direct service provided by the Department to the juvenile and
the family that requires the participation of the juvenile and the family.137
And even if Shelby-style orders were to be deemed a proper service
provided to the juvenile or the juvenile’s family, the “service” would arguably still not fall within the “family services” portion of the juvenile code’s
limited waiver because such a “service” would not fall within the limited
legitimate purposes that the juvenile code’s definition of “family services”
requires.138 These purposes limit “family services” to only those services
that are provided to prevent removal, reunify the juvenile with the person
from whom the juvenile was removed, implement a permanency plan of
guardianship or adoption in a dependency-neglect case, or rehabilitate a
juvenile in a delinquency or family-in-need-of-services case.139
For example, the service would not be for the purpose of preventing
removal of a juvenile from a home because the Department’s failure to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or make other changes to the Department’s
internal operations would not—as the juvenile code requires—constitute an
immediate danger to a juvenile where removal would be necessary to prevent serious harm to the juvenile.140 Likewise, the service would not be for
137. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-402, 9-28-111 (Supp. 2013). Case plans are an important
element in dependency-neglect cases and require the Department to develop case plans with
the family and other interested parties in dependency-neglect cases in order to set out the
“plan for services for a juvenile and his or her family” and to let the family know what is
required of them in the case. Id. §§ 9-27-303(9), -337, -338, -341, -359 to -361, 9-28-111
(Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013).
138. See id. § 9-27-303(25)(B). In addition, the juvenile code also imposes express limitations on the definition of “family services” and a circuit court’s ability to enter certain orders
related to them. For example, the juvenile code specifically prohibits a circuit court from
specifying a specific provider of “family services.” Id. § 9-27-335(b)(1) (Supp. 2013). Likewise, “cash assistance” is one of the services that a circuit court is empowered to order the
Department to provide—but the juvenile code provides a specific definition for cash assistance that excludes certain types of assistance, including long-term financial assistance; financial assistance that is the equivalent of a foster-care board payment, an adoption subsidy,
or a guardianship subsidy; and financial assistance for car insurance. Id. § 9-27-303(10)(B)
(Supp. 2013). Such exclusions accordingly narrow the services that a circuit court could order
the Department to perform and narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity that R.P. and other
cases recognize.
139. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, at 7–8, 423 S.W.3d
86, 90.
140. Id., 423 S.W.3d at 90 (holding that an order directing the Department to provide
school uniforms to a juvenile was not for the purpose of preventing removal because the lack
of school uniforms did not constitute an immediate danger where removal was necessary to
prevent serious harm to the juvenile, which are required elements under the juvenile code).
The Department’s failure to prepare a case plan in Shelby would also not meet this requirement for the same reasons: the lack of a case plan would not itself constitute an immediate
danger to a juvenile where removal would be necessary to prevent serious harm to the juvenile. Cf. id., 423 S.W.3d at 90. Moreover, in Shelby, the juvenile had already been removed at
the time of the circuit court’s order, so the purpose could not have been to prevent removal.
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the purpose of reunifying a juvenile with the person from whom the juvenile
was removed because changes to a caseworker’s caseload or the Department’s other internal operations would not make a juvenile more or less safe
if the juvenile were to be returned, which is how the juvenile code evaluates
reunification.141 The service would also not be for the purpose of implementing a permanent plan of adoption or guardianship in a dependency-neglect
case because changes to a caseworker’s caseload or the Department’s other
internal operations would not implement the adoption or guardianship of a
juvenile, prepare a juvenile for adoption or guardianship, prepare a prospective adoptive parent or guardian, or otherwise impact any element of the law
governing adoptions or guardianships in Arkansas.142 Finally, the service
would not be for the purpose of rehabilitating a juvenile in a delinquency or
family-in-need-of-services case because changes to a caseworker’s caseload
or the Department’s other internal operations in a dependency-neglect case
simply do not relate to the rehabilitation of a juvenile.143
141. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(48)(A)(iii) (“In determining whether or not to
remove a child from a home or return a child back to a home, the child’s health and safety
shall be the paramount concern.”) (emphasis added); id. § 9-27-337(e)(1)(C)(iii) (providing
that in all review hearings the circuit could shall determine whether the juvenile should be
returned to his parents based on the best interests of the juvenile and “whether or not the
juvenile’s health and safety can be protected by his or her parent or parents if returned
home”); id. § 9-27-338(c) (providing that the statutory preference at permanency planning
hearings is to return a juvenile to a fit parent or to the person from whom custody was removed if it is in the best interests of the juvenile and the juvenile’s health and safety can be
adequately safeguarded if returned home); see also id. § 9-27-302(1)–(2) (Supp. 2013)
(providing that the health and safety of the juvenile shall be the measure of when a juvenile
must be removed from a home); id. § 9-27-328(a)–(b) (providing that a juvenile should not
be removed from his or her home unless the health and safety of the juvenile warrant immediate removal in order to protect the juvenile); id. § 9-27-332(a)(2) (Supp. 2013) (same); id. §
9-27-335(e) (same). The permanency planning statute in fact provides specific conditions for
reunification to occur and specific conditions to continue with reunification, none of which
involve the Department’s staffing operations. Id. § 9-27-338(c).
142. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-9-201 to -224 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (Revised Uniform
Adoption Act); id. §§ 28-65-101 to -704 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (“the Guardianship
Code”). The facts in Shelby demonstrate even more directly that changes to the Department’s
internal staffing operations are not provided to implement an adoption or guardianship because there was in fact no permanency plan established in Shelby other than reunification, so
the purpose could not have been to implement a permanent plan of adoption or guardianship.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2, 2012 WL 401615, at *2 (observing that the circuit court declined to hold a permanency planning hearing, which would have
changed the goal in the case from reunification to another permanency plan). When Shelby
was decided, the purposes sanctioned by the juvenile code were slightly different, but still
covered the implementation of adoption and guardianship permanency plans as appropriate
purposes. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(B)(iii).
143. Shelby was also a dependency-neglect case, a type of case in which the juvenile
code—unlike with delinquency or family-in-need-of-services cases—does not provide the
rehabilitation of a juvenile as an appropriate disposition. Compare id. § 9-27-330 (Supp.
2013) (providing for the rehabilitation of juveniles as a permissible disposition in delinquen-
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Furthermore, interpreting Shelby-style orders as meeting one of the juvenile code’s legitimate purposes would be inappropriate for two additional
reasons. First, such an interpretation would improperly expand the category
of services authorized under “family services” to allow a court to order the
Department to perform any act so long as the act merely relates to actual,
legitimately-purposed “family services” that the Department provides to the
juvenile or the family.144 Second, such an interpretation would eviscerate
any meaningful separation of powers between the judiciary and the Department in child-welfare cases and empower a circuit court to act as a manager
of an executive agency. Indeed, the only connection between one of the limited legitimate purposes for “family services” and ordering the Department
to change its internal operations or a court managing the use of the Department’s resources is that such orders relate to services that the Department
provides insofar as the Department’s caseworkers provide the services.
The holding in R.P. is also in harmony with numerous cases that recognize that the juvenile code limits the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts to
only that jurisdiction provided by the General Assembly in the juvenile
code.145 For example, in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. A.M.,
the Arkansas Court of Appeals invalidated an order directing the Department to pay for a juvenile’s school uniforms because the lack of school uniforms did not constitute an immediate danger where removal was necessary
to prevent serious harm to the juvenile as would be required under the juvenile code to authorize removal.146 Although A.M. was not based on the Department’s sovereign immunity per se, it did recognize that the definition of
“family services”—and the meaning of the terms in the definition—imposed
limitations on what a circuit court could order the Department to do in the
same way that the courts in R.P. and other cases have evaluated the propriety of court orders against the statutory definition of “family services.”147
cy cases), and id. § 9-27-332 (providing for the rehabilitation of juveniles as a permissible
disposition in family-in-need-of-services cases), with id. § 9-27-334 (Supp. 2013) (omitting
the rehabilitation of juveniles from the list of permissible dispositions in dependency-neglect
cases); see Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2, 2012 WL 401615, at *2. And even though anyone who
has ever practiced in dependency-neglect cases would note that courts routinely address juvenile rehabilitation in dependency-neglect cases, the juvenile code has now been amended to
limit “family services” in dependency-neglect cases by excluding services provided for the
purpose of rehabilitating juveniles. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(B)(iii), (iv)
(Supp. 2013), with id. § 9-27-303(25)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2012).
144. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
145. Supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text.
146. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, at 7–8, 423 S.W.3d 86,
90.
147. Compare id., 423 S.W.3d at 90, with Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.B., 347 Ark.
593, 601–03, 67 S.W.3d 539, 544–46 (2002) (finding that an order to pay $48,000 for a juvenile’s sex offender treatment did not violate the Department’s sovereign immunity because it
fell within the “cash assistance” and “treatment” provisions of the “family services” defini-
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R.P. and A.M. also reflect the limited jurisdiction and authority prescribed by the express terms of the juvenile code itself. Most notably, the
juvenile code currently provides circuit courts with only a limited jurisdiction to hear child-welfare proceedings148 and only a limited authority to act
in child-welfare proceedings.149 For example, the juvenile code provides that
modern circuit courts are only empowered to make certain specific dispositions in dependency-neglect cases, namely, ordering the Department to provide family services as discussed above; setting custody of juveniles found
to be dependent-neglected, including placing custody of such juveniles with
the Department; and ordering parenting classes for the parents150—with each
of those dispositions in turn heavily circumscribed in other sections of the
juvenile code.151

tion); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–33
(1998) (holding that order to pay money to restore a family’s utilities did not violate the
Department’s sovereign immunity because it fell within the “cash assistance” provision of the
“family services” definition and the services were offered to prevent the removal of the juvenile); Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. C.M., 100 Ark. App. 414, 417, 269 S.W.3d
387, 389–90 (2007) (holding that an order to pay the attorney fees for a juvenile in the Department’s custody did not violate the Department’s sovereign immunity because it fell within the “cash assistance” provision of the “family services” definition); supra notes 51, 92–96
and accompanying text.
148. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a)(1) (Supp. 2013).
149. See id. §§ 9-27-329 to -335, -355 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (providing jurisdiction
and authority of modern circuit courts to act in child-welfare proceedings); supra notes 51,
92–96 and accompanying text; id. §§ 9-9-101 to -405 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (providing
the terms of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which imposes
limitations on the jurisdiction and authority to act in child-welfare proceedings).
150. See, e.g., id. § 9-27-334(a). Although section 9-27-334 applies only to dependencyneglect cases like Shelby, the juvenile code provides similar prescriptions of authority in the
other two types of child-welfare proceedings governed by the juvenile code, delinquency and
families-in-need-of-services cases. See id. § 9-27-330 (prescribing disposition limitations in
delinquency cases); id. § 9-27-331 (same); id. § 9-27-332 (Supp. 2013) (prescribing disposition limitations in family-in-need-of-services cases); id. § 9-27-333 (same).
151. See, e.g., id. § 9-27-334(a)(2) (limiting a circuit court’s authority to place custody of
a juvenile with the Department only if it is in the best interests of the juvenile and only if the
juvenile is physically placed with a licensed or approved foster home, shelter, or facility or
exempt child-welfare agency); id. § 9-27-335 (limiting the disposition that a circuit court can
order, including as to services and placement provided by the Department; prohibiting a
circuit from ordering a specific provider for placement or family services except in limited
circumstances; prohibiting a court from transferring custody of a juvenile to an individual
absent a written home study; prohibiting a court from transferring custody of a juvenile unless the Department used reasonable efforts to provide family services and prevent removal
of the juvenile from the home unless the court makes other specific findings; and prohibiting
a court from ordering the Department to expend or forward social security benefits when the
Department is the payee of the benefits); id. § 9-27-355 (limiting a circuit court’s authority to
make placements involving the Department, including precluding a circuit court from ordering a particular foster care placement).
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Further, the narrow limited waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity recognized by Arkansas courts indicates that circuit courts do not
necessarily need control over the internal operations of the Department in
order to give effect to the juvenile code’s statutory scheme. Indeed, if circuit
courts did need such control in order to give effect to the juvenile code’s
statutory scheme, then would not circuit courts have the authority to order
the Department to provide any relevant services in child-welfare proceedings that the court found would directly address the issues in a given childwelfare proceeding? Cases like R.P. and A.M. implicitly reject that conclusion by not recognizing a broad authority that would allow circuit courts to
exceed their authority under the juvenile code.
Absent such a broad authority obtaining from the juvenile code’s statutory scheme, the only way for circuit courts to have the authority to issue
Shelby-style orders would be if such authority was allowed based on a specific statutory component of the juvenile code related to obligations imposed
on the Department or the judiciary. This article therefore now evaluates
whether the juvenile code’s statutory scheme creates an implied waiver of
the Department’s sovereign immunity.
ii.

The R.P.-McLemore framework indicates the juvenile
code does not create implied waivers of the Department’s sovereign immunity

The juvenile code’s statutory scheme is broadly purposed for the judiciary to protect juveniles and “assure that all juveniles brought to the attention of the courts receive the guidance, care, and control . . . that will best
serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the
best interest of the state.”152 To achieve these ends, the juvenile code places
152. Id. § 9-27-302(1) (Supp. 2013). The juvenile code also provides other related purposes, such as the following:
To preserve and strengthen the juvenile’s family ties when it is in the best
interest of the juvenile; . . . [t]o protect a juvenile by considering the juvenile’s health and safety as the paramount concerns in determining
whether or not to remove the juvenile from the custody of his or her parents or custodians, removing the juvenile only when the safety and protection of the public cannot adequately be safeguarded without such removal; . . . to secure for [juveniles removed from his or her own family]
custody care and discipline with primary emphasis on ensuring the health
and safety of the juvenile while in the out-of-home placement; . . . [t]o
assure, in all cases in which a juvenile must be permanently removed
from the custody of his or her parents, that the juvenile be placed in an
approved family home and be made a member of the family by adoption; . . . [t]o protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation
and rehabilitative restitution, recognizing that the application of sanctions
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numerous obligations on the judiciary and the Department.153 The question
therefore becomes, do any of the these purposes or obligations imply a
waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity so as to allow a circuit
court to order the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations?
Arkansas courts have found implied waiver only where the implication
of a statute’s express terms necessarily requires waiver of an agency’s sovereign immunity in order to give effect to the statutory scheme and avoid
absurd results related to express provisions. Further, Arkansas case law illustrates a useful four-step framework for determining whether the implication of a statute’s express terms necessarily requires the waiver of a state
agency’s sovereign immunity (“the R.P.-McLemore framework”). First,
does the given statute impose a non-discretionary154 obligation on the judiciary or the Department to act for the benefit of another party in the case? If
so, second, does the statute specify a remedial mechanism to address a failure of the judiciary or the Department to perform that obligation? If not,
third, is there any other remedial mechanism that would give effect to the
obligation? If not, fourth, does the agency’s sovereign immunity need to be
waived in order to give effect to the obligation in the way intended by the
statutory scheme?
In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. R.P., for example, the
Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the juvenile code’s express terms that
authorized circuit courts to “order family services” but did not specify who
would provide or otherwise pay for such services.155 The Arkansas Supreme
Court nevertheless held that the General Assembly specifically waived the
that are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all
cases; and . . . [t]o provide means through which the provisions of this
subchapter are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured
a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized
and enforced.
Id. § 9-27-302(2)–(3).
153. E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 409, 802 S.W.2d 461, 464
(1991) (providing that the juvenile code prescribes affirmative requirements that are designed
to achieve the juvenile code’s statutory purposes).
154. The nondiscretionary component of the R.P.-McLemore framework flows implicitly
from the namesake cases described below involving nondiscretionary obligations of state
agency, but also reflects the well-established rule in Arkansas that the judiciary does not have
the authority to compel an executive or legislative body to perform a discretionary act. See,
e.g., T.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 656–57, 210 S.W.3d 79, 82–83 (2005)
(providing that a court lacks the authority to compel an executive or legislative body to act if
the duty to act is discretionary); Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 550, 898 S.W.2d 43, 45–
46 (1995) (same); State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 426, 426, 3 S.W. 352, 360 (1887); Hawkins v.
Governor, 1 Ark. 570, 587–92, 1839 Ark. LEXIS 29, at *13–15 (1839).
155. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–
33 (1998).
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Department’s sovereign immunity to being ordered to provide family services in child-welfare proceedings because “[a]ny other interpretation would
effectively eviscerate the court’s power to order family services,” especially
given that in certain types of child-welfare proceedings, the proceedings
could be initiated by “any adult” and the Department would not even be a
party involved in the case at all.156 The General Assembly, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held, could not have intended such a consequence and would
have understood that the Department’s sovereign immunity would need to
be waived as to providing family services in child-welfare proceedings even
where the Department was not yet a party.157
Likewise, in Weiss v. McLemore the Arkansas Supreme Court evaluated the sovereign immunity of the state agency responsible for managing the
retirement program for the Arkansas State Police against suits brought by
retirees to compel the agency to correct errors in retirement payments.158 In
such circumstances, the Court held that the agency’s sovereign immunity
was waived because the applicable statute expressly directed the agency to
adjust errant payments and correct the error that caused errant payments. 159
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that even though the statute did not
specify a remedial mechanism for an aggrieved retiree to correct an underpayment like the statute provided the agency to collect an overpayment, the
General Assembly could not have intended aggrieved retirees to be unable
to compel the agency to correct errant payments as required by the statute.160
Such a result, the Court held, would “eviscerate the purpose of the statute,”
which was expressly designed to correct errors of payments.161
In the case of the obligations imposed by the juvenile code and the necessity of Shelby-style orders to give effect to the obligations and the juvenile code’s statutory scheme, the most likely types of obligations that could
require that circuit courts have the authority to issue Shelby-style orders are

156. Id. at 532, 970 S.W.2d at 233. Moreover, even the waiver of sovereign immunity
recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court is limited because the juvenile code also prescribes limitations on the family services that a court can order. For example, the juvenile
code’s definition of “family services” itself limits the services that a circuit court can order to
only such services as are permitted through the definitions, terms, and purposes. See supra
notes 130–46 and accompanying text. Likewise, section 9-27-335(b)(1) limits the “family
services” waiver to only allow circuit courts to order family services that are provided
through a provider of the Department’s choosing. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-335(b)(1). In sum,
these and other limitations narrow the General Assembly’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
157. R.P., 333 Ark. at 532, 970 S.W.2d at 233.
158. Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 541–44, 268 S.W.3d 897, 900–02 (2007).
159. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 900–02.
160. Id. at 544, 268 S.W.3d at 902.
161. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 902.
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the Department’s obligation to provide “services”162 and the circuit court’s
related power to order the Department to provide “family services” in certain child-welfare proceedings.163 The R.P.-McLemore framework, however,
indicates that the authority to issue Shelby-style orders is not required in
order to give effect to either obligation. First, the only non-discretionary
obligation is the Department’s obligation to provide “family services” as
ordered by the circuit court because all services that do not fall within the
definition of “family services” are within the sole discretion of the Department to provide and are not subject to judicial coercion.164 Second, at least
four remedial mechanisms exist to give effect to the “family services” obligation and eliminate the need for a circuit court to have the authority to issue Shelby-style orders.
The first three remedial mechanisms are related to the requirement under federal and state law that the Department provide “reasonable efforts” in
child-welfare proceedings and provide significant consequences if the Department fails to provide appropriate services sufficient to meet the “reasonable efforts” standard.165 For example, the juvenile code provides that if a
circuit court finds that the Department has not made “reasonable efforts” to
provide services to prevent a juvenile’s removal, the circuit court may dismiss the child-welfare proceeding outright, order family services to prevent
the juvenile’s removal from the home, or transfer custody of the juvenile to

162. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-103 (Supp. 2013) (providing that the Department must
provide “services to dependent-neglected children and their families” and prevent the need to
remove a maltreated juvenile from his or her home).
163. See id. § 9-27-303(25) (Supp. 2013) (defining “family services” in child-welfare
proceedings); id. § 9-27-332(a)(1) (Supp. 2013) (authorizing circuit courts to order “family
services” in family-in-need-of-services cases); id. § 9-27-334(a)(1) (Supp. 2013) (authorizing
circuit courts to order “family services” in dependency-neglect cases); see also Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–33 (1998).
164. See supra note 154. In this way, the statutory dichotomy between the undefined
“services” the Department is required to provide and the limited, narrowly defined “family
services” that a circuit court is permitted to order is significant and does not defeat the juvenile code’s statutory scheme as to services that do not fall within the definition of “family
services” because the juvenile code specifically contemplates that the only services that are
enforceable in child-welfare proceedings are “family services.” Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-27-332(a)(1), and id. § 9-27-334(a)(1), with id. § 9-28-103.
165. “Reasonable efforts” are defined by statute as the requirement that the Department
“exercise reasonable diligence and care to utilize all available services related to meeting the
needs of the juvenile and the family.” id. § 9-27-303(48)(A)(iv). More specifically, “reasonable efforts” are required under state law in three circumstances in child-welfare proceedings:
to prevent removal, to provide family services, and to finalize a permanency plan. See e.g., id.
§ 9-27-303(48)(A)(i); id. § 9-27-328(b)(2), (c), (d), (f) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-335(a)(2),
(e)(1), (e)(2) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-337(e)(1)(B)(i)(b) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-338(d)
(Supp. 2013). For the purposes of this subsection, however, the distinctions between the types
of “reasonable efforts” are inconsequential.
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the Department despite the lack of “reasonable efforts.”166 Similarly, if a
circuit court finds that the Department has not made “reasonable efforts” to
prevent removal or “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family following removal of the juvenile, the circuit court may authorize or continue the juvenile’s removal and shall, in either case, note the Department’s failure on the
record.167 Finally, a failure by the Department to provide “reasonable efforts” in providing services renders any juvenile subject to a circuit court’s
finding of “no reasonable efforts” ineligible for federal funding until a court
enters a subsequent finding of “reasonable efforts,” which represents a significant incentive to provide appropriate services because federal funding
can make up seventy-five cents out of every dollar spent on a juvenile in
foster care.168
The fourth remedial mechanism is the coercive power of the circuit
court’s inherent contempt power, which is itself an exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity169 and can be used to compel the Department to
provide any family services that the circuit court may order in an open case
before the circuit court. Indeed, a circuit court simply does not need to be
able to issue Shelby-style orders to give effect to the Department’s obligation to provide “family services” as ordered by a circuit court because all a
circuit court would need to do is simply order the Department to perform the
given family service deemed by the circuit court to be appropriate and punish the Department if the Department fails to perform the service ordered. In
these ways, the circuit court’s contempt power provides a meaningful remedial mechanism that gives sufficient effect to the juvenile code’s statutory
scheme by punishing any failure by the Department to provide required
“family services.”
By contrast, R.P. and McLemore both involved cases in which the lack
of a sufficient remedial mechanism occurred outside of a court’s contempt
authority and outside of an existing court case. In R.P., for example, the
Department was not yet a party to the family-in-need-of-services case in
166. Id. § 9-27-335(e)(2).
167. See id. § 9-27-328(d) (“When the court finds that the department’s preventive or
reunification efforts have not been reasonable, but further preventive or reunification efforts
could not permit the juvenile to remain safely at home, the court may authorize or continue
the removal of the juvenile but shall note the failure by the department in the record of the
case.”).
168. See, e.g., Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 §§ 423(a), 471(a)(15),
472(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 671 (2013); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), (d) (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL §§
8.3A.5, 8.3A.9, 8.3A.9b, 8.3C.4 (2014), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/programs/cb/
laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp_pf.jsp; Gullick v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 326
Ark. 475, 477–78, 931 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1996) (finding that reasonable efforts findings are
not mere formalities because of the impact on the availability of federal matching funds).
169. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.d.
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which the circuit court had ordered the Department to provide adequate
housing and utilities to the family in the case.170 As a result of the Department’s nonparty status, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a juvenile
court’s authority in such circumstances would be meaningless unless the
Department’s sovereign immunity to such an order was waived.171 Similarly
in McLemore, the waiver of the agency’s sovereign immunity found by the
Arkansas Supreme Court was based precisely on the fact that there was no
ongoing case between the agency and the aggrieved retiree who had sued
the state to correct the payments that the agency should have been making to
the retiree.172 Absent a waiver to allow aggrieved retirees to initiate such
actions, the Arkansas Supreme Court held, aggrieved retirees would be unable to compel the agency to correct errant payments that the agency was
required to provide.173 The Arkansas Supreme Court in both cases therefore
held that the sovereign immunity of the agencies involved must be waived
in order to provide a mechanism to compel the agencies’ respective obligations.
The Department’s other service-related obligations174 also do not require that circuit courts have the authority to issue Shelby-style orders be170. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–
33 (1998).
171. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 232–33.
172. Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 541–44, 268 S.W.3d 897, 900–02 (2007).
173. Id., 268 S.W.3d 897, 900–02.
174. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-323(k) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to
“develop a statewide referral protocol for helping to coordinate the delivery of services to
sexually exploited children”); id. § 9-27-335(d) (Supp. 2013) (providing that a juvenile may
not be placed into the custody of any person unless a home study is performed by the Department or a licensed social worker approved to do home studies); id. § 9-27-353(a) (Supp.
2013) (requiring the Department “to care for and maintain [juveniles in the Department’s
custody] and to see that the juvenile[s are] protected, properly trained and educated, and
[have] the opportunity to learn a trade, occupation, or profession”); id. § 9-27-361(a) (Repl.
2009) (requiring the Department to file with the circuit court at least seven business days
before a dependency-neglect review hearing a court report that has been distributed to all
parties); id. § 9-27-361(b) (Repl. 2009) (requiring the Department to file with the circuit
court at least seven business days before a dependency-neglect review hearing a permanency
planning court report that has been distributed to all parties); id. §§ 9-27-363(b) (Supp. 2013),
9-28-114(b) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to develop a transitional plan “with
every juvenile in foster care not later than the juvenile’s seventeenth birthday or within ninety
(90) days of entering a foster care program for juveniles who enter foster care at seventeen
(17) years of age or older); id. §§ 9-27-363(c), (e)–(g) (Supp. 2013), 9-28-114(c), (e)–(g)
(Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to assist the juvenile in arranging for the juvenile’s
medical, housing, financial, educational, and social needs and to provide to juveniles who
reach eighteen years of age certain documents before closing the juvenile’s case); id. § 9-28101 (Supp. 2013) (providing that “the state has a responsibility to protect children from abuse
and neglect by providing services and supports that promote the safety, permanency, and
well-being of the children and families of Arkansas”); id. §§ 9-28-105 (Supp. 2013), 9-28108(c)(1) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to give preference to adult relatives in
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cause sufficient remedial mechanisms exist to address adequately any failure
by the Department to perform its service obligations without having to have
the circuit court assume control over the Department’s internal operations.
Indeed, although each of these numerous obligations imposes an obligation
on the Department that may or may not be discretionary, the remedial mechanisms arising from the Department’s “reasonable efforts” requirement and
the circuit court’s contempt power are sufficient and applicable175 to give
effect to each obligation by providing meaningful ways to coerce the Department to perform its service obligations and to punish the Department for

certain circumstances involving placement decisions); id. § 9-28-106 (Supp. 2013) (requiring
the Department to give preference to religious considerations in certain circumstances involving placement decisions); id. § 9-28-108(c)(3) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to
inform any relative who inquires about being a placement resource for a juvenile about becoming a foster home and about obtaining custody); id. § 9-28-109(b) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to conduct a staffing within forty-eight hours of a foster parent’s request
that a foster child be removed from the foster home); id. § 9-28-111 (Supp. 2013) (requiring
the Department to develop a case plan for each dependency-neglect and family-in-need-ofservice case in which the court places custody of a juvenile with the Department); id. §§ 928-112, -113(a)(2), (b) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to work with a juvenile’s
school district to further the juvenile’s best interests, provide notice to a juvenile’s school
district upon taking or receiving emergency custody of a juvenile, provide notice to a juvenile’s school upon a change in the juvenile’s placement, make educational decisions for juveniles in the Department’s custody, work together with other educational resources to ensure
continuity of educational services for juveniles in the Department’s custody, immediately
enroll a juvenile subject to a school enrollment change in the juvenile’s new school, and
provide all known information related to the health and safety of the juvenile being enrolled
or the other children at the school); id. § 9-28-118 (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department’s
caseworkers, supervisors, and area directors to have one hour of annual training on issues
related to foster care placements).
175. Id. §§ 9-27-323(k), 9-28-118. The “reasonable efforts” remediation mechanisms are
applicable because the Department’s service-related obligations relate to the Department’s
service obligations, and the contempt-power remediation mechanism is applicable because
each service-related obligation likely constitutes a limited waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity under R.P. and each obligation exists only in the context of an ongoing childwelfare proceeding. The only two exceptions are the juvenile code’s requirements that the
Department “develop a statewide referral protocol for helping to coordinate the delivery of
services to sexually exploited children” and that certain Department employees receive specialized training in issues related to foster care placements. Nevertheless, neither of these
provisions would necessarily require that a circuit court have the authority to order the Department to change the caseload of the Department’s caseworker, compel the Department to
modify the Department’s staffing levels or allocations, or otherwise issue Shelby-style orders
that direct the Department to “fix” problems as identified by a given circuit court. Moreover,
a circuit court’s contempt power could still be used to give effect to these provisions because
the Department’s failure to perform these obligations could be raised in a child-welfare proceeding, each obligation would likely constitute a waiver of the Department’s sovereign
immunity under R.P., and a circuit court could order the Department to perform these obligations under pain of contempt.
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failures to provide appropriate services to meet the Department’s servicerelated obligations.
b.

The Department did not waive its sovereign immunity because the Department does not voluntarily seek relief in
child-welfare proceedings

The Department does not waive its sovereign immunity to Shelby-style
orders under the Moving Party Exception by filing or otherwise participating in child-welfare proceedings. Although a state agency usually is deemed
to have waived its sovereign immunity when it files a lawsuit to seek affirmative, specific relief,176 Arkansas’s appellate courts have held that a state
agency does not waive its sovereign immunity if the agency is required to
file a lawsuit and participate in the case.177
This exception to the exception was expressly recognized in the case of
child-welfare proceedings in Arkansas Department of Human Services v.
State where the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Department did not
voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity to orders not expressly sanctioned
by the juvenile code because the Department was required to initiate and
appear in child-welfare proceedings due to the juvenile code’s mandate that
the Department obtain custody of juveniles in dependency-neglect proceedings and appear in juvenile proceedings.178 The lack of voluntariness arising
from the Department’s statutory obligation, the Arkansas Supreme Court
held, was dispositive.179
The Department therefore does not waive its sovereign immunity to
Shelby-style orders by merely filing and participating in the child-welfare
proceedings that the Shelby Doctrine purports to control precisely because
the Department is required by law to do so in order to fulfill the Department’s statutory obligation to protect juveniles. And as observed previously,
176. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Lindsey, 299 Ark. 249, 251, 771 S.W.2d
769, 770 (1989); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Parker, 248 Ark. 526, 528–30, 453 S.W.2d
30, 32 (1970).
177. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 488–89, 850 S.W.2d
847, 851 (1993); cf. Lindsey, 299 Ark. at 251, 771 S.W.2d at 770 (providing that a state
agency had voluntarily waived sovereign immunity by entering an appearance and seeking
affirmative relief where it had no obligation to do so) (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v.
Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 319–20, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1987)).
178. State, 312 Ark. at 488–89, 850 S.W.2d at 851.
179. See id., 850 S.W.2d at 851. The Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of
Appeals have repeatedly cited State favorably. In Kiesling-Daugherty v. State, for example,
the Arkansas Supreme Court applied State’s voluntary waiver requirement to the Office of
the Attorney General of Arkansas in denying a motion for costs on appeal against the Office
because the Office was required to be involved in the case at issue and therefore did not voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity. 2013 Ark. 281, at 3–4, 2013 WL 3322335, at *3–4.
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the General Assembly’s decision to require the Department to file and participate in child-welfare proceedings also does not act to waive the Department’s sovereign immunity.
c.

The Department cannot be compelled to perform nonministerial actions required by statute, and Shelby-style orders do not enjoin improper actions by the Department

The Department’s sovereign immunity to Shelby-style orders is not
overcome by the Ministerial Exception, which provides that an agency’s
sovereign immunity may be overcome if the agency is not performing a
ministerial action that the agency is required to perform by statute or if the
agency is acting improperly.180 As described below, Shelby-style orders exceed the scope of the Ministerial Exception because such orders compel the
Department to perform actions that the Department is not required to perform by statute and mandate the internal operations of a state executive
agency at the direction of the circuit court. Shelby-style orders also arguably
do not enjoin the Department from performing illegal actions.
The scope of the Ministerial Exception is limited to two applications.
The first limited application is that circuit courts acting through the Ministerial Exception may only mandate a state agency to perform a purely ministerial action that the agency is required to perform by statute (“the Compel
Action Application”).181 But the Ministerial Exception does not permit a
circuit court to order an agency to perform any action under this application
unless the action is one that a state officer or employee must perform in a
specific manner prescribed by law without any discretion as to how or under
what circumstances the action is to be performed.182 By contrast, the Ministerial Exception does not apply to discretionary actions within the authority
of the executive branch that involve “the exercise of reason in the adaptation
of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act
180. See, e.g., LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t. of Corr., 372 Ark. 40, 43, 269 S.W.3d
793, 795 (2007) (“If the state agency is acting illegally or if a state agency officer refuses to
do a purely ministerial action required by statute, an action against the agency or officer is
not prohibited.”).
181. Id., 269 S.W.3d at 795.
182. Pitock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 547, 121 S.W. 742, 750 (1909) (Wood, J., concurring)
(defining a ministerial act as an action that “an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done”). Other jurisdictions have long held similar definitions. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
475, 498 (1866) (“A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in proper cases, be
required of the head of a department, by judicial process, is one in regard to which nothing is
left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to
exist, and imposed by law.”).
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should be done or course pursued.”183 The second limited application is that
circuit courts acting through the Ministerial Exception may only enjoin a
state agency from acting illegally, beyond the authority of the agency, or
otherwise arbitrarily, capriciously, in bad faith, or in a wantonly injurious
manner (“the Enjoin Action Application”).184 But even if an agency’s action
is illegal, beyond the authority of the agency, or otherwise arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, or in a wantonly injurious manner, the only remedy
available to the circuit court to address the improper action is to enjoin the
agency from performing that action.
The Ministerial Exception therefore does not allow the Shelby Doctrine
to overcome the Department’s sovereign immunity because Shelby-style
orders do not satisfy the elements of either of the Ministerial Exception’s
two limited applications. In the case of the Compel Action Application,
Shelby-style orders do not satisfy the Compel Action Application’s two requirements. First, Shelby-style orders effectively seek to compel the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations in child-welfare cases—none of which the
Department is required to do by statute. Put another way, the Ministerial
Exception did not cover the circuit court’s order in Shelby even though the
Department was required by statute to create a case plan because the Department was not required to do what the circuit court effectively ordered, to
wit, to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise comport the Department’s internal staffing operations to a statutory requirement. Second, there
appears to be no question that the management of the Department’s staffing
operations is a discretionary action within the exclusive province of the Department as a state executive agency. Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court
itself recognized in Shelby that “the circuit court is generally without jurisdiction to judicially review the discretionary functions of the executive
branch of government” and that staffing operations are a discretionary function of the Department that circuit courts do not have the authority to manage.185 Moreover, even if the court in Shelby had ordered the Department to
prepare a case plan directly, such an order would arguably not fall within the
183. Murray v. Leyshock, 915 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990).
184. Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 7, 428 S.W.3d 415, 420
(providing that the exceptions to sovereign immunity for unconstitutional, ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, and bad-faith acts are limited to injunctive relief only); Ark. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality v. Oil Producers of Ark., 2009 Ark. 297, at 6–7, 318 S.W.3d 570, 573–74 (2009);
Ark. Tech. Univ. v. Link, 341 Ark. 495, 507, 17 S.W.3d 809, 816 (2000); Ark. Game & Fish
Comm’n v. Lindsey, 299 Ark. 249, 252, 771 S.W.2d 769, 771 (1989) (citing Ark. State Game
& Fish Comm’n v. Eubank, 256 Ark. 930, 512 S.W.2d 540 (1974)); Ark. Game & Fish
Comm’n v. Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 319–20, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1987).
185. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 5, 2012 WL 401615, at *5
(concluding that the circuit court was not attempting to control discretionary staffing issues
impermissibly).
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Compel Action Application because preparing a case plan is not a merely
ministerial action, but rather requires the exercise of considerable discretion
in the Department’s primary expertise in child-welfare proceedings, social
work.
Likewise, Shelby-style orders do not satisfy both elements of the Enjoin Action Application because such orders do not actually direct the Department to stop acting illegally.186 Rather, Shelby-style orders direct the
Department to affirmatively “fix” problems identified by a court by taking
certain actions. Thus, although the order in Shelby did seek to stop the Department from acting illegally in so far as the Department did not comply
with the juvenile code’s requirement that the Department prepare a case
plan, Shelby-style orders exceed the scope of the Enjoin Action Application
because such orders purport to authorize a remedy other than the only remedy authorized under the Enjoin Action Application: the injunction of a specific, illegal action being performed by a state agency.
d.

The Shelby Doctrine does not invoke a circuit court’s inherent contempt powers

The Department’s sovereign immunity relative to the Shelby Doctrine
is not overcome by a circuit court’s inherent contempt power because the
Shelby Doctrine simply does not rely on the circuit court’s contempt power.
Without question, circuit courts have a broad, inherent authority187 to compel compliance with court orders and to punish for noncompliance of those
orders.188 Indeed, Arkansas courts have long recognized the judiciary’s contempt power as an exception to the sovereign-immunity doctrine that could
be used to compel a state agency like the Department to obey a court order
or to punish the Department for failing to obey a court order where the coer186. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
187. The Arkansas Supreme Court interprets the contempt power extremely broadly and
does not recognize limitations on its authority to punish contempt set by statute by the General Assembly even though the General Assembly is empowered to regulate the punishment
of indirect contempt. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 26 (permitting the General Assembly to regulate
the punishment of indirect contempt but not direct contempt or indirect contempt from the
disobedience of “process”); Ivy v. Keith, 351 Ark. 269, 279, 92 S.W.3d 671, 677 (2002)
(interpreting statutory limits to be supplemental to a court’s authority and not as a limitation
on the courts authority because “process” includes the disobedience of any order or similar
mandate, whether made in writing or verbally); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312
Ark. 481, 487–88, 850 S.W.2d 847, 851 (1993) (“The power to punish for contempt is an
inherent power of the court.”).
188. Arkansas courts also have the clear authority to punish for willful misconduct committed before the given court that threatens the orderly procedure of the court or reflects upon
the court’s integrity and that is separate from the disobedience of a court order. See, e.g., Ivy,
351 Ark. at 278–79, 92 S.W.3d at 676–77; Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 197, 33
S.W.3d 492, 499 (2000).
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cion of the state agency arises from the court’s contempt powers.189 The
Shelby Doctrine, however, does not invoke a circuit court’s contempt power
as the source of a circuit court’s authority to enter Shelby-style orders. Consequently, the Shelby Doctrine does not benefit from the exception to sovereign immunity arising from the contempt power and circuit courts could not
justify Shelby-style orders based solely on a circuit court’s contempt power.
Nevertheless, even if the circuit court in Shelby had relied on the
court’s contempt power, the circuit court could still not have issued Shelbystyle orders as a sanction for contempt because the contempt power only
enforces jurisdiction; it does not create jurisdiction and is subject to constitutional and jurisdictional limitations that preclude the application of the
contempt power in the context of Shelby-style orders.190 Arkansas courts
have recognized that a court may punish the disobedience of a court order
only where that court had the jurisdiction to enter the order.191 Likewise, a
court may not impose sanctions in contempt situations that the court does

189. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 498–501,
505, 237 S.W.3d 7, 9–11, 13 (2006); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–
32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–33 (1998); State, 312 Ark. at 487–88, 850 S.W.2d at 851 (recognizing that trial courts “must have the authority to control the parties and other persons before it”
and that this control is effected in the context of the trial court’s contempt power); Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 563–66, 810 S.W.2d 331, 331–34 (1991) (providing
that the contempt power is necessary for the purpose of enforcing its orders and ensuring that
a party does not disregard orders in the future by having a consequence for failing to comply
with the trial court’s order); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 115–
16, 839 S.W.2d 543, 544–45 (1992).
190. See, e.g., Bennett v. Collier, 351 Ark. 447, 451–52, 95 S.W.3d 782, 784–85 (2003)
(holding that a party in a child-welfare proceeding could not be held in contempt after the
court had terminated that party’s parental rights to the given juvenile because the court lost
jurisdiction of that party after the termination proceedings ended); Gould v. Gould, 308 Ark.
213, 217, 823 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1992) (providing that a court has the authority to “enforce an
order to compel conduct, even if it is an order to pay money, by the contempt power” in the
context of collecting past due child support arrearages, but that contempt power remains
subject to the limitations imposed by article 2, section 16 of the Arkansas Constitution);
Criswell v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2014 Ark. App. 309, at 8, 436 S.W.3d 152,
157 (holding that a circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hold a party in contempt where that
party was never properly served in the case); Black v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 788, at 3, 2010
WL 4880682, at *3; Brock v. Eubanks, 102 Ark. App. 165, 168–69, 288 S.W.3d 272, 275
(2008) (holding that a court may not vest with another party the court’s power and authority
to determine compliance with a court order).
191. Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 534, 597 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1980)
(“Disobedience of any valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having jurisdiction to enter
it may constitute contempt.”); Black, 2010 Ark. App. 788, at 3, 2010 WL 4880682, at *3
(citing White v. Taylor, 19 Ark. App. 104, 717 S.W.2d 497 (1986)) (recognizing that the
contempt power “must be premised on the disobedience of a valid order of a court having
jurisdiction to enter it”).
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not have the jurisdiction to impose.192 This contempt power therefore does
not give a circuit court carte blanche to enter whatever order it may feel is
needed in a case, nor does it allow a circuit court to use the Department’s
failure to comply with a court order to trigger additional jurisdiction over
the Department or otherwise allow that circuit court to order the Department
to do something that is beyond the circuit court’s jurisdiction to order.
Given these principles, it seems clear that a circuit court could not use
its contempt powers to issue Shelby-style orders—either as an order in the
first instance or as a sanction for a failure to comply with a previous order—
because circuit courts lack the jurisdiction necessary to enter Shelby-style
orders, and such orders violate the Department’s sovereign immunity. 193 Put
another way, although a circuit court could order the Department to perform
something the juvenile code requires the Department to do and then rely on
the circuit court’s contempt power to hold the Department in contempt for
failure to comply with that order, a circuit court must not exceed its jurisdiction when doing so.194
The counterargument to this conclusion arises from the legions of cases
that state that the contempt power can be used to “protect the rights of litigants.” The majority in Shelby arguably cited this basis for the circuit
court’s authority to protect the rights of juveniles and other litigants as direct
and sufficient support for its holdings.195 And even though the majority in
Shelby did not cite specifically to contempt as the basis for such authority,
Chief Justice Hannah expressly references in his dissent in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Briley—the first apparent formu-

192. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 768–70, 888 S.W.2d 642, 645–46 (1994) (holding
that a trial court improperly imposed sanctions related to contempt because the trial court did
not have the jurisdiction to order the alleged contemnor into custody before the hearing to
show case and that such actions were unconstitutional as a violation of due process); Ex Parte
Burton, 237 Ark. 441, 442–45, 373 S.W.2d 409, 409–11 (1963) (holding that a court could
not punish a lawyer with incarceration and disbarment because the court lacked the jurisdiction to do so where the lawyer’s conduct was not determined to be contemptuous and the
court lacked the authority to disbar the lawyer).
193. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.1, III.B.2.a–c.
194. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 6–7, 2012 WL 401615, at
*6–7 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (citing Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Denmon, 2009 Ark.
485, 346 S.W.3d 283) (observing that although the circuit court in Shelby could have ordered
the Department to prepare the case for a permanency planning hearing and then punished the
Department if the Department did not follow that order, the “circuit court must be careful not
to exceed its jurisdiction when issuing these orders”).
195. Id. at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. Specifically, the majority in Shelby referenced
the need to protect the rights of juveniles and other litigants based on the circuit court’s jurisdiction over juveniles in equity as well as the circuit court’s Inherent Protection Power. Id.,
2012 WL 401615, at *3–4.
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lation of the Shelby Doctrine concept—three contempt cases as justification
for the circuit court to enter a Shelby-style order in that case.196
A further review of the contempt power and its requirements,197 however, indicates that the authority to “protect the rights of litigants” through
the contempt power is limited and does not afford circuit courts with the
authority to issue Shelby-style orders. This authority to “protect the rights of
litigants” exists only in the context of a civil contempt sanction that seeks to
enforce the rights of a litigant by compelling obedience to orders made for
the benefit of that litigant.198 In this way, the “rights of litigants” contemplated under the contempt power are simply the rights of parties in litigation
to receive the benefit and enforcement of court orders imposed in the parties’ individual cases. Thus, the contempt power could not be used to impose a Shelby-style order as a sanction to “protect the rights of litigants”
precisely because the civil contempt power is predicated on the enforcement
of a prior court order; it is not a mechanism by which a court protects a party’s rights directly.
Moreover, none of the contempt cases cited by Chief Justice Hannah in
Briley provide a sufficient jurisdictional basis for a circuit court to enter a
Shelby-style order because the trial court in each case had the jurisdiction to
enter the orders and sanctions at issue, and none of the cases recognize a
separate jurisdictional basis arising through the contempt power. For example, the trial court in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. R.P. had
the authority to sanction the Department’s representative with incarceration
for the representative’s refusal to comply with the court’s valid and then196. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 507, 237 S.W.3d 7,
15 (2006) (citing Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998);
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992); Hart v.
McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001)).
197. The law and practice of contempt is extraordinarily broad, particularly with respect
to the nature of the contempt power and the limitations that prescribe when and under what
circumstances the contempt power can be employed. See generally Terry Crabtree, Contempt
Law in Arkansas, 51 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2–16 (1998). Fortunately, the only limitation relevant to
the analysis of Shelby-style orders in this article relate to civil, indirect contempt arising out
of the disobedience of a court order, specifically, the requirement that civil contempt sanctions must be for the benefit of a party before the court. Briley, 366 Ark. at 499–501, 504–05,
237 S.W.3d at 9–10, 13.
198. Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., 356 Ark. 440, 448–49, 454, 156
S.W.3d 228, 234–35, 238 (2004) (providing that civil contempt preserves and enforces the
rights of private parties and coerces compliance with an order of the court); Hart, 344 Ark. at
670, 42 S.W.3d at 562 (observing that a court’s contempt power may be wielded “to preserve
the court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of the court’s orders, and to preserve
and enforce the parties’ rights,” and that civil contempt sanctions “are to preserve and enforce
the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of
those parties”); R.P., 333 Ark. at 534 n.2, 970 S.W.2d at 234 (“[C]ivil contempt proceedings
are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of those parties.”).
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unchallenged order for the Department to pay to restore utilities in a childwelfare proceeding because trial courts may impose criminal penalties such
as imprisonment for disobedience of court orders199 and the trial court’s specific, statutory jurisdiction to order the Department to provide cash assistance as a “family service” in the child-welfare proceeding before the trial
court.200 Likewise, the trial court in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Gruber had the authority to punitively fine the Department $150 for
the failure of a specific representative of the Department to appear at a juvenile delinquency hearing regarding the placement of a juvenile because trial
courts may impose criminal penalties, including fines, for disobedience of
court orders201 and trial courts have the authority to order non-parties like
the Department’s representative to appear—even though neither the Department nor the representative was a party to the case—where that nonparty
was physically present before the trial court when it ordered the representative to appear at the next hearing.202 Finally, the trial court in Hart v.
McChristian had the authority to sanction a litigant with the full cost of arbitration between the parties where that litigant violated the trial court’s valid
and then-unchallenged court order to transfer certain assets to a receiver and
not to interfere with the receiver because trial courts may impose such remedial civil penalties for the disobedience of court orders and there was no
allegation that the trial court lacked the authority to order parties to transfer
assets and not interfere with a receiver.203
Nevertheless, the nature of the contempt power does leave open the
possibility that a circuit court may enter a Shelby-style order as a valid civil
sanction if the sanction would be for the benefit of one or more of the specific parties before a court in a child-welfare procedure.204 Perhaps the most
relevant case on this point is Briley, with the majority holding that a circuit
199. See, e.g., R.P., 333 Ark. at 540–41, 970 S.W.2d at 237; Crabtree, supra note 197, at
1, 4–7 & nn.18–37.
200. R.P., 333 Ark. at 529–32, 970 S.W.2d at 231–33.
201. See, e.g., Gruber, 39 Ark. App. at 114–16, 839 S.W.2d at 544–45 (1992); Omni
Holding, 356 Ark. at 448–49, 454, 156 S.W.3d at 234–35, 238 (discussing the ability of
courts to impose fines); Crabtree, supra note 197, at 4–7 & nn.18–37.
202. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. at 115–16, 839 S.W.2d at 544–45 (citing Gatlin v. Gatlin, 306
Ark. 146, 811 S.W.2d 761 (1991); Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 597 S.W.2d
596 (1980); Dennison v. Mobley, 257 Ark. 216, 515 S.W.2d 215 (1974)).
203. See, e.g., Omni Holding, 356 Ark. at 448–49, 454, 156 S.W.3d at 234–35, 238; Hart,
344 Ark. at 670, 42 S.W.3d at 562; Crabtree, supra note 197, at 4–7 & nn.18–37.
204. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 498–501,
505, 237 S.W.3d 7, 9–11, 13 (2006) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d
492 (2000)) (“Civil contempt is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties
to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of those parties.”); see Hart, 344 Ark. at 670, 42 S.W.3d at 562 (“The purposes of civil contempt are to
preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders
made for the benefit of those parties.”).
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court could not order the Department to prepare a “written methodology for
responding to future staffing issues”—but only because such an order would
not benefit the parent in that case given that the parent’s case had been
closed.205 Although the majority arguably rejected the extensive authority
asserted in Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent by finding that the writtenmethodology sanction was not appropriate, the majority’s sole reliance on
the lack of benefit to the parent suggests that it might have ruled differently
had the parent still been a party.
The Arkansas Supreme Court may therefore find that a Shelby-style order could be an appropriate sanction—but only if the circuit court has the
jurisdiction to enter such an order. This article now turns to the only jurisdictional basis that has not been addressed—and rejected—thus far: the Inherent Protection Power.
3.

The Inherent Protection Power Does Not Overcome a State Agency’s Sovereign Immunity

The Shelby Doctrine and all Shelby-style orders that coerce the Department to act are invalid under the sovereign immunity doctrine despite
the broad Inherent Protection Power asserted in Shelby. The Inherent Protection Power, however, has never been recognized as an exception to any state
agency’s sovereign immunity.206 The only way for the Shelby Doctrine’s
assertion of the Inherent Protection Power to overcome the sovereign immunity of a state agency like the Department would therefore be if a court
were to interpret the Inherent Protection Power as constituting a new exception to sovereign immunity.
The Shelby Doctrine’s assertion of the Inherent Protection Power, however, should not be recognized as a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity in child-welfare proceedings. First, the Shelby Doctrine’s
assertion of the Inherent Protection Power lacks sufficient support from Arkansas law to constitute a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity. Second, the judiciary lacks a constitutionally sufficient role in childwelfare proceedings that would otherwise support the Shelby Doctrine’s
application of the Inherent Protection Power as a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity.

205. See Briley, 366 Ark. at 505, 237 S.W.3d at 13.
206. See supra Part III.B.2.
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The Inherent Protection Power asserted under the Shelby
Doctrine is contrary to Arkansas law and does not constitute
a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity

The Inherent Protection Power as asserted by the Shelby Doctrine
should not be interpreted as constituting a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity because the actual inherent power invoked by
the Shelby Doctrine under City of Fayetteville v. Edmark relates only to the
procedural authority of courts to conduct proceedings and control court operations and records (“the Inherent Procedural Power”) and would therefore
not be sufficient to overcome the Department’s sovereign immunity related
to the Department’s internal operations. Further, a careful review of the
Shelby Doctrine’s progenitor in Arkansas Department of Human Services v.
Briley and long-standing precedent highlights the limited application of a
subcategory of the Inherent Procedural Power to a court’s ability to compel
a nonjudicial governmental entity to take certain actions necessary for the
court to operate and does not extend to a circuit court’s authority to enter
Shelby-style orders. Yet even this type of the Inherent Procedural Power is
limited and would not provide the exception to the Department’s sovereign
immunity that would be necessary for a court to enter Shelby-style orders.
The Shelby Doctrine, however, sets out the Inherent Protection Power
broadly as the “inherent authority” of a circuit court to protect the integrity
of its proceedings and safeguard litigants appearing before it such that a
circuit court may compel the Department to fulfill the Department’s obligations under the juvenile code and “correct problems that were preventing
work and services [from being performed by the Department].”207 This invocation of the Inherent Protection Power, however, is relatively new and underdeveloped analytically, with the Shelby majority citing only one case to
support it, namely, City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, which is a 1990 Arkansas
Supreme Court case that held that attorney work product was subject to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) absent the application of an exception
such as a valid protective order.208
The Shelby majority’s reliance on Edmark is misplaced because the
“inherent authority” described in Edmark related only to the ability of trial
courts to enter protective orders related to FOIA disclosures and to protect a
litigant’s constitutional fair trial rights.209 And even though dicta in Edmark
207. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at
*3–5.
208. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 191–95, 801 S.W.2d 275, 281–83
(1990).
209. See id., 801 S.W.2d at 281–83. Specifically, the Edmark court stated that “[a] trial
court has the inherent authority to protect the integrity of the court in actions pending before
it and may issue appropriate protective orders that would provide FOIA exemption[s] . . . and
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more broadly related to protecting the “integrity of the court” and a litigant’s
fair trial rights, Edmark itself simply does not support a broad “inherent”
control over parties such as the control that the Shelby Doctrine expressly
contemplates. Rather, Edmark was specific to the control over the parties
expressly provided by statute under FOIA related to the disclosure or nondisclosure of public records.210 Moreover, the “inherent authority” relied on
in Edmark was limited in so far as the court found that a court in a FOIA
action—apparently notwithstanding the court’s own “inherent authority”
and the request for protection from the parties before the court—did not
have the authority to enter a protective order binding on another court with
pending litigation related to the FOIA disclosure.211
The authorities relied on by Edmark and other invocations of a court’s
“inherent authority” also support the conclusion that the “inherent authority”
contemplated by Edmark was limited and did not include broad control of
parties appearing before the court. For example, although the Edmark court
cited Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson as support for the “inherent
authority to secure the fair trial rights of litigants before it,”212 Patterson
only related to fair trial rights granted to litigants under the United States
Constitution and the Arkansas Supreme Court’s determination that a court
did not have the authority to close the pretrial hearings in the criminal matter
at bar because the appropriate constitutional test was not satisfied.213 Like-

always has the inherent authority to secure the fair trial rights of litigants before it.” Id. at
191, 194, 801 S.W.2d at 281, 283. The Edmark court also referenced, without supporting
authority, the “inherent power of a trial court to control actions pending before it.” Id. at 194,
801 S.W.2d at 283. The issues in Edmark, however, did not pertain to protecting the integrity
of the trial court or controlling the action before the trial court, but rather only related to
protective orders and protecting the fair trial rights of the litigants, including the litigation
rights of the City of Fayetteville under FOIA. See id. at 191–94, 801 S.W.2d at 281–83.
210. Id. at 191, 194, 801 S.W.2d at 281, 283. Furthermore, the Edmark court’s separate
reference to “the inherent power of a trial court to control actions pending before it” does not
change the limited scope of the “inherent authority” described in Edmark because Edmark
did not involve controlling actions or parties appearing before the trial other than the disclosure or nondisclosure of records under FOIA. Id. at 194–95, 801 S.W.2d at 283. The interpretation of Edmark by later appellate decisions in Arkansas also bears out the limited nature of
Edmark’s “inherent authority.” See, e.g., Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 313, 253 S.W.3d 927,
927 (2007) (providing that “the inherent authority of the trial court to control court records . .
. is not absolute”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 124, 871 S.W.2d
352, 355 (1994) (describing the “inherent authority” recognized in Edmark as the “authority
of a trial court to issue appropriate protective orders to control court records” and noting that
this “inherent authority” has limitations).
211. See Edmark, 304 Ark. at 191, 801 S.W.2d at 281; cf. Hardy, 316 Ark. at 124, 871
S.W.2d at 355.
212. Edmark, 304 Ark. at 194, 801 S.W.2d at 283.
213. Ark. Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 214, 662 S.W.2d 826, 827 (1984).
Specifically, Patterson addressed the application of a state law that provided all state courts

454

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

wise, other Arkansas courts have relied on the procedural nature of a court’s
inherent power to ensure “an orderly, efficient[,] and effective administration of justice,”214 control court records,215 enforce its orders,216 stay an appeal pending further proceedings,217 adopt rules of evidence, 218 adopt rules
of procedure,219 order remittitur,220 correct and modify its own judgments,221
address issues incidental to criminal law,222 appoint a special prosecutor
when the prosecuting attorney is implicated in a crime,223 establish guidance
for court clerks,224 and direct the manner in which a jury should be selected
and summoned.225
Moreover, only one appellate opinion in Arkansas has ever concluded
that Edmark represents the broad power over litigants contemplated in Shelby—and that was Chief Justice Hannah’s previous dissent in Briley, which
is addressed below separately. Indeed, out of the twenty-five other appellate
court opinions that have cited to Edmark, other than Shelby and Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley, no opinion has asserted anything beyond the
procedural authority of courts to conduct proceedings and control court operations and records.226 For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited
shall be public and the First Amendment with a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
related to a fair trial. See id., 662 S.W.2d at 827.
214. Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 472, 780 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1989); Coakes v. State, 2014
Ark. App. 298, at 5 n.1, 2014 WL 2011804, at *5 (“The right to counsel of one’s choice is
not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the inherent power of the court to command an
orderly, efficient, and effective administration of justice.”).
215. Ward v. State, 2013 Ark. 250, at 3, 2013 WL 2460209, at *3 (“We have recognized
the inherent authority of the trial court to control court records.”); Ward, 369 Ark. at 313, 253
S.W.3d at 927; Hardy, 316 Ark. at 123–24, 871 S.W.2d at 355–56.
216. Kelley v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 402, at 1 n.1, 424 S.W.3d 295, 296 (citing Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991)).
217. Stratton v. Stratton, 2014 Ark. App. 292, at 4–5, 2014 WL 1856706, at *4–5 (citing
Clements v. State, 306 Ark. 596, 817 S.W.2d 194 (1991)).
218. Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 104–05, 717 S.W.2d 488, 489–90 (1986).
219. Miller v. State, 262 Ark. 223, 226, 555 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1977).
220. Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292, 297, 711 S.W.2d 776, 778 (1986).
221. Blissard Mgm’t & Realty, Inc. v. Kremer, 284 Ark. 136, 139, 680 S.W.2d 694, 696
(1984) (citing Massengale v. Johnson, 269 Ark. 269, 599 S.W.2d 743 (1980)); Cooper v.
Cooper, 2013 Ark. App. 748, at 10, 431 S.W.3d 349, 355 (citing Harrison v. Bradford, 9 Ark.
App. 156, 655 S.W.2d 466 (1983)).
222. Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 498, 625 S.W.2d 521, 523 (1981).
223. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 380–81, 516 S.W.2d 895, 898 (1974).
224. Christy v. Speer, 210 Ark. 756, 758, 197 S.W.2d 466, 467 (1946) (noting that courts
have the “inherent power to make such rules, not in conflict with the constitution or any valid
statute, as the court may deem necessary for the prompt and efficient handling of matters
before it”).
225. Norrid v. State, 188 Ark 32, 32, 63 S.W.2d 526, 527 (1933).
226. In addition to the cases that cite Edmark directly, at least 469 Arkansas cases cite to
some form of “inherent authority” or “inherent power” at the time of this writing according to
the FastCase research system. This article, however, does not purport to have exhaustively
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Edmark in Broussard v. Saint Edward Mercy Health System regarding the
authority of a court to decide who may testify and under what conditions,227
as well as in Valley v. Phillips County Election Commission as support for a
circuit court disqualifying an attorney from representing a client in a case
before the court.228 The Arkansas Supreme Court also cited Edmark in Ward
v. State and Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Hardy for the authority of a court to control court records and seal portions of the record,229
as did Justice Karen Baker in her dissent in McNair v. Johnson related to
sealing court records230 and in her opinion in Reid v. Frazee related to the
authority of a trial court to schedule an additional hearing after an adoption
hearing but before entry of its adoption decree in order to obtain the consent
of the minor being adopted as required by statute.231 Justice Baker has also
cited Edmark in her concurrence and dissent in Arkansas Judicial Discipline
and Disability Commission v. Simes as support for a circuit court’s authority
to determine if sanctions are warranted for a violation of Rule 11 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure,232 as well as in her dissent in Hausman v.
Throesch as support for a trial court’s authority to enter an amended order.233
The remaining seventeen decisions citing to Edmark relate only to either the
reviewed these cases because they are not cited by the majority opinion in Shelby or Chief
Justice Hannah’s dissenting opinion in Briley other than his citations to Edmark and Valley v.
Phillips County Election Commission. Nevertheless, even a cursory review of these cases
indicates that other Arkansas cases citing to a court’s “inherent authority” are consistent with
the limitation on the “inherent authority” described in the Edmark line of cases as relating
only to the procedural authority of courts. See, e.g., Green v. State, 2009 Ark. 113, at 8–11,
313 S.W.3d 521, 526–28 (relating to the authority to hold parties to the terms of plea bargains); Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. Isbell, 360 Ark. 256, 258, 200 S.W.3d 873, 875 (2005)
(relating to the authority of a court to modify its own order within ninety days of filing); Ark.
Best Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital, 317 Ark. 238, 245–46, 878 S.W.2d 708, 711–12 (1994)
(relating to the court’s authority to enter appropriate protective orders to control court records); Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 537, 623 S.W.2d 813, 819 (1981) (relating to the
authority of a court to require a bond for payment of child support); Wade v. Sonic Drive-In,
42 Ark. App. 260, 261, 856 S.W.2d 630, 630 (1993) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (relating to the
authority to institute orderly procedures for situations that arise and are not provided by any
rule).
227. Broussard v. Saint Edward Mercy Health Sys., 2012 Ark. 14, at 6–7, 386 S.W.3d
385, 389.
228. Valley v. Phillips Cnty. Election Comm’n, 357 Ark. 494, 497–98, 183 S.W.3d 557,
559 (2004).
229. Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 313, 253 S.W.3d 927, 927 (2007); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 123–24, 871 S.W.2d 352, 355–56 (1994).
230. McNair v. Johnson, 75 Ark. App. 261, 266–67, 57 S.W.3d 742, 746 (2001) (Baker,
J., dissenting).
231. Reid v. Frazee, 72 Ark. App. 474, 479–80, 41 S.W.3d 397, 400–01 (2001).
232. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disciplinary Comm’n v. Sines, 2011 Ark. 193, at 26, 381
S.W.3d 764, 780 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Hausman v. Throesch, 104 Ark. App. 113, 116–17, 289 S.W.3d 493, 495–96 (2008)
(Baker, J., dissenting).
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precedential value of Attorney General Opinions234 or to FOIA matters that
do not assert any authority other than the ability of a court to enter orders
related to FOIA and its exceptions.235
The decisions in Ward, McNair, and Reid are particularly salient to understanding Edmark’s limited procedural scope because—just as in Shelby
and Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley—the objective in each of the
assertions of “inherent authority” in those cases related to protecting juveniles from harm. In Shelby, for example, the objective was ensuring that the
Department provided juveniles with necessary services by compelling the
Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations,236 and in Briley it was ensuring that the Department would be better able to fulfill its statutory obligations by ordering
the Department to prepare a written methodology for responding to future
staffing issues.237 Likewise, the objective in Ward was protecting against the
disclosure of photographs of nude juveniles,238 protecting against the disclosure of two juveniles’ testimony during an appeal in McNair,239 and protecting the juvenile’s statutory rights by requiring evidence of the juvenile’s
consent to adoption in Reid.240
The actual authority described in Ward, McNair, and Reid demonstrates that even when a court’s objective is to protect juveniles from harm,
the “inherent authority” of a trial court is limited to its procedural authority
to conduct proceedings and control court operations and records. The authority asserted in Ward and McNair, for example, related to the trial court’s
234. See, e.g., White v. Priest, 348 Ark. 135, 144, 73 S.W.3d 572, 576 (2002); Ark. Prof.
Bail Bondsman v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 59, 69 S.W.3d 855, 862 (2002); Willis v. State, 71
S.W.3d 61, 65–66 (Ark. App. 2002) (Roaf, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., Hopkins v. City of Brinkley, 2014 Ark. 139, at 12, 432 S.W.3d 609, 617;
Harrill v. Farrar, 2012 Ark. 180, at 9, 402 S.W.3d 511, 516; Nabholz Const. v. Contractors
for Pub., 371 Ark. 411, 418–19, 266 S.W.3d 689, 292–94 (2007); Pulaski Co. v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, 370 Ark. 435, 447–48, 260 S.W.3d 718, 726–27 (2007) (Glaze, J., dissenting);
Harris v. City of Fort Smith, 359 Ark. 355, 365, 197 S.W.3d 461, 467 (2004); Fox v. Perroni,
358 Ark. 251, 257–58, 188 S.W.3d 881, 885–86 (2004); Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455,
472 n.4, 182 S.W.3d 112, 124 (2004); Bryant v. Weiss, 335 Ark. 534, 538–39, 983 S.W.2d
902, 904 (1998); Swaney v. Tilford, 320 Ark. 652, 653–54, 898 S.W.2d 462, 463–64 (1995);
Johninson v. Stodola, 316 Ark. 423, 425, 872 S.W.2d 374, 375 (1994); Sebastian Co. Chapter
of the Am. Red Cross v. Weatherford, 311 Ark. 656, 658–59, 846 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1993);
Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 485–86, 830 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1992); Kristen Inv. Props.,
LLC v. Faulkner Cnty. Waterworks, 72 Ark. App. 37, 40–41, 32 S.W.3d 60, 61–62 (2000).
236. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–5, 2012 WL 401615, at
*2–5.
237. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505–08, 237 S.W.3d 7, 13–15
(2006) (Hannah, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 313, 253 S.W.3d 927, 927 (2007).
239. McNair v. Johnson, 75 Ark. App. 261, 266–67, 57 S.W.3d 742, 746 (2001) (Baker,
J., dissenting).
240. Reid v. Frazee, 72 Ark. App. 474, 478–79, 41 S.W.3d 397, 400–01 (2001).
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authority to seal court records.241 Likewise, the authority asserted in Reid
related to the trial court’s authority to hold a subsequent hearing after an
adoption hearing, but prior to the entry of the court’s judgment, once the
court discovered the lack of evidence on the juvenile’s consent to adoption.242 By contrast, the authority asserted in Shelby and in Chief Justice
Hannah’s dissent in Briley related to the direct control of the Department’s
actions and operations and not merely to the court’s authority to control its
own proceedings.243
Nevertheless, the reliance of the Shelby majority on Edmark and the
Inherent Protection Power is not surprising because it is not the first time
that members of the Shelby majority have cited Edmark in support of a
Shelby-like Inherent Protection Power in a child-welfare proceeding. Indeed,
Chief Justice Hannah, joined by Justice Jim Gunter, cited Edmark in a more
detailed and arguably even broader exposition of the Inherent Protection
Power in dissent to Briley than the power Chief Justice Hannah described
almost six years later as the author of the majority opinion in Shelby.
The issue in Briley was the Department’s failure to comply with a circuit court’s orders to provide family services and the circuit court’s finding
that the Department was in contempt as a result of that failure.244 The majority upheld the contempt finding and the circuit court sanction of reimbursing
the parent $160 for out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the De241. Ward, 369 Ark. at 313, 253 S.W.3d at 927; McNair, 75 Ark. App. at 266–67, 57
S.W.3d at 746 (Baker, J., dissenting). Notably, the majority in McNair implicitly rejected
Justice Baker’s concern for protecting the juveniles in favor of following established appellate procedural requirements that required all testimony to be abstracted. Id. at 263, 57
S.W.3d at 743 (majority opinion).
242. Reid, 72 Ark. App. at 478–79, 41 S.W.3d at 400–01. The Court of Appeals in Reid
actually cited several bases for the trial court’s authority in that case to hold a hearing before
the entry of the final adoption decree. First, the court found that trial courts have statutory
authority to hold such hearings. Id. at 479, 41 S.W.3d at 400 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9214(b) (Repl. 1993)) (“The court may continue the hearing from time to time to permit further observation, investigation, or consideration of any facts or circumstances affecting the
granting of the petition.”). Second, the court found that even without statutory authority the
trial court had the “inherent authority” to hold such a hearing, citing for support Edmark and
Massengale v. Johnson, a 1980 Arkansas Supreme Court case affirming the authority of a
trial court to vacate its judgment and set a new hearing after the court became aware that it
may have made a mistake in its judgment. Id., 41 S.W.3d at 401 (citing Massengale v. Johnson, 269 Ark. 269, 599 S.W.2d 743 (1980)).
243. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–5, 2012 WL 401615, at
*2–5; Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505–07, 237 S.W.3d 7, 13–15
(2006) (Hannah, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Hannah and Justice Gunter, however, may take exception to this characterization given the link drawn in
Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley between the ability of a trial court to fulfill its responsibilities in child-welfare proceedings and the Department’s performance of its statutory
obligations and “full cooperation with the juvenile courts.” See id., 237 S.W.3d at 13–15.
244. Briley, 366 Ark. at 498–99, 237 S.W.3d at 9 (majority opinion).
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partment’s contempt, but the majority rejected the sanction of compelling
the Department to prepare a “written methodology for responding to future
staffing issues” because such a sanction would not benefit the parties in the
case as is required for all civil contempt sanctions.245
Chief Justice Hannah in turn concurred with the contempt finding and
the $160 reimbursement sanction, but dissented from the majority’s rejection of the “written methodology” sanction because circuit courts, Chief
Justice Hannah argued, had the authority to order the Department to provide
assurance in the form of a written methodology that the Department would
carry out the Department’s obligations in child-welfare proceedings in addition to the actual issue of contempt.246 And just as in Shelby, Chief Justice
Hannah cited in support of this authority the Inherent Protection Power,
namely, the “inherent authority” of circuit courts “to protect the integrity of
the court in actions before it . . . [and] to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it.”247
But Chief Justice Hannah did not stop there. In addition to citing
Edmark and Valley as authority for the Inherent Protection Power later articulated in Shelby, 248 Chief Justice Hannah further argued that circuit courts
also have the inherent authority to “control parties who appear before it,
especially parties such as [the Department] who appear repeatedly in court
on many different cases” based on (1) the “duty” of a circuit court to “put in
place a system designed to assure [the Department’s] performance in future
cases, which benefits all children over whom the court has jurisdiction rather than just the child at issue [in Briley], and (2) “the primary responsibility and supervisory control [of the courts] to see that children of this state
receive the assistance dictated by the statutes and the care and protection
dictated by the judiciary’s inherent obligation to serve justice.”249
245. Id. at 504–05, 237 S.W.3d at 13.
246. Id. at 505, 237 S.W.3d at 13–14 (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
247. Compare Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 4, 2012 WL 410615, at *4, with Briley, 366 Ark.
at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15 (citing Valley v. Phillips Cnty. Election Comm’n, 359 Ark. 494,
183 S.W.3d 557 (2004); City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275
(1990)).
248. Briley, 366 Ark. at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15. Chief Justice Hannah’s citation to Valley
is in effect merely a second citation to Edmark in so far as the Valley court cited to Edmark
and no other authority for the principle that a circuit court has the “inherent authority to protect the integrity of the court in actions before it.” Valley, 359 Ark. at 498, 183 S.W.3d at
559.
249. Briley, 366 Ark. at 506–07, 237 S.W.3d at 14–15. Chief Justice Hannah also cited to
the statutory mandate that the juvenile code be liberally construed to “assure that all juveniles
brought to the attention of the courts receive the guidance, care, and control . . . [that] will
best serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the best interest of
the state.” Id., 237 S.W.3d at 14–15 (quoting ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-302(1) (Repl. 2002)).
It is not clear, however, how—or even if—Chief Justice Hannah considered that goal as
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In support of the concept that such expansive authority inures to a circuit court as a consequence of the Department’s failure to “fulfill its duty
under the statutes,” Chief Justice Hannah cited to three cases involving the
contempt power.250 Specifically, Chief Justice Hannah cited R.P. for the
propositions that a circuit court cannot fulfill its duty if the Department does
not perform its obligations and that the circuit court could order the Department to do the Department’s duty, namely, to provide family services.251
Chief Justice Hannah likewise cited Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Gruber for the proposition that circuit courts cannot fulfill their statutory responsibility without the Department’s “full cooperation with the
juvenile courts” given the duty placed on the Department as the agency
charged with providing or otherwise arranging services.252 Finally, Chief
Justice Hannah cited to Hart v. McChristian to support the idea that a
court’s contempt powers were appropriate to compel the Department “to
provide assurance that [the Department] would and could carry out its obligations . . . [because a] court’s contempt power may be wielded to preserve
the court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of the court’s orders,
and to preserve and enforce the parties’ rights.”253
Chief Justice Hannah’s assertion of “inherent authority” fails to support
a sufficient jurisdictional basis for Shelby-style orders because it conflates
the limited jurisdiction afforded to circuit courts by the juvenile code with a
circuit court’s limited power to control its own proceedings and records and
the court’s equally limited civil contempt power.254 First, the juvenile code
empowering circuit courts to exercise control over parties, but it is consistent with the oftcited assertion by circuit courts in child-welfare proceedings that they have the authority to
act in a juvenile’s “best interests.” In any event, for the reasons cited in this article, such
authority is inconsistent with Arkansas law.
250. Id. at 505–07, 237 S.W.3d at 15. It is also important to note that Chief Justice Hannah’s citations to these cases for support of the Inherent Protection Power are entirely comprised of citations to jurisprudential considerations that are at most nonbinding dicta. See
generally Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001); Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 255 (1998); Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39
Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992).
251. Briley, 366 Ark. at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15.
252. Id., 237 S.W.3d at 15.
253. Id., 237 S.W.3d at 15.
254. That said, there may be at least two votes on the current Arkansas Supreme Court for
recognizing “inherent authority” as sufficient to overcome the sovereign immunity of a state
agency like the Department. Justice Karen Baker, for example, dissented in KieslingDaugherty v. State and argued that sovereign immunity may be overcome, or at least avoided,
by court rules adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court. 2013 Ark. 281, at 4–5, 2013 WL
3322335, at *4–5 (Baker, J., dissenting). In the same case, Justice Josephine Linker Hart
likewise stated in dissent that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s rule-making authority may
overcome sovereign immunity based on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s constitutional “grant
of authority . . . to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions under amendment 80
and this court’s attendant promulgation [of rules]” and that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
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only provides circuit courts with a limited jurisdiction to act in child-welfare
proceedings and does not provide sufficient authority to enter Shelby-style
orders because of the impact of Amendment 67.255 Second, the procedural
power set out in Edmark and its progeny constitutes a source of authority
that is (1) separate and distinct from the circuit court’s jurisdiction under the
juvenile code and its contempt power, and (2) limited in its application to
controlling a circuit court’s own proceedings and records.256 Third, a circuit
court’s contempt power is another source of authority that is likewise (1)
separate and distinct from the circuit court’s jurisdiction under the juvenile
code and its procedural power under Edmark, and (2) limited in application
to imposing sanctions that a circuit court has the jurisdiction to enter and
does not provide circuit courts with any such additional jurisdiction.257
Moreover, the majority in Briley implicitly rejected Chief Justice Hannah’s assertion of such a broad “inherent authority,” insofar as the circuit
court lacked the authority due to the limitations of the circuit court’s contempt power.258 Indeed, had the majority recognized the Inherent Protection
Power articulated in Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent, the majority arguably
would have found that the circuit court did have the authority to address the
Department’s failure to adequately perform, which, Chief Justice Hannah
observed, “is certainly relevant to the integrity of the proceedings before the
court” and the “fair administration of justice both in [the case before the
circuit court] and in many other cases before the circuit court involving neglected children.”259 Instead, the majority in Briley did not address at all the
joint responsibility between the Department and the judiciary that Chief
Justice Hannah argued to exist in the operation of the juvenile system, finding simply that the circuit court exceeded its authority in ordering the Department to prepare a written methodology to address future staffing issues.260
“interest in orderly, expeditious proceedings justifies the imposition of costs, and the power
to make an award of costs is incident to our inherent jurisdiction and authority over the orderly administration of justice between all litigants.” Id. at 5–7, 2013 WL 3322335, at *5–7
(Hart, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Chief Justice Hannah wrote the majority opinion in
Kiesling-Daugherty that rejected the operation of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s appellate
rules allowing a litigant to recover the costs of appeal against the state. Id. at 2–4, 2013 WL
3322335, at *2–4 (majority opinion).
255. See supra Part III.A.
256. See supra notes 207–43 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part III.B.2.d. In addition, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a
court’s power to control and protect litigants is actually the contempt power, which this article has already noted is of limited application and does not constitute a separate source of
jurisdiction. Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 487–88, 850 S.W.2d 847, 851
(1993); see also supra Part III.B.2.d.
258. See Briley, 366 Ark. at 505, 237 S.W.3d at 13 (majority opinion).
259. Id., 237 S.W.3d at 14 (Hannah, C.J., dissenting).
260. See id., 237 S.W.3d at 13 (majority opinion).
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That said, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that state courts
do have the constitutional authority to order a state governmental entity to
take actions that are necessary and essential for the court to operate.261 As
the Arkansas Supreme Court observed in Abbott v. Spencer, for example,
state courts have the “inherent power” to order a governmental entity to pay
expenses that are necessary and essential for a court to operate based on the
doctrine that “there [are] three separate but equal branches of government,
and therefore, inherent in the constitution is the principle that when one of
the other branches fails to fund a court that court has the power to order
those acts done which are necessary and essential for the court to operate.”262 Although Chief Justice Hannah did not cite this specific authority in
either Shelby or his dissent in Briley, Chief Justice Hannah appears to invoke at least the spirit of this doctrine by focusing on (1) how dependent on
the Department’s actions the circuit court’s own abilities to fulfill the circuit
court’s statutory responsibilities in child-welfare proceedings, and (2) the
circuit court’s responsibility to “see that the children of this state receive the
assistance dictated by the statutes and the care and protection dictated by the
judiciary’s inherent obligation to serve justice.”263
The limited nature of this power, however, indicates that it is insufficient to overcome the Department’s sovereign immunity and authorize Shelby-style orders. First, the doctrine recognized in Abbott has only been exercised in the context of a court’s ability to order a governmental entity to pay
certain costs and resources and has never been used to justify any broad
authority over that governmental entity, much less the entry of Shelby-style
orders.264 Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court itself has admonished that
this inherent power must be exercised conservatively and “only in those

261. See, e.g., Abbott v. Spencer, 302 Ark. 396, 398–99, 790 S.W.2d 171, 172 (1990);
Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton, 285 Ark. 23, 28–29, 684 S.W.2d 252, 255 (1985); Turner Ex
Parte, 40 Ark. 548, 551, 1883 WL 1184, at *2 (1883). Many courts have referred to this
authority as the “inherent powers doctrine” based on the principles initially articulated in
Turner Ex Parte in 1883. See, e.g., Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172; Venhaus,
358 Ark. at 28–29, 684 S.W.2d at 255. Still other courts and commentators have described a
related “inherent powers doctrine” regarding the judiciary’s authority to regulate the practice
of law in Arkansas and elsewhere. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and
Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 1 (1989).
262. Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398, 790 S.W.2d at 172 (citing Turner Ex Parte, 40 Ark. 548,
1883 WL 1184); Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 28–29, 684 S.W.2d at 255.
263. Briley, 366 Ark. at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15 (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
264. See, e.g., Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172 (rejecting the application of
the power because the issue did not relate to a failure to fund the court); Turner, 40 Ark. at
551, 1883 WL 1184, at *1 (providing that a court had the authority to order another governmental entity to pay the costs of a courthouse in which the court could operate).
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areas that are vital for the proper functioning of a court.”265 Second, the doctrine is limited to only such orders that are necessary for the court to operate
and not merely such things that would merely aid a court in carrying out its
responsibilities.266 For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has twice rejected the authority of a circuit court to set the salaries to be paid by other
governmental entities for court employees who aid the court in its operation
where there was no showing that the court’s funding was so low that the
court could not operate effectively.267
A court’s limited power to order acts to be done that are necessary to
the court’s operation, therefore, would not apply to save Shelby-style orders
because such orders do not relate to paying costs or providing necessary
resources such as court facilities. Rather, Shelby-style orders relate to the
Department’s operations, not the court’s operations. In addition, despite
Chief Justice Hannah’s assertion that a failure of the Department to perform
its own obligations impacts the ability of a circuit court to fulfill its responsibilities under the juvenile code, there has never been a showing that such
failures of the Department rise to the level of preventing a court from operating. But even if they could, this article has already described how the circuit court’s contempt power and other remedial mechanisms available under
the juvenile code would make the exercise of the power unnecessary because sufficient means exist to ensure that the Department fulfills its obligations.268
b.

The judiciary lacks a role in child-welfare proceedings that is
constitutionally sufficient to support the Inherent Protection
Power as a new exception to the Department’s sovereign
immunity

The Shelby Doctrine may survive if the judiciary has a constitutional
role in child-welfare proceedings that would separately allow the broad Inherent Protection Power asserted in Shelby to overcome the Department’s
sovereign immunity as a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity or otherwise allow a circuit court to enter a Shelby-style order. Such
a role is in fact presumed both implicitly in Chief Justice Hannah’s majority

265. State v. Post, 311 Ark. 510, 526, 845 S.W.2d 487, 495 (1993) (dissenting) (citing
Turner Ex Parte, 40 Ark. 548, 1883 WL 1184).
266. See Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172; Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 28–29,
684 S.W.2d at 255.
267. Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172; Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 28–29, 684
S.W.2d at 255.
268. See supra Part III.B.2.a. But see Boyer, supra note 127, at 385–86 (arguing that
juvenile courts must have the powers necessary to discharge their responsibilities effectively).
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opinion in Shelby269 and explicitly in Chief Justice Hannah’s dissenting
opinion in Briley.270 Chief Justice Hannah specifically argued in Briley that
the judiciary has a duty and sufficient authority to participate in developing
a compliant and proper “system” in child-welfare proceedings that would
appropriately benefit juveniles in future cases. “Obviously,” Chief Justice
Hannah wrote, “the circuit court was attempting to put in place a system
designed to assure [the Department’s] performance in future cases, which
benefits all children over whom the court has jurisdiction rather than just the
child at issue in this case. This is the court’s duty.”271
Neither Chief Justice Hannah’s majority opinion in Shelby nor his dissenting opinion in Briley, however, articulates a specific constitutional basis
that authorizes such a role or otherwise overcomes the Department’s sovereign immunity. To the contrary, the responsibilities cited by Chief Justice
Hannah are either statutory272 and, therefore, do not establish a constitutionally based role that would be sufficient to authorize a circuit court to violate
the Department’s sovereign immunity, or, in the case of “the judiciary’s
inherent obligation to serve justice,” are unsupported assertions of authority
over the Department that have not been recognized as exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine.273 Thus, although the juvenile code does impose
certain responsibilities on circuit courts and generally “recognizes that the
state has a responsibility to protect children from abuse and neglect by
providing services and supports that promote the safety, permanency, and
well-being of the children and families of Arkansas,” a circuit court’s responsibilities are merely statutory and, therefore, cannot overcome a constitutional barrier like the Department’s sovereign immunity unless an appropriate exception applies.274 As described above, no such exception applies.
This article therefore now turns to evaluate two possibly analogous circumstances that may support the entry of Shelby-style orders insofar as these
circumstances have previously afforded a court with sufficient constitutional
authority to control the operations of another branch of government. These
circumstances include (1) the Lake View line of cases in which the Arkansas
Supreme Court found that it had the authority to take active part in the development of an appropriate educational system, and (2) the Angela R. line
269. See Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at
*4–5 (authorizing circuit courts to order systemic changes to the Department’s operations in
order to “assure that necessary services are being delivered” in child-welfare proceedings).
270. Ark. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505–08, 237 S.W.3d 7,
13–15 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
271. Id. at 506, 237 S.W.3d at 14.
272. See discussion supra Parts III.A, III.B.2.a.
273. See discussion supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.a.
274. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367, 9-28-101 (Repl. 2009 & Supp.
2013).
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of cases in which federal courts became involved in the Department’s operations and imposed a “comprehensive revision of the child welfare system.”275
In the Lake View line of cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court authorized
a system of compliance trials that afforded the judiciary with ongoing jurisdiction to actively take part in the development of an appropriate educational system based on the Arkansas Constitution’s mandate that “the State shall
ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public
schools.”276 Although Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley does not cite
to the Lake View doctrine directly, it arguably does invoke the same concept
of compliance trials authorized under Lake View. As Chief Justice Hannah
argued in Briley, the circuit court had the authority to mandate the Department to report to the circuit court the Department’s “fitness to perform [the
Department’s] statutorily required function” in future cases—with the evaluation’s prospective application strongly echoing the authority recognized in
the Lake View cases that a circuit court can actively participate in the ongoing development of an appropriate educational system.277
The Lake View line of cases, however, is based on a fundamentally different authority than the judiciary’s role in child-welfare proceedings provides precisely because of the specific—arguably tenuous278—constitutional
basis relied on by the Arkansas Supreme Court in sanctioning the judiciary’s
involvement in Arkansas’s educational system. Indeed, unlike the Arkansas
Constitution’s multiple provisions related to the educational system,279 there
is no current constitutional provision that relates to child-welfare proceedings other than Amendment 67, which provides the General Assembly with
exclusive authority to prescribe the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare
proceedings.280 There is therefore simply no state constitutional basis to provide circuit courts with the authority to enter Shelby-style orders or otherwise participate in Lake View-style compliance trials related to the pursuit of
275. See infra notes 276–84 and accompanying text.
276. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see Sharum, supra note 33, at 86–94;
see also Bettina Brownstein, Lake View—A Roadmap for Asserting the Rights of Jailed
Mentally Ill, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 525, 530–33 (2013) (describing the Lake View
analysis for evaluating constitutional mandates on the state).
277. Compare Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505, 508, 237
S.W.3d 7, 14, 15 (2006), with Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 45–46,
51–54, 79, 91 S.W.3d 472, 479, 482–85, 501 (2002), Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 492–94, 10 S.W.3d 892, 899–900 (2000), and Sharum, supra note 33, at
86–94.
278. Sharum, supra note 33, at 90–93.
279. See ARK. CONST. art. XIV (the education article); id. amend. 11 (school tax); id.
amend. 40 (school district tax); id. amend. 53 (free school system); id. amend. 74 (school tax,
budget).
280. See discussion supra Part III.A.

2015]

JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE

465

an appropriate child-welfare system—a fact that the Arkansas Supreme
Court recognized in Walker when it rejected a broad role for the judiciary in
the development of a constitutional child-welfare system and left “the matter
of achieving a constitutional system to the legislature, the body equipped
and designed to perform that function.”281
Likewise, in the Angela R. line of cases federal courts became involved
in the operation of the Department’s child-welfare operations after a class of
plaintiffs commenced a civil rights case under section 1983 of the United
States Code and alleged that Arkansas’s child-welfare system violated the
constitutional and federal statutory rights of children.282 Specifically, the
allegations were that the Department failed to investigate allegations of
child abuse and neglect, failed to make reasonable efforts to keep families
together, failed to provide adequate care for juveniles placed in foster
homes, and failed to properly train foster parents.283 The parties in Angela R.
ultimately settled the lawsuit with the adoption of a detailed settlement plan
governing the Department’s child-welfare operations that was also later
passed into law and ultimately enforceable through application to federal
court as a consent decree.284

281. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 51, 722 S.W.2d 558, 562
(1987) (citing Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983)). It is also
interesting to note that one of the principal actors in the Lake View appellate and trial court
cases was Justice Annabelle Clinton Imber, who also later wrote the majority opinion in
Briley that implicitly rejected the expansive role in child-welfare proceedings that Chief
Justice Hannah’s dissenting opinion advocated. It is even more interesting to note that Chief
Justice Hannah himself has consistently recognized limitations to the very model of a compliance trial that Chief Justice Hannah seems to suggest is appropriate in Briley, including a
hilarious parable involving Humpty Dumpty related to the danger of a court acting in an area
simply because the court says it can. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 364 Ark.
398, 420–27, 220 S.W.3d 645, 660–65 (2005) (Hannah, C.J., dissenting); Lake View Sch.
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 362 Ark. 520, 527–30, 210 S.W.3d 28, 33–37 (2005) (Hannah,
C.J., dissenting); see also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 161–163,
189 S.W.3d 1, 17–18 (2004) (Hannah, J., concurring); Lake View, 351 Ark. at 100–08, 91
S.W.3d at 513–18 (Hannah, J., concurring). Moreover, Chief Justice Hannah himself has
rejected the core authority relied on by the Lake View cases to justify the judiciary’s involvement in the development of an appropriate educational system, namely, that the Arkansas Constitution’s provision designating “the State” as responsible for providing a constitutionally appropriate educational system somehow permits the judiciary to act in any way
other than the judiciary’s traditional role of reviewing the actions of the other branches in the
context of a specific case challenging the actions of the other branches. See, e.g., Lake View,
364 Ark. at 420–27, 220 S.W.3d at 660–65 (Hannah, C.J., dissenting).
282. Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1993).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 323; see also Martha Matthews, Stunning Victory for Arkansas Children, 13:2
YOUTH L. NEWS, March/April 1992, available at http://www.parentsinaction.net/english/
ClassActions/ARK92.pdf.
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Just as with Lake View, however, the Arkansas judiciary’s role in childwelfare proceedings involves a fundamentally different assertion of authority than the authority relied on in the Angela R. line of cases that simply provides no applicable basis to sanction Shelby-style orders. Even if one accepts the Shelby Doctrine’s authority arguendo, the Arkansas judiciary’s
role in child-welfare proceedings lacks the federal-law nexus relied on in
Angela R. because the Arkansas judiciary’s role is entirely based on the statutory and constitutional law of Arkansas.285 Likewise, the Shelby Doctrine
lacks the adoption of any statutory authority or enforcement mechanism that
allows for the enforcement of the “comprehensive revision of the childwelfare system” at issue as a consent decree in Angela R.286 Federal courts
have further recognized that federal courts should refrain from micromanaging state agencies and involving themselves in purely state law issues.287
For these reasons, the Inherent Protection Power should not be interpreted as creating a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity
because the judiciary holds only a statutory role in child-welfare proceedings. Circuit courts therefore lack a constitutionally sufficient role in childwelfare proceedings sufficient to overcome a constitutional-level barrier
such as the Department’s sovereign immunity and are, therefore, precluded
from entering Shelby-style orders that seek to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arkansas’s child-welfare system is complicated and messy. As Justice
Darrell Hickman observed, “[j]uveniles in trouble are one of the most serious concerns for our society, our government, and our judicial system.
There are rarely quick, easy, clear answers in juvenile matters.”288 To make
matters worse, nearly every resource in the child-welfare system—both nationally and in Arkansas—is at its limit. In Arkansas’s 2013 state fiscal year,
for example, there were only 1,193 foster homes available in the entire state

285. Angela R., 999 F.2d at 322; see also discussion supra Part III.A.
286. Angela R., 999 F.2d at 322, 325.
287. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The courts,
of course, should refrain from micromanaging the state and its agencies.”); Roe v. Crawford,
514 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[F]ederal courts must be constantly mindful of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State
administration of its own law.”); Elizabeth v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2006);
Miener ex rel. Miener v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“[F]ederal courts have little interest in enforcing contractual agreements involving only state
law issues.”).
288. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 54, 722 S.W.2d 558, 565
(1987) (Hickman, J., concurring).
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for the 7,700 juveniles who were in foster care during that time.289 Likewise,
hundreds of caseworkers consistently struggle with caseloads well above
recommended levels290 while being tasked with investigating 36,206 allegations of child maltreatment and ensuring the safety and well being of more
than 10,000 juveniles every month on an annual budget of only $47.5 million.
It is therefore little wonder that courts around the state become frustrated with the Department’s performance and look to see what they can do to
help. And that is exactly what Judge Brown, an experienced juvenile judge,
was attempting to do when he ordered the Department to fix the high caseload issue that was preventing a caseworker from providing the services
required in her case. Not surprisingly, all but one member of the majority in
Shelby also had judicial experience in child-welfare proceedings as a juvenile judge or chancery judge and were likely familiar with the service and
performance issues that arise in child-welfare proceedings and the resource
limitations that Judge Brown was attempting to address.291
But the Shelby Doctrine is not the solution. As this article has argued,
the Shelby Doctrine is unconstitutional because it asserts that circuit courts
have jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the General Assembly has not
provided by law, assumes authority outside the limited jurisdiction provided
to courts in child-welfare proceedings under the juvenile code, and relies on
a court’s equitable jurisdiction and “inherent authority” to authorize circuit
courts to control the Department’s internal operations without the benefit of
any recognized exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity.
289. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., 2013 STATISTICAL REPORT DCFS-13, DCFS-28
(2014).
290. DIV. OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE REPORT 3RD
QUARTER SFY 2014 28 (2014) (“DCFS 3RD QUARTER REPORT”). The average caseload for
caseworkers in Arkansas is above twenty-five cases per caseworker—with some counties
averaging as many as eighty cases per caseworker, which is well above the twelve to seventeen cases recommended by national child-welfare organizations and existing research. See
generally id.; CHILDREN & FAMILY RESEARCH CENTER, CASELOAD SIZE IN BEST PRACTICE
LITERATURE REVIEW 1–4 (2002); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS OF
EXCELLENCE FOR CHILD WELFARE SERVICES (1999); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA,
STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR FAMILY FOSTER CARE SERVICES (1995).
291. Chief Justice Hannah, for example, was a juvenile judge from 1976 to 1978 and a
chancery/probate judge from 1979 to 1999. Chief Justice Jim Hannah, ARKANSAS JUDICIARY,
https://courts.arkansas.gov/courts/supreme-court/justices/chief-justice-jim-hannah (last visited May 31, 2015). Justice Karen Baker was a juvenile judge from 1995 to 1996 and a circuit/chancery judge from 1997 to 2000. Associate Justice Karen R. Baker, Position 6,
ARKANSAS JUDICIARY, https://courts.arkansas.gov/courts/supreme-court/justices/associate-jus
tice-karen-r-baker-position-6 (last visited August 26, 2015). From the information provided
on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s website, it is not clear whether any member of the dissent
has direct trial court experience in child-welfare proceedings. Likewise, Justice Jim Gunter
was a chancellor from 1983 to 1991 and a circuit/chancery judge from 1991 to 1999. Jim
Gunter, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Jim_Gunter (last visited May 31, 2015).
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The Shelby Doctrine is also symptomatic of the judiciary’s increasingly
unconstitutional role in child-welfare proceedings. Although numerous appellate decisions recognize the limitations that the juvenile code imposes on
the authority of circuit courts to act in child-welfare proceedings, the judiciary as a whole certainly believes it has a role in the development of an appropriate child-welfare system,292 and juvenile judges around the state frequently invoke the “best interests of the child” as a basis for broad authority
to make orders and complex social-work decisions in child-welfare proceedings—often regardless of the juvenile code.
These courts, however, lack the constitutional and subject-matter competency to assume such a role because Arkansas law provides that the Department is the state actor charged with providing social work and developing case plans in child-welfare proceedings. Circuit courts are effectively
limited to determining if a juvenile is dependent-neglected or otherwise in
need of services under the juvenile code and, if so, then ordering limited
“family services” based on the recommendations of the Department and
other service providers.293 The only supervisory role that courts have under
the juvenile code is to determine whether the Department’s social work efforts have been reasonable and ensure the Department does what the juvenile code requires.
The Arkansas Supreme Court must, therefore, repudiate the Shelby
Doctrine because until it does so, the Shelby Doctrine will stand for the
proposition that the judiciary can direct a state agency to comply with a given court’s determination of what that agency’s staffing, internal operations,
or services should be. And given the Shelby Doctrine’s expansion of a
court’s “inherent authority” and the Edmark line of cases, there is no reasoned basis why some form of the Shelby Doctrine could not be applied in
other types of cases involving other state agencies. The child-welfare system
may be only another step for the judiciary’s increasing role in public policy.

292. The Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, has created a number of committees and
commissions to assess and make recommendations related to the child-welfare system, including the Arkansas Supreme Court Commission on Children, Youth, and Families, see In
Re Creation of the Ark. Supreme Court Comm’n on Children, Youth and Families, 2011 Ark.
545, and the Arkansas Supreme Court ad hoc Committee on Foster Care and Adoption Assessment, see In re Ark. Supreme Court Ad Hoc Comm. on Foster Care & Adoption Assessment, 319 Ark. 835 (1995). Indeed, the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), the administrative arm of the Arkansas judiciary, has a Juvenile Division that runs the parent counsel, attorney ad litem, and CASA programs. ARKANSAS JUVENILE DIVISION OF THE COURTS,
http://www.arjdc.org (last visited August 25, 2015). Ironically, the AOC’s Juvenile Division
was created by statute. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-401 (Supp. 2013).
293. But see Boyer, supra note 127, at 383–86 (“[U]ltimate responsibility should rest
with the juvenile court for determining when deference to administrative decisionmaking is
appropriate.”).

